Simon Jantschgi is named Rising Star in Market Design
The University of Tokyo Market Design Center names Simon Jantschgi (UZH), Fernando Ochoa (New York University), and Andrew Koh (MIT) as Rising Stars in Market Design.
The three young researchers hold workshops in English about their topic of interest on Monday, December 1st. Attendance is free of charge but pre-registration is required. The deadline for the pre-registration ends on Thursday, November 27th 4:00 pm CET (Switzerland) / Friday, November 28th, 12:00 pm (Japan Time).
More information and the possibility to pre-register for the workshops are on the University of Tokyo Market Design Center's website about the event.
Workshop by Simon Jantschgi (University of Zurich)
Competitive Combinatorial Exchange
9:00 am Japan Time / 1:00 am CET (Switzerland)
Many essential resources cannot be traded for money — such as humanitarian supplies, donated organs, time-bank volunteering, or school and shift schedules. These must be exchanged directly, and designing fair and efficient rules for doing so is extremely difficult, especially when participants demand bundles of items rather than individual goods.
Simon’s research on market design, joint work with Alex Teytelboym (University of Oxford) and Thanh Nguyen (Purdue University), introduces the first mechanism that works on the full preference domain of combinatorial exchanges, without restricting what bundles people are allowed to exchange. The mechanism recovers competitive equilibrium without payments by using internal shadow prices, ensuring allocations that are efficient, individually rational, and fair ex-ante and ex-post. Their mechanism BRACE (Budget-Relaxed Approximate Competitive Equilibrium) provides a practical foundation for improving real-world (re)allocation systems in humanitarian aid, refugee resettlement, food banks, shift scheduling, organ exchange, and student course allocation.
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