



ELSEVIER

Available online at www.sciencedirect.com

SCIENCE @ DIRECT®

Poetics 32 (2004) 439–461

POETICS

www.elsevier.com/locate/poetic

The changing impact of social background on lifestyle: “culturalization” instead of individualization?

Koen van Eijck*, Bertine Bargeman

*Department of Social Cultural Sciences, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153,
5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands*

Abstract

In this study, a number of hypotheses on the changing effects of social background on cultural consumption and other leisure activities were tested. Based on notions regarding the waning of traditional cultural hierarchies, a decrease in the effects of age, gender, education, income, religion, and political party preference on popular cultural activities was expected. The second hypothesis, inspired by the notion of the elitist rearguard, predicted increasing effects of age and education on highbrow culture. Third, based on the alleged culturalization of lifestyles, it was hypothesized that social categorizations based on cultural socialization (education, age) had become more relevant overall lifestyle predictors, whereas categorizations based on economic resources (income) were losing their impact. Finally, the secularization hypothesis predicted overall diminishing effects of religion. The analyses, based on data on 12,478 Dutch respondents gathered between 1980 and 2000, largely confirmed the second and third hypothesis. There were no signs of a general decline in the impact of social background, with some exceptions for gender and income. The effects of education and age often became larger, corroborating the idea that socialization has become a more important determinant of lifestyles. The impact of financial barriers and gender roles seems to have become somewhat less influential. Religion and political preference have mostly stable effects.

© 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

* Corresponding author. Tel.: +31 13 466 3386; fax: +31 13 466 2003.
E-mail address: C.J.M.vEijck@uvt.nl (K. van Eijck).

1. Introduction

According to a number of scholars, we are witnessing a decline in the impact of class on people's identity (Featherstone, 1991; Lash, 1994). Instead, identity is argued to be increasingly based on consumption patterns or a person's lifestyle which, in turn, is thought to be less closely related to class (Bauman, 1998, pp. 26–30). This shift is typically described in terms such as ambivalence, ambiguity, flux, or fragmentation (e.g., Bauman, 1991, 1996; Connor, 1997). The fragmentation of identities and lifestyles, as well as the supposed disappearance of their relation to class background, has been related to a number of potential causes. Examples are people's increasing exposure to mass media (Kellner, 1995), the ongoing professionalisation and functional differentiation of the labor market (Beck, 1992; Sennett, 1998), the increasing fluidity, flexibility, and virtuality of social networks (Maffesoli, 1992; Rifkin, 2000), and capitalism's need for the highest possible turn-over rate of its consumer goods (Harvey, 1990; see also Waldman, 1993). In short, modernity *is* change and all these trends, it is contended, gnaw at traditional social structures, leaving individuals with little but an increasing preoccupation with themselves, which is thought to result in a growing importance and diversification of lifestyles (Zablocki and Kanter, 1976).

Notwithstanding the vast number of eminent scholars arguing along these lines, empirical studies do not point towards the disappearance of social structures. People can still be understood best if we regard them as social beings rather than isolated individuals. Social categories, when turned into variables, still explain a substantial part of their behavior and ideas. In that sense, class analysis still 'works' and therefore "social class is an obstinate concept that refuses to make a dignified exit from the social scientific agenda" (Savage, 1995, pp. 15–16).

Nevertheless, it does seem that traditional boundaries and restrictions are increasingly contested, not only in the minds of postmodernist intellectuals, but also through people's everyday activities. Leisure pursuits that used to have a firm base in the higher status groups have become available to people from various backgrounds, while popular culture is increasingly engaged in by members from the upper classes (e.g., Peterson and Kern, 1996). But do such trends actually imply a *diminishing* of the relevance of people's income, age, gender, or education? The question addressed in this study was whether the impact of socio-demographic characteristics on cultural and other leisure activities is indeed declining.

We did not find much evidence of socio-cultural fragmentation, but rather a process of realignment. The subjective experiences of individualization and independence of traditional boundaries are too evident to be missed, even by quantitative survey techniques. But the lack of empirical evidence for fragmentation in turn suggests that some of these demographics must still be very important, if not increasingly so.

2. Theoretical background

2.1. Evaporation or realignment?

To some extent, the idea that the impact of socio-demographic characteristics is diminishing stems from the recognition by social theorists that the role of consumption in

social life is increasing. There are several versions of this account. At one extreme, Baudrillard (1998) claims that identities are essentially the product of signs that we appropriate. He denounces ‘the end of the social.’ Lodziak (2002, pp. 117–118), taking the opposite materialist perspective, also recognizes an increasing stylization of life, but holds that this is not so much a result of people’s playful manipulation of symbolic meanings, but rather reflects the fact that ‘the fashionable’ is increasingly built into products that people need. As consumers often have no alternative but to buy the latest fashionable product because nothing else is available, basic survival costs are actually escalating because companies keep looking for novel ways of making profits in saturated markets. In many cases, he argues, style is forced onto people rather than chosen. Lodziak claims that taste is still strongly related to social class, if only because less well-to-do groups cannot afford to think about taste.

Similarly, Bourdieu (1984) acknowledges that for large groups there is only “the choice of the necessary,” as the seventh chapter of *Distinction* is titled. But, for others, consumption is indeed becoming the main site for identity formation. Bourdieu states (1984, p. 310): “The new logic of the economy rejects the ascetic ethic of production and accumulation, based on abstinence, sobriety, saving and calculation, in favor of a hedonistic morality of consumption, based on credit, spending, and enjoyment. This economy demands a social world which judges people by their capacity for consumption, their ‘standard of living’, their lifestyle, as much as by their capacity for production.” Although consumption is perhaps the main site of identity formation for these groups (the new *petite bourgeoisie*), Bourdieu claims that those who engage in this type of consumerism do so in order to legitimize their non-traditional labor market position and because it yields the most favorable returns on their material, cultural, and social resources.

Featherstone (1991) also claims that hedonistic, postmodern lifestyles are still related to class position, albeit less clearly than during the modern era. He claims that “. . . references to the ‘end of the social’, ‘the end of normativity’, ‘the end of the intellectuals’, ‘the end of the avant-garde’ and general ‘fin de millennium’ pathos which are often linked to postmodernism, may then not indicate an abandonment of all the old frames, but rather the development of more flexible modes of classification. A new frame which entails a more flexible generative structure within which a wider range of differences can be recognized and tolerated” (Featherstone, 1991, p. 145). Featherstone speaks of the development of a more flexible habitus. This implies a looser link between socioeconomic background and taste because, according to Bourdieu’s (1984, p. 170) definition, the habitus mediates between socioeconomic background and lifestyle.

Why would the habitus become more flexible? Beck (1992) provides one answer when he states that the increasing prosperity witnessed since the 1960s allowed more and more people to afford luxury consumer goods and enjoy their leisure according to their own preferences. If conditions of existence allow for more lifestyle options, it might be argued that the habitus, mediating between the two, becomes less determined by material conditions (i.e., scarcity). But conditions of existence also encompass cultural elements whose impact does not necessarily decrease as well. In itself, the fact that ever more commodities or leisure activities come within people’s reach does not turn them into detached loners in pursuit of meaning. Warde (1997, pp. 2–3), criticizing postmodern notions of identity and lifestyle, puts it as follows: “While accepting that selection among

the ever-expanding range of commodities is a complex and skilled task, I find it a less individualized process. Strategies for dealing with the diversity of goods include drawing upon deeply seated social dispositions and the advice of experts.” Having more options and more resources as a consumer does not imply that one no longer cares about the opinions of relevant others (cf. Giddens, 1994). Choices are still restricted and thus predictable, even if they are affected by other dispositions.

2.2. *The cultural omnivore*

The emergence of the cultural omnivore, first noted by Peterson and Simkus in 1992, offers a more empirical view on the changing lifestyle consequences of social background. The rise of the omnivore has been linked to the changing labor market conditions touched upon in the first section (see DiMaggio, 1991), social mobility (Van Eijck, 1999), the waning belief in the moral superiority of classical Western culture (Peterson, 1997), or the increasing prevalence of media and pop culture (Peterson and Kern, 1996). According to Peterson and Kern (1996), American highbrows became more omnivorous in their musical taste between 1982 and 1992. This suggests that the appreciation of popular music has become more widespread, seeping up towards the higher status groups. For the Netherlands, Van Eijck (2001) found that musical omnivores tend to be highly educated and younger than the average highbrow snob. Similarly, Van Eijck and van Rees (2000) found that the group of Dutch media omnivores increased and became more highly educated between 1975 and 1995. Popular culture might therefore indeed be less closely related to lower status.

This weakening of background effects need not occur for highbrow culture as well. In the Netherlands, but also in the US (see DiMaggio and Mukhtar, 2004), arts attendance has declined, most steeply among the younger members of the higher status groups (Van Eijck et al., 2002). This makes the audience for specific, declining art forms more rather than less select in terms of their social background. For reading or classical concert attendance, for instance, we can at least expect increasing age effects because the audiences are clearly becoming older.

With regard to schooling effects, Kraaykamp (1996) found mostly signs of increasing openness, i.e., a diminishing impact of educational level between 1975 and 1990 for volunteering, watching TV, and reading books. No such interaction effects were found for attending sports events, cultural participation in general, going to bars and discotheques, or reading newspapers. Nevertheless, the idea that the arts audience increasingly consists of an elitist rearguard (Knulst, 1992) suggests increasing selectivity with regard to schooling as well. People with lower levels of education, who were already less frequent arts participants, have more readily substituted performing arts attendance or reading for, for example, TV than the more highly educated, who had more to lose by such a substitution because they had invested more in their cultural skills. Today, highbrow participation, whether or not combined with popular culture, is still typical of the higher status groups. According to Emmison (2003, p. 227), “. . .inclusive cultural competence [. . .] remain[s] a restricted commodity, largely the preserve of the professional and managerial knowledge classes.” It seems that knowledge or education is a more relevant determinant of (omnivorous) cultural taste patterns than income or other economic resources (see also Van

Eijck, 2001). Just as Lodziak claims that a great concern with style and commodities is only possible when material resources are abundant, so it can be argued that one needs ample cultural resources to engage in a broad range of cultural activities and thus to savor all that is available. Perhaps this is even increasingly the case.

2.3. *Is culture becoming more important?*

From the above, it can be inferred that material conditions are likely to have a diminishing effect on lifestyles, but the same is not necessarily true for cultural conditions. Terms like knowledge classes (e.g., Emmison, 2003), the brainy class (Brooks, 2000), the information age (Castells, 2000), or the information society (Webster, 2002) actually suggest that social structure is in large part shaped by differences in (access to) knowledge. Although such concepts are not immediately useful as analytic tools, their emergence does signal “. . . that not only is there a very great deal more information about than ever before, but also that it plays a central and strategic role in pretty well everything we do, from business transactions, leisure pursuits, to government activities” (Webster, 2002, p. 263). If indeed both a person’s occupational status and his leisure preferences are increasingly tied up with information or knowledge, functioning as a type of capital in the Bourdieuan sense, it may be expected that intellectual or cultural skills become increasingly important determinants of people’s cultural and leisure pursuits.

Another, albeit related, reason why culture might come to matter more as a determinant of taste and leisure activities has to do with the shift from external to internal regulation of behavior (cf. Elias, 1982). Following Foucault, Elchardus (2002) states that traditions, explicit regulations, external authority, and the disciplining function of scarcity have become less important for the regulation of people’s behavior. People are, more than ever, expected to make choices. However, the increasing freedom to choose is paralleled by increasingly advanced attempts of social institutions to determine the decision-making process from inside, through the ‘soft tissue of the brain’. The most important institutions affecting the choices people make by socializing them in a certain manner are the educational system and the mass media. Both have become much more prominent during the last decades, in the sense that people are much more exposed to – and thus affected by – them. Elchardus states that, as a result, we do not witness the emergence of the *homo optionis*, but rather of an individual through whom beliefs, attitudes, and emotions are disseminated by means of socialization and subtle manipulation. This line of reasoning also leads to the expectation that cultural socialization will become more relevant at the cost of the disciplining function of scarcity, i.e., material resources.

The abovementioned arguments lead us to expect an increasing impact of education. In addition, age will remain an important taste determinant as well. People who share relevant socializing experiences and are in the target audience for the same mass media and advertising products will be more similar to one another than to members from different cohorts. This is not to say that age is among the ‘softer’ social categories, but rather that people from the same cohort have been socialized under comparable circumstances. This will probably make them more similar culturally than economically during the rest of their lives. Money, on the other hand, is thought to become less relevant as the effects of

economic deprivation are waning due to increasing affluence. As far as gender is concerned, we expect a diminishing effect over time because traditional gender role prescriptions are losing cogency as well.

3. Hypotheses

Our first hypothesis is infused by the omnivore thesis. Popular cultural activities are increasingly viable leisure options for the higher status groups. If popular culture is moving up, if snobbism no longer yields wide esteem, popular cultural participation will become increasingly hard to predict by any background characteristic. But this is not true for highbrow culture, which is still the domain of the more highly educated and also still seems to require cultural capital to be enjoyed. After all, cultural omnivores are mostly found in the upper classes (e.g., Peterson and Kern, 1996). We therefore did not expect that “anyone increasingly likes anything”, but rather that the appreciation of popular culture only is becoming more widespread. Thus, our first hypothesis, called the *popular culture diffusion hypothesis*, is as follows:

Hypothesis 1. All background effects on popular cultural practices and other (non-highbrow) leisure activities are diminishing.

For highbrow culture, we did not expect a weakening of background effects. We have argued above that the audience for most highbrow art forms is becoming more rather than less select in terms of age. The relation between education and highbrow participation is probably increasing among older generations (elitist rearguard). However, given the fact that highbrow participation is becoming rather rare among younger generations, it is becoming more difficult to predict arts participation of the members from younger cohorts on the basis of their level of education (Van Eijck, 1999). This diminishing arts participation among more highly educated members of the younger cohorts was controlled for by including age in our models. Therefore, our second hypothesis, called the *highbrow rearguard hypothesis*, is as follows:

Hypothesis 2. The effects of age and education on highbrow cultural participation are increasing.

The idea that cultural resources are of growing importance while economic resources are losing part of their relevance suggests changes that are partly overlapping with the abovementioned hypotheses, but sufficiently different to merit a third, alternative hypothesis. In our analysis, we assessed (changes in) the effects of four socio-demographic indicators (gender, age, education, and income) and the effects of two additional indicators of people’s values (religion and political party preference). If the ideas of, for example, Elchardus (2002) hold true, we would expect potential sources of material scarcity or traditional regulations to lose relevance. Characteristics that are largely affected by, or indicative of, cultural socialization are, on the other hand, expected to gain importance. Thus, as argued above, education and age would become more important determinants of all cultural and leisure behaviors studied. Effects of income would diminish.

These expectations are in line with earlier findings by Van Eijck (1997) regarding the changing impact of family background on siblings' cultural participation. It was found that the total family impact remained stable, but that this stability was the result of a shrinking impact of paternal job status and a growing impact of maternal education. This suggests that, also with respect to family background, socio-economic indicators are losing impact on people's lifestyles in favor of more cultural characteristics. Hence, our third hypothesis, called the *culturalization*¹*hypothesis*:

Hypothesis 3. The effects of age and education are increasing for all lifestyle indicators, and the effects of income are decreasing.

For religious and political preferences, it is more difficult to come up with hypotheses, although we do know they are important determinants of cultural and leisure participation. DiMaggio (1996) found that art museum visitors were, among other things, more secular and politically liberal than comparable non-visitors. Van Rees and Van Eijck (2003) found that media preferences correlate significantly with religion and political interest. Bryson (1996) found a positive relation between political tolerance and musical tolerance, and also effects of religious background on the preference for a number of musical genres (Bryson, 1997). Understanding secularization as the decline in religious authority rather than in religion per sé (Chaves, 1994), it can be hypothesized that the impact of religion on an individual's lifestyle has diminished in the last few decades. Traditional moral regulations are becoming less binding, or at least people tend to refer to them less explicitly when dealing with moral dilemmas (Thompson and Sharma, 1998). Because religion is increasingly an optional socializing institution, we did not expect the impact of religious socialization was becoming more relevant. The culturalization thesis might elicit this expectation, but (Christian) religion is clearly losing ground in the Netherlands, while education and media are becoming more prevalent. Therefore, our fourth hypothesis (*secularization hypothesis*) is:

Hypothesis 4. The effects of religion are decreasing for all cultural and leisure activities studied.

Regarding the impact of political preference, we were less confident about what changes to expect. Like religion, political preference may function as a moral guideline and lose its effectiveness as well. But unlike religion, for which the typical options are to either hold on to the faith you have grown up with or leave the church, political preference is more often a fluctuating preference of the individual that does not develop before adolescence. This makes political preference itself a subject of choice, even an increasingly unstable one over the life course (Need, 1997), which may thus periodically align with other interests and preferences, including leisure behavior. This might result in an increasingly close relation

¹ Here, the term refers to a growing importance of cultural attributes, but it has also been used in social psychology, where it indicates the socialization process through which people acquire their social personalities by means of interaction with their specific cultural, institutional context (Kantor, 1929: 265–266). This interpretation also fits with the meaning we suggest in the sense that the process by – and institutions through – which individuals are culturalized is becoming more important for understanding social differentiation within societies.

between politics, on the one hand, and cultural lifestyle, on the other. On balance, we do not have a clue regarding potential changes in the effect of political preference.

4. Data and method

In order to test our hypotheses, we used a data set containing five waves of the Dutch Time Budget Studies (TBS). The TBS has been repeated every 5 years since 1975 among a sample of the Dutch population aged 12 and over. Regarding the variables that are relevant for our current research questions, data gathered since 1980 provide comparable information across the waves. Furthermore, we selected only respondents aged between 18 and 70. This resulted in a total sample of 12,478 respondents.² Each respondent filled out two questionnaires and a diary. The diary, sandwiched between the two in-home interviews, covered seven consecutive twenty-four hour periods. For each quarter of an hour, respondents were asked to indicate their activity by means of pre-coded categories. Data were weighted for degree of urbanization, gender, age, number of persons in the household, and profession, resulting in a representative sample of the Dutch population for each wave.

We used a list of 13 dependent variables tapping cultural and other leisure participation activities. Five of these stem from the diary because they are activities undertaken often enough to be assessed reliably within a one-week period. The others are taken from the surveys. For the purpose of presentation, we have divided our 13 dependent variables into three – admittedly neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive – categories:

Popular culture	Number of visits to discotheque per year Number of visits to cinema per year Number of visits to cafés or bars per year Membership of sports club (no or yes)
Highbrow culture	Number of plays or concerts attended per year Number of museum visits per year Reading (hours spent reading books, newspapers, and magazines during diary week)
Other leisure	Number of parties attended per year Number of restaurant visits per year Civic participation (hours spent on volunteering for associations, clubs, or church during diary week) Social contacts (hours spent visiting, or having visitors, chatting, and talking on the phone during diary week)

² Respondents are divided over the waves as follows: 1980 = 2302, 1985 = 2808, 1990 = 1979, 1995 = 2836, 2000 = 1552.

Going out (total hours spent on attending events and sports games, restaurants, cinema, bars, parties, performing arts during diary week)

Media use (hours spent listening to radio, records, tapes or cd's, and watching TV during diary week)

The independent variables we used were gender, age, educational level, net monthly household income, religion, and political preference. Gender was coded 1 = male and 2 = female. Age was a continuous variable, measured in single years. Education was measured as the highest level completed (diploma) or level of current enrollment, using six categories. Income was also measured using six pre-coded categories. Because both schooling level and income rose significantly between 1980 and 2000,³ we corrected for this trend by dividing each respondent's score on these variables by the mean score for the sample of the year to which the respondent belonged. Thus, our income and education variables represent *relative* income and *relative* education within each measurement wave. Religion was measured using only two categories: not religious versus any religion. Finally, political preference was measured by ordering respondents' political party preferences on a six-point scale ranging from the most right-wing to the most left-wing parties in present Dutch politics. Since a number of relatively small parties at the extremes of the scale were established, disappeared, or merged during the period under investigation, we assembled the relevant smaller right-wing parties in the lowest category and the smaller left-wing parties in the upper one. These categories thus contained different, albeit interchangeable, political parties across the measurement waves.

In order to test our hypotheses, we used OLS regression analysis with interaction effects. For each independent variable, the initial model contained interaction terms of 'year of measurement', consisting of five categories, with all six independent variables. Insignificant interaction terms were removed from the model one by one, starting with the smallest effects, in order to come up with the best interpretable final model for each dependent variable. For 'membership of sports club' we used binary logistic regression because this variable was dichotomous. The other dependent variables are either coded in hours or times per year, which we constructed from the original answering categories from the diary and the survey, respectively.

5. Results

5.1. Participation rates

Before we estimate changes in the effects of socio-demographic background and values, we will first look at the mean participation rates per year for the thirteen dependent variables. Table 1 lists the results. It can be seen that significant variation across years was

³ Mean level of education went up from 2.63 in 1980 to 3.79 in 2000. Mean income scores rose from 2.92 in 1980 to 4.14 in 2000. The inclusion of year of measurement in our models largely corrects for these trends, but non-linearity in the increases of schooling levels and incomes might still cause bias in our interaction effects.

Table 1
Means for popular and highbrow culture and other leisure per year

Year	Popular culture				Highbrow culture			Other leisure					
	Disco per year	Cinema per year	Bar, café per year	Member sports club	Play, concert per year	Museum per year	Reading time per week	Parties per year	Restaurants per year	Social part per week	Social cont per week	Going out per week	Media per week
1980	2.43	2.14	8.51	0.26	1.38	1.52	5.77	7.54	6.09	2.49	11.73	4.81	11.55
1985	3.52	2.12	10.35	0.27	1.56	1.94	5.41	9.05	6.25	2.76	10.50	5.56	12.94
1990	3.68	2.23	11.61	0.30	1.66	2.08	5.15	8.74	7.37	2.68	10.19	5.73	12.74
1995	3.97	2.50	13.54	0.29	2.18	2.09	4.59	8.72	7.74	2.76	9.62	6.26	12.68
2000	2.85	2.52	15.51	0.27	2.05	2.06	3.78	8.67	7.92	2.15	8.67	6.33	12.48
<i>F</i> -test	10.91 ^{***}	2.96 [*]	72.67 ^{***}	3.66 ^{**}	14.69 ^{***}	6.68 ^{***}	58.75 ^{***}	8.19 ^{***}	18.97 ^{***}	4.49 ^{**}	58.51 ^{***}	22.62 ^{***}	9.21 ^{***}

* Significant at $p < 0.05$ level.

** Significant at $p < 0.01$ level.

*** Significant at $p < 0.001$ level.

found for all variables. For the popular culture items, we see an increase in participation rates over time up to 1995. Between 1995 and 2000, visits to the disco and sports club membership dropped somewhat, whereas going to the cinema increased only marginally. Frequenting bars and cafes held on to its impressive growth rate since 1980; the average number of yearly visits nearly doubled in just two decades.

Regarding highbrow culture, we see an increase for plays and concerts until 1995, but then it drops off slightly to an average of 2.05 per year, which is still more than before 1995. Museums show a relatively constant rate since 1990. Between 1980 and 1990, the number of museum tickets sold rose 40% (Ministry of Welfare, Health and Cultural Affairs, 1994). Today, museums seem to be doing better than most other types of highbrow culture in the Netherlands. The number of museum visitors has grown, but they increasingly constitute an audience of occasional passers-by rather than enthusiasts. The audience for reading matter is definitely shrinking. Between 1980 and 2000, average reading time declined by two hours per week. This trend has been observed consistently during the last decades (e.g., Knulst and Kraaykamp, 1998).

For the six activities assigned to the ‘other leisure’ category, we see a number of familiar trends as well. Civic participation per week declined seriously after 1995 but shows no clear trend between 1985 and 1995 (see also Knulst and van Eijck, 2002 on volunteering in the Netherlands). The time spent on social contacts per week declined from almost twelve hours in 1980 to just over eight and a half in 2000. Going out increased since 1980 while media use went up rapidly during the early 1980s and declined slowly since 1985. Going to parties peaked in 1985 and hardly changed after 1990. Number of restaurant visits per year and hours going out per week both increased during the entire period under investigation.

5.2. Trends in the impact of background variables

5.2.1. Popular culture

We will now look at the trends in background effects. The trends for popular culture are shown in Table 2. Interaction terms are in the lower part of the table. Non-significant interactions that were removed are shown as “n.s.”. The main effects of variables that do not interact with year of measurement can be interpreted straightforwardly. The main effects of variables that interact significantly with year in fact represent the effect for the lowest category of the variable ‘year’, i.e., 1980. The interaction effects reflect changes in the 1980 effect of these variables per measurement wave. For example, if we look at yearly disco visits in Table 2, we see a significant age effect of -0.056 . Because the lower half of the table shows a significant interaction effect of age with year, this -0.056 effect represents the situation in 1980. In 1985, the age effect increased -0.032 to -0.088 . In 1990, another -0.032 was added and we get a negative effect of -0.120 . Subsequently, it was -0.152 in 1995 and -0.184 in 2000. Thus, the negative effect of age on number of disco visits per year increased significantly, from -0.056 to -0.184 , between 1980 and 2000.

The other significant interaction effect on disco visits pertains to income. The initial positive income effect of 2.360 changed by 1.307 per wave and thus reversed to -2.868 in 2000. The effects of the other independent variables were either non-significant (religion and political preference) or stable (a negative gender effect and a positive effect of

education) during the full span of waves. Because the main effects of year are affected by each interaction term, these will not be discussed (trends in participation rates were already presented in Table 1).

Appendix A lists the means for each of the independent variables for respondents who belong to the participants in each of the activities measured by the dependent variables. For each dependent variable, we dichotomized participation, trying to approximate a 50–50 distribution as closely as possible (the variable descriptions in Appendix A include the cut-off point), and calculated means for each of the independent variables. By comparing these results to the regression effects, it can be seen to what extent interaction effects actually represent changes in the composition of the group of participants per activity. For instance, the significant increase in the age effect on number of yearly disco visits corresponds to the (non-linearly) increasing difference between the mean age of the sample and the mean age of disco attendants from (41.42 – 29.32 = 11.10) years in 1980 to (42.56 – 27.59 = 14.97) years in 2000. Similarly, the mean income for disco was 0.02 above the sample mean in 1980 and 0.04 below it in 2000. Such parallels between the multivariate regression effects and the bivariate descriptives in Appendix A certainly do not appear as a rule. The regression effects were controlled for the other independent variables and the estimates, including the interaction effect, are linear, which is of course a simplification. This also means that our extrapolations of the main effects on the basis of the interaction terms are at best an approximation of the main effects that would be found by calculating them independently per year.

Table 2 further shows that the yearly rate of cinema attendance was higher for people who are younger, not religious, and politically left-wing. Both being non-religious and

Table 2
Regression of popular culture participation on social background

	Disco per year		Cinema per year		Bar or café per year		Member sports club ^a	
	<i>B</i>	Beta	<i>B</i>	Beta	<i>B</i>	Beta	<i>B</i>	Exp(<i>B</i>)
Gender	-1.315***	-0.083	-0.091	-0.009	-4.689***	-0.166	-0.176**	0.838
Age	-0.056**	-0.102	-0.089***	-0.246	-0.254***	-0.260	-0.062***	0.940
Education	0.491*	0.028	0.762	0.066	0.929**	0.030	-0.090	0.914
Income	2.360***	0.113	-0.002	-0.000	0.848	0.023	0.539***	1.714
Religion	-0.172	-0.011	-0.698***	-0.066	1.094	0.039	-0.126*	0.881
Left-wing	-0.034	-0.006	0.352***	0.092	0.355**	0.034	-0.071***	0.931
Year (yr)	3.084***	0.503	0.091	0.022	4.843***	0.442	-0.507***	0.602
Gender*yr	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Age*yr	-0.032***	-0.329	n.s.	n.s.	-0.041***	-0.236	0.010***	1.010
Education*yr	n.s.	n.s.	0.365***	0.150	n.s.	n.s.	0.132**	1.141
Income*yr	-1.307***	-0.314	-0.317*	-0.114	-0.994**	-0.134	n.s.	n.s.
Religion*yr	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-0.622**	-0.093	n.s.	n.s.
Left-wing*yr	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Adj. <i>R</i> ²	13.8%		14.9%		25.7%		7.9% (Nagelkerke <i>R</i> ²)	

^a Logistic regression.

* Significance level: $p \leq 0.05$.

** Significance level: $p \leq 0.01$.

*** Significance level: $p \leq 0.001$.

having a left-wing orientation indicate more liberal cultural values, which is likely to enhance cinema going, with its high ‘risk’ of being confronted with violence, promiscuity, foul language, and other potentially disconcerting matters. Although the 1980 main effect of education is just not significant ($p = 0.06$), it almost triples to 1.857 in 2000. The effect of income, on the other hand, became negative as it went from -0.002 in 1980 to -1.270 in 2000. [Appendix A](#) shows that the first interaction does not indicate increasing schooling levels of cinema visitors. Average income declined from the 1980s to the 1990s.

Females are less likely to go to bars or cafes than are males, and young people are more likely to go than are those who are older. The negative age effect increased significantly from -0.254 in 1980 to -0.418 in 2000. Throughout the 1980–2000 period, schooling level is positively associated with bar attendance. The 1980 income effect is not significant, but does change significantly over time (from 0.848 in 1980 to -3.128 in 2000). Religion shows a similar trend: its 1980 effect (1.094) is non-significant, but during the next two decades it does change significantly to -1.394 . However, both in 1980 and in 2000 the effect of religion is not significant. Finally, people with a left-wing orientation are more likely to go to bars and cafes.

Sports club members are more likely to be male, young, non-religious, and have more right-wing political preferences. Income has a positive impact on membership, which is also reflected in the above-average income levels of sports club members in every year of measurement. There are two significant interaction effects. The negative impact of age largely disappears, going from -0.062 in 1980 to -0.022 in 2000. Indeed, [Appendix A](#) shows that the average sports club member became 6.41 years older, approaching the sample mean. The impact of education increased significantly from -0.090 in 1980 to 0.438 in 2000. The fact that average schooling levels per year did not increase accordingly is probably explained by the increasing age of sports club members, and perhaps also by the fact that the proportion of female members has increased.

The hypothesis that participation in popular culture becomes less dependent on social background cannot be confirmed by our findings. The impact of age increased significantly for disco and bar attendance and decreased only for sports club membership. Schooling effects increased for cinema visiting and sports club membership. Income showed three significantly negative interactions. On the one hand, this means that lack of money decreasingly determines participation in popular culture. On the other hand, the size of the income effect becomes larger for cinema and bar attendance, although the extrapolated effects for 2000 are still relatively modest and [Appendix A](#) does not show increasing selectivity on income either. Finally, the effect of religion reverses from positive to negative for bar attendance, but the resulting effects are not substantial; only the difference between the years is. Thus, the effects of age and education on popular culture consumption on average increased rather than decreased. Other effects showed no noteworthy trends between 1980 and 2000. These findings provide more support for the culturalization hypothesis than the popular culture diffusion hypothesis.

5.2.2. *Highbrow culture*

We will now look at highbrow culture. The interaction effects in [Table 3](#) show that the effects of income, religion, and political orientation on attending plays and concerts, visiting museums, and reading have remained stable, or absent, since 1980. Gender

Table 3
Regression of highbrow cultural participation on social background

	Plays and concerts per year		Museum visits per year		Time spent reading during diary week	
	<i>B</i>	Beta	<i>B</i>	Beta	<i>B</i>	Beta
Gender	0.479***	0.053	0.428***	0.044	-1.306***	-0.146
Age	-0.009	-0.028	-0.044***	-0.131	0.053***	0.172
Education	0.887*	0.090	0.970*	0.091	1.066**	0.108
Income	0.389**	0.033	0.027	0.002	0.165	0.014
Religion	-0.439***	-0.049	-0.338**	-0.035	-0.198	-0.022
Left-wing	0.205***	0.063	0.314***	0.088	0.055	0.017
Year (yr)	-0.488**	-0.140	-1.188***	-0.315	-2.075***	-0.598
Gender [*] yr	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	0.336***	0.210
Age [*] yr	0.008**	0.149	0.021***	0.345	0.020***	0.358
Educ. [*] yr	0.386***	0.186	0.457***	0.203	0.233**	0.112
Income [*] yr	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Relig. [*] yr	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Left-w. [*] yr	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Adj. <i>R</i> ²	6.8%		7.2%		18.2%	

* Significance level: $p \leq 0.05$.

** Significance level: $p \leq 0.01$.

*** Significance level: $p \leq 0.001$.

interacts with year in the model for reading, which means that men and women have become more similar (the negative 1980 gender effect of -1.306 virtually disappears). Especially the reading of novels is an increasingly feminine pastime in the Netherlands because far more men than women have given up doing so (Knulst and Kraaykamp, 1998).

Both age and education interact positively with year for all of the highbrow indicators. For reading, the age effect was already significantly positive in 1980 (0.053), but it increased further to 0.133 in 2000. For plays and concerts, the insignificant effect of -0.009 increased to 0.023 in 2000, whereas for museums we see a reversal of the effect rather than an increase because the 1980 and 2000 effects are of similar absolute size (-0.044 resp. 0.040). The ageing of the highbrow audience is also evident in the Appendix A, although the trend for plays and concerts is U-shaped and diverging only little from the sample means.

Education is becoming more significant for all the highbrow indicators. In all cases, the initial 1980 effects are already significantly positive and they increase substantially: from 0.887 to 2.431 for plays and concerts, from 0.970 to 2.798 for museum visits, and from 1.066 to 1.998 for reading. This does not mean that the average relative schooling level of the highbrow audience has gone up. Since younger generations tend to be less interested in highbrow culture, their leaving the scene is more likely to decrease relative schooling levels of highbrow participants, as Appendix A shows. But within categories of similar age, it is increasingly the more highly educated segments only that show an interest in highbrow culture. Thus, highbrow cultural participation was more strongly affected by age and education in 2000 than it was in 1980. These trends are in line with the rearguard hypothesis, but also with the culturalization hypothesis.

5.2.3. *Other leisure activities*

Further indications of changing background effects on general leisure activities can be found in [Table 4](#). Gender effects are either stable or diminishing. For going out in general, we see that women caught up with men and even surpassed them in 2000, as [Appendix A](#) shows. The gender effect goes down two thirds from -1.278 to -0.418 . A similar, albeit less impressive, trend is present for audiovisual media, where the gender effect declined from -4.011 to -2.503 between 1980 and 2000.

The effect of age only changes for civic participation. It increased from -0.001 to 0.055 , which reflects the ageing of Dutch volunteers. Education shows increasing effects for restaurant visits per year, going out, and media use. Again, [Appendix A](#) does not show increasing selectivity, but it is more and more education that causally determines these activities. The effects are increasingly positive for restaurant visits (from 1.432 to 4.520) and going out (from -0.488 to 1.584) and increasingly negative for media use (from -0.482 to -3.678).

Income effects are either constant (parties, restaurants), disappearing (going out), or increasingly negative (civic participation, social contacts, and media use). For civic participation, the income effect changed from 0.425 to -1.207 . For social contacts, it shifted from -0.223 to -1.675 . The negative income effect on media use went from -0.904 to -2.876 . These are increasing income effects, albeit increasingly negative. They do not indicate a growing relevance of income as a necessary resource. It is rather the other way around: the higher income groups seem to have turned away from these relatively cheap but time-consuming activities.

For going out, the income effect diminished from 1.449 to -0.599 . According to [Appendix A](#), none of these income effects indicate greater or lesser selectivity of the participants in terms of income. For instance, the decreasing income effect on going out does not indicate that people who go out were relatively poorer in 2000 than they were in 1980, but rather that their financial resources were less of a determining factor. Instead, their relative education had a larger positive effect. Since people with a higher education tend to have higher incomes, income levels do not change on balance.

Finally, we found an interaction of year and religion for restaurant visits and an interaction of year with political orientation for social contacts. The effect of religion on restaurant visits changed from 1.144 to -1.620 . Neither of these effects is substantial, but the difference between them is. The effect of a left-wing political orientation on social contacts went down from 0.508 to 0.076 . Yet, overall, the impact of political orientation seems to be substantial as it significantly affected five out of six leisure activities while four of these were stable between 1980 and 2000. People with a left-wing orientation spent more time on social contacts and audiovisual media but less time on civic participation per week, and they went to fewer parties and restaurants per year. The effects of religion were also significant five times, with four stable effects. Being religious positively affected going to parties, civic participation, and time spent on social contacts per week. It had a reverse effect on time spent going out and time spent on audiovisual media. It seems that being religious positively affects social activities in familiar social settings or networks (parties, volunteering, social contacts), which might well be a result of the extensive social networks of people who are church members (e.g., [Maloney, 1999](#)). These effects have not diminished, so our secularization hypothesis has to be rejected.

Table 4
Regression of other leisure activities on social background

	Parties per year		Restaurant visits per year		Time spent on civic participation during diary week		Time spent on social contacts during diary week		Time spent on going out during diary week		Time spent on audiovisual media during diary week	
	<i>B</i>	Beta	<i>B</i>	Beta	<i>B</i>	Beta	<i>B</i>	Beta	<i>B</i>	Beta	<i>B</i>	Beta
Gender	0.010	0.000	-0.666**	-0.035	-0.499***	-0.045	2.593***	0.199	-1.278**	-0.109	-4.011***	-0.278
Age	-0.143***	-0.214	-0.007	-0.011	-0.001	-0.004	0.000	0.001	-0.047***	-0.115	0.120***	0.196
Education	1.421***	0.067	1.432*	0.068	0.670***	0.055	0.608***	0.042	-0.488	-0.035	-0.482	-0.025
Income	0.639*	0.025	2.424***	0.097	0.425	0.029	-0.223	-0.013	1.449*	0.094	-0.904	-0.039
Religion	1.291***	0.067	1.144	0.060	1.794***	0.162	0.503**	0.039	-0.391**	-0.033	-1.643**	-0.093
Left-wing	-0.223*	-0.032	-0.294***	-0.042	-0.265***	-0.065	0.508**	0.107	0.036	0.008	0.608***	0.094
Year (yr)	0.467***	0.062	0.168	0.023	-0.101	-0.024	-0.044	-0.009	0.133	0.029	0.846*	0.123
Gender* yr	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	0.215*	0.103	0.377*	0.119
Age* yr	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	0.014***	0.200	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Education* yr	n.s.	n.s.	0.772***	0.175	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	0.518***	0.191	-0.799***	-0.195
Income* yr	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-0.408**	-0.140	-0.363*	-0.106	-0.512***	-0.166	-0.493*	-0.106
Religion* yr	n.s.	n.s.	-0.691***	-0.153	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Left-wing* yr	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-0.108*	-0.124	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Adj. <i>R</i> ²	6.2%		8.9%		6.7%		7.2%		5.1%		15.0%	

* Significance level: $p \leq 0.05$.

** Significance level: $p \leq 0.01$.

*** Significance level: $p \leq 0.001$.

6. Conclusions and discussion

To summarize, we have found convincing evidence of the formation of an elitist rearguard with respect to highbrow culture, but little evidence of an opening up of popular culture, or leisure in general, for members of different backgrounds. Thus, the popular culture diffusion hypothesis could not be confirmed. Only the effects of gender and income show some signs of decline. Leisure and consumption are still, to a considerable extent, expressions of social background, as Bourdieu (1984) put forward. The evidence found in this study does not indicate that membership in a social group or category has become less decisive. Social categories still have an impact on cultural and leisure preferences.

The highbrow rearguard hypothesis does a lot better than the popular culture diffusion hypothesis. It is fully confirmed, but maybe it tells only half the story that needs to be told here. While it is true that cultural resources have come to matter more for highbrow participation, at the same time, material conditions seem to have lost their relevance and the increase of the effects of schooling and age is not restricted to our highbrow indicators. The hypothesis that is most informative, matching a surprisingly large part of our findings, is the culturalization hypothesis. Age not only had an increasing impact on all of the highbrow activities, but also on disco and bar attendance and civic participation. The only activity that was less affected by age in 2000 than in 1980 was sports club membership (which is arguably the item that is most dependent on physical conditions). Education increasingly affected participation in all highbrow activities, but also cinema and restaurant visits, going out, sports club membership, and media use. The findings on education, the effect of which never declined, provide a strong refutation of the popular culture diffusion hypothesis and strong support for the symbolization hypothesis. For income, on the other hand, all significant interaction effects are negative. In all of these cases, the effect changed from positive or insignificant to negative. We see this for disco, cinema, and bar visits per year and for time spent on civic participation, social contacts, going out, and media during the diary week. These effects show that financial barriers are becoming less important. Income has a growing negative effect on time spent on social contacts and using audiovisual media. It may well be that high income indicates being more hurried, which leaves less time for informal chat and TV (e.g., Robinson and Godbey, 1997).

Contrary to what we expected in our fourth hypothesis, the religion effect did not generally decline. We see only a reversal from positive to negative effects for visiting bars or cafés and restaurants. Otherwise, religion negatively affects visiting cinemas and museums, attending plays and concerts, sports club membership, going out, and media use. It has stable positive effects on parties per year plus time spent on civic participation and social contacts per week. Finally, the impact of political preference only changes for social contacts, where we see the positive impact of left-wing sympathies diminish. Like religion, political preference is a relevant determinant of popular culture participation and other leisure activities. A liberal preference enhances visiting cinemas, bars, and the weekly time spent on social contacts and media use. Being more right-wing has positive effects on sports club membership, number of parties and restaurants visited per year, and the time spent on civic participation.

In sum, we see that traditional boundaries related to gender and economic resources are losing their relevance in a number of areas, whereas age and education are becoming more

important. These trends in the effects of background variables are not always immediately visible in participation rates or general measures of audience composition. But they do point toward an important shift. Traditional (gender) roles and money (scarcity) do indeed determine taste patterns less. This definitely allows people more freedom to choose from an increasing range of alternatives. But these choices, although the people who make them undoubtedly feel more free in doing so than 20 years ago, are still very much structured by other aspects of their social background. Education is the most important one. As this indicator is often considered as a proxy for cultural capital, we argue that cultural resources are increasingly important for lifestyle formation. So much so, that they seem to totally compensate for the smoothing down of economic or traditional (gender)role-related barriers. Perhaps there are taste groups developing that seem to form irrespective of gender or income or class background, but such groups are likely to be increasingly similar in at least two other aspects: education and age. Age and education do not in themselves compel people to do one thing and avoid the other, leaving aside the extreme cases in which one is too crippled or too dim-witted to participate. But they determine people's information-processing skills and their reference groups, which makes them more likely to determine interests than, for example, money or gender.

The idea of culturalization goes rather well with other important trends, such as the emergence of the cultural omnivore. It might be argued that the omnivore also demonstrates that traditional cultural guidelines are fading and that people with sufficient cultural resources are most clearly enjoying the new possibilities. Whether or not one is a cultural omnivore is very much determined by social background, most notably education and age (e.g., Van Eijck, 2001). In our view, culturalization, or what Elchardus (2002) called the emergence of the symbolic society, can be understood as a middle course between more cultural and more materialist views on (post)modernization or individualization. On the one hand, it is true that traditional boundaries are shifting and sometimes weakening. On the other hand, people still live their lives according to preferences that are tied up with their social background. Social background is not becoming irrelevant, but rather exerting its influence through different channels. Cultural preferences are less driven by scarcity or coercion and more by socialization and persuasion. Advertisers do not recommend their products because of their functional qualities or low price, but because they are supposed to help consumers define who they are (see Harris, 2000 for a delightful exposition). Obviously, consumers already know who they are, or want to be, because they have developed a notion of self vis-à-vis their families, fellow students, friends, and perhaps idols. The alleged freedom to conjure up a personal identity cannot conceal the fact that identities remain socially embedded. This ensures that lifestyles are also still related to social categories, especially if these refer to commonalities in socialization. Traditions, regulations, or rigid cultural boundaries are no requirement for similarities in cultural behavior (see also Liebersson, 2000). While socio-economic deprivation no longer holds most people back from pursuing cultural and leisure activities, cultural differences in skills and interests are becoming more dominant. Lash (1994, p. 133) speaks of a shift from 'social' to 'cultural citizenship' to indicate the growing importance of being able to deal with, and appreciate, the abundance of possibilities in today's society. In principle, this abundance allows people to virtually go anywhere but, by sociological necessity, socialization still makes some directions (far) more obvious than others.

Acknowledgement

The authors wish to thank the two Poetics reviewers for their helpful comments.

Appendix A. Mean scores on the independent variables, per dependent variable per year

	% Female	Age	Education	Income	% Religious	Left-wing
Entire sample						
1980	50	41.42	1.00	1.00	58	3.80
1985	50	40.96	1.00	1.00	56	3.71
1990	50	40.53	1.00	1.00	52	3.68
1995	51	41.46	1.00	1.00	47	3.54
2000	50	42.56	1.00	1.00	44	3.81
Disco at least once last year						
1980	43	29.32	1.09	1.02	50	3.94
1985	45	27.45	1.18	1.03	49	3.87
1990	44	27.24	1.14	0.96	38	3.86
1995	45	28.99	1.10	0.95	33	3.56
2000	48	27.59	1.10	0.96	29	4.30
Cinema at least once last year						
1980	45	32.57	1.21	1.10	49	3.99
1985	48	32.53	1.23	1.08	46	3.83
1990	52	31.93	1.18	1.02	42	3.95
1995	49	34.53	1.14	1.04	38	3.68
2000	52	36.66	1.10	1.02	38	3.95
Bars and cafés at least 4× last year						
1980	40	33.14	1.11	1.02	55	3.97
1985	40	32.73	1.12	1.02	49	3.78
1990	44	33.22	1.09	1.01	43	3.79
1995	45	35.00	1.06	1.01	40	3.58
2000	47	38.35	1.03	1.01	40	3.94
Member any sports club						
1980	44	35.17	1.13	1.14	55	3.74
1985	48	36.08	1.12	1.07	52	3.63
1990	49	36.26	1.09	1.08	51	3.61
1995	46	39.37	1.09	1.05	44	3.49
2000	52	41.58	1.07	1.03	44	3.78

Appendix A. (*Continued*)

	% Female	Age	Education	Income	% Religious	Left-wing
Plays and concerts at least once last year						
1980	54	42.07	1.15	1.10	57	3.85
1985	54	41.06	1.15	1.09	54	3.69
1990	55	39.82	1.14	1.04	48	3.78
1995	54	41.56	1.10	1.04	46	3.56
2000	55	42.77	1.09	1.03	45	3.80
Museum at least once last year						
1980	49	40.06	1.18	1.11	61	3.73
1985	50	40.81	1.14	1.06	56	3.68
1990	53	40.85	1.12	1.04	50	3.77
1995	50	42.62	1.10	1.02	47	3.60
2000	49	44.29	1.09	1.02	47	3.87
Reading at least 1 h diary week						
1980	48	43.78	1.03	1.02	59	3.75
1985	51	44.83	1.04	1.01	58	3.68
1990	54	44.83	1.02	1.01	52	3.69
1995	53	48.33	1.02	1.02	53	3.60
2000	53	49.93	1.01	1.00	51	3.69
Parties at least 5× last year						
1980	48	36.29	1.12	1.03	61	3.76
1985	52	36.03	1.06	1.06	59	3.64
1990	49	37.25	1.07	1.03	52	3.67
1995	51	37.99	1.01	1.01	49	3.48
2000	49	40.52	1.03	1.08	44	3.70
Restaurants at least 3× last year						
1980	49	39.16	1.15	1.14	54	3.71
1985	48	39.43	1.15	1.12	50	3.65
1990	49	39.43	1.10	1.06	48	3.70
1995	50	40.59	1.10	1.05	40	3.52
2000	49	41.83	1.06	1.04	41	3.78
Participation at least 15 min diary week						
1980	49	42.95	1.03	1.00	71	3.64
1985	52	42.96	0.98	0.98	70	3.47
1990	52	43.54	1.00	1.00	69	3.40
1995	54	44.81	0.99	1.00	63	3.43
2000	53	47.33	1.01	1.00	61	3.56

Appendix A. (Continued)

	% Female	Age	Education	Income	% Religious	Left-wing
Social contacts at least 9.5 h diary week						
1980	52	42.07	<i>0.99</i>	<i>0.98</i>	61	3.81
1985	60	41.19	<i>0.98</i>	<i>0.97</i>	57	3.74
1990	60	41.08	<i>0.97</i>	<i>0.97</i>	53	3.70
1995	64	41.87	<i>1.00</i>	<i>0.97</i>	48	3.56
2000	61	43.52	<i>1.02</i>	<i>0.99</i>	48	3.76
Going out at least 3.75 h diary week						
1980	46	39.07	<i>1.08</i>	<i>1.03</i>	57	3.89
1985	47	37.98	<i>1.06</i>	<i>1.01</i>	52	3.72
1990	48	38.20	<i>1.06</i>	<i>1.02</i>	48	3.76
1995	49	39.53	<i>1.06</i>	<i>1.02</i>	44	3.56
2000	53	41.40	<i>1.04</i>	<i>1.01</i>	44	3.84
Media at least 10.5 h diary week						
1980	40	44.64	0.89	0.93	56	3.91
1985	41	43.38	0.92	0.95	54	3.83
1990	43	42.14	0.94	0.97	47	3.79
1995	48	43.10	0.94	0.98	45	3.68
2000	46	44.84	0.92	0.98	44	3.88

Italics indicate that mean scores do not vary significantly between the years of measurement.

References

- Baudrillard, Jean, 1998. *The Consumer Society: Myths and Structures*. Sage, London.
- Bauman, Zygmunt, 1991. *Modernity and Ambivalence*. Polity Press, Cambridge.
- Bauman, Zygmunt, 1996. From pilgrim to tourist – or a short history of identity. In: Hall, Stuart, du Gay, Paul (Eds.), *Questions of Cultural Identity*. Sage, London, pp. 18–35.
- Bauman, Zygmunt, 1998. *Work, Consumerism and The New Poor*. Open University Press, Buckingham.
- Beck, Ulrich, 1992. *Risk Society: Towards A New Modernity*. Sage, London.
- Bourdieu, Pierre, 1984. *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*. Routledge, London.
- Brooks, David, 2000. *Bobos in Paradise: The New Upper Class and How They Got There*. Simon & Schuster, New York.
- Bryson, Bethany, 1996. “Anything but heavy metal”: Symbolic exclusion and musical dislikes. *American Sociological Review* 61, 884–899.
- Bryson, Bethany, 1997. What about the univores? Musical dislikes and group-based identity construction among Americans with low levels of education. *Poetics* 25, 141–156.
- Castells, Manuel, 2000. *The Rise of the Network Society*, second ed. Blackwell, Oxford.
- Chaves, Mark, 1994. Secularization as declining religious authority. *Social Forces* 72, 749–774.
- Connor, Steven, 1997. *Postmodernist Culture: An Introduction to Theories of the Contemporary*. Blackwell Publishers, Oxford.

- DiMaggio, Paul, 1991. Social structure, institutions, and cultural goods: The case of the United States. In: Bourdieu, P., Coleman, James S. (Eds.), *Social Theory for a Changing Society*. Westview Press, Boulder, pp. 133–155.
- DiMaggio, Paul, 1996. Are art museum visitors different from other people? The relationship between attendance and social and political attitudes in the United States. *Poetics* 24, 161–180.
- DiMaggio, Paul, Mukhtar, Toqir, 2004. Arts participation as cultural capital in the United States, 1982–2002: signs of decline? *Poetics* 32, 169–194.
- Elchardus, Mark, 2002. Op in rook? In: Elchardus, Mark, Glorieus, Ignace (Eds.), *De Symbolische Samenleving*. Lannoo, Tielt, pp. 7–30.
- Elias, Norbert, 1982. *The civilizing process. State Formation and Civilization*, vol. 2. Blackwell, Oxford.
- Emmison, Michael, 2003. Social class and cultural mobility: reconfiguring the cultural omnivore thesis. *Journal of Sociology* 39, 211–230.
- Featherstone, Mike, 1991. *Consumer Culture and Postmodernism*. Sage, London.
- Giddens, Anthony, 1994. Living in a post-traditional society. In: Beck, U., Giddens, A., Lash, S. (Eds.), *Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order*. Polity Press, Cambridge, pp. 56–109.
- Harris, Daniel, 2000. *Cute, Quaint, Hungry and Romantic: The Aesthetics of Consumerism*. Da Capo Press, Cambridge.
- Harvey, David, 1990. *The Condition of Postmodernity*. Blackwell Publishers, Oxford.
- Kantor, Jacob R., 1929. *An Outline of Social Psychology*. Follett Publishing, Chicago.
- Kellner, Douglas, 1995. *Media Culture: Cultural Studies, Identity and Politics Between the Modern and the Postmodern*. Routledge, New York.
- Knulst, Wim, 1992. An elitist rearguard: an effort to explain changes in the extent and composition of the arts audience in the age of television. *The Netherlands' Journal of Social Science* 28, 72–94.
- Knulst, Wim, Kraaykamp, Gerbert, 1998. Trends in leisure reading: forty years of research on reading in the Netherlands. *Poetics* 26, 21–41.
- Knulst, Wim, van Eijck, Koen, 2002. *Vrijwilligers in Soorten en Maten II*. Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Tilburg University, Tilburg.
- Kraaykamp, Gerbert, 1996. Ontwikkelingen in de sociale segmentering van vrijetijdsbesteding. In: Ganzeboom, H.B.G., Ultee, W.C. (Eds.), *De Sociale Segmentering van Nederland in 2015*. Sdu Uitgevers, Den Haag, pp. 171–203.
- Lash, Scott, 1994. Reflexivity and its doubles: structures, aesthetics, community. In: Beck, Ulrich, Giddens, Anthony, Lash, Scott (Eds.), *Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order*. Polity Press, Cambridge, pp. 110–173.
- Liebersohn, Stanley, 2000. *A Matter of Taste: How Names, Fashions, and Culture Change*. Yale University Press, New Haven.
- Lodziak, Conrad, 2002. *The Myth of Consumerism*. Pluto Press, London.
- Maffesoli, Michel, 1992. *The Time of the Tribes: The Decline of Individualism in Mass Society*. Sage, London.
- Maloney, W.A., 1999. Contracting out the participation function: social capital and chequebook participation. In: van Deth, J.W., Maraffi, M., Newton, K., Whiteley, P.F. (Eds.), *Social Capital and European Democracy*. Routledge, London, pp. 178–199.
- Ministry of Welfare, Health and Cultural Affairs, 1994. *Cultural policy in the Netherlands: European program for the evaluation of national cultural policies*. Rijswijk: Ministry of Welfare, Health and Cultural Affairs.
- Need, Ariana, 1997. *The Kindred Vote*. ICS, Nijmegen.
- Peterson, Richard A., 1997. The rise and fall of highbrow snobbery as a status marker. *Poetics* 25, 75–92.
- Peterson, Richard A., Kern, Roger M., 1996. Changing highbrow taste: from snob to omnivore. *American Sociological Review* 61, 900–907.
- Peterson, Richard A., Simkus, Albert, 1992. How musical tastes mark occupational status groups. In: Lamont, Michèle, Fournier, Marcel (Eds.), *Cultivating differences: Symbolic boundaries and the making of inequality*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 152–186.
- Rifkin, Jeremy, 2000. *The Age of Access: The New Culture of Hypercapitalism Where All of Life is a Paid-for Experience*. Tarcher/Putnam, New York.
- Robinson, John P., Godbey, G., 1997. *Time for Life*. Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania.

- Savage, Mike, 1995. Class analysis and social research. In: Butler, Tim, Savage, Mike (Eds.), *Social Change and the Middle Classes*. UCL Press, London, pp. 15–25.
- Sennett, Richard, 1998. *The Corrosion of Character: The Personal Consequences of Work in the New Capitalism*. Norton, New York.
- Thompson, Kenneth, Sharma, Anita, 1998. Secularization, moral regulation and the mass media. *British Journal of Sociology* 49, 434–455.
- Van Eijck, Koen, 1997. Socialisatie in het gezin en de culturele consumptie van siblings. *Sociale Wetenschappen* 40 (2), 106–125.
- Van Eijck, Koen, 1999. Socialization, education, and lifestyle: how social mobility increases the cultural heterogeneity of status groups. *Poetics* 26, 309–328.
- Van Eijck, Koen, 2001. Social differentiation in musical taste patterns. *Social Forces* 79, 1163–1184.
- Van Eijck, Koen, de Haan, Jos, Knulst, Wim, 2002. Snobisme hoeft niet meer: de interesse voor hoge cultuur in een smaakdemocratie. *Mens en Maatschappij* 55, 153–177.
- Van Eijck, Koen, van Rees, Kees, 2000. Media orientation and media use: television viewing behavior of specific reader types from 1975 to 1995. *Communication Research* 27, 574–616.
- Van Rees, Kees, Van Eijck, Koen, 2003. Media repertoires of selective audiences: the impact of status, gender, and age on media use. *Poetics* 31, 465–490.
- Waldman, Michael, 1993. A new perspective on planned obsolescence. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 108, 273–283.
- Warde, Alan, 1997. *Consumption, Food and Taste: Culinary Antinomies and Commodity Culture*. Sage, London.
- Webster, Frank, 2002. *Theories of the Information Society*. Sage, London.
- Zablocki, B.D., Kanter, R.M., 1976. The differentiation of life-styles. *Annual Review of Sociology* 269–298.

Koen van Eijck is assistant professor at the Department of Social Cultural Sciences, Tilburg University. Current research areas include socialization, media use, and cultural consumption patterns.

Bertine Bargeman is assistant professor at the Department of Social Cultural Sciences, Tilburg University. Her research focuses on consumer decision-making processes and leisure behavior.