

**PATHWAYS OF WELFARE AND POPULATION
RELATED POLICIES:**

*towards a multidimensional typology of welfare state regimes in
Eastern and Western Europe*

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Abstract:

This article starts with a critical review of Esping-Andersen's inspiring approach to distinguish different welfare regimes. The demand firstly to expand the scope of comparative welfare research to all countries participating in the DIALOG project and to Eastern Europe in general, and secondly the attempt to cope with important shortcomings of Esping-Andersen's theory, particularly the assumption of a strong path-dependency, are the main reasons to draft theoretical considerations which focus on a reconciliation of typological approaches on the one hand, and a functionalist modernization theory on the other. By referring on (i) Stein Rokkan's cleavage theory, (ii) Kaufmann's concept of welfare as a system of dynamic interdependencies and (iii) Cliquet's generalized Fishbein-model (resources-restriction-behavior model), we specify in a first step the relevant sociological dimensions determining the different structures and developments of welfare systems. This leads to the proposal to divide a triad of trajectories (rather than regime types), which are taken as distinct solutions how countries can participate in the process of modernization. Based on a broad set of variables, we try to show in the subsequent sections, that the country-specific configuration of cultural and structural macro-conditions, which depend on long-term historical legacies, determine the scope of distinct policies as well as the perception and evaluation of demographic trends. It can be shown that there exist strong correlations between the cultural prerequisites and the development of national welfare systems. Furthermore, the hypothesis according to which the Eastern European countries with a Catholic history tend to develop welfare systems in which intermediate institutions (e.g. the family) play an important role (subsidiarity, intergenerational solidarity). By contrast, more secularized Eastern European countries tend to follow rather the trajectory of an encompassing (etatist) social policy. Furthermore, poor economical conditions (particularly in the second belt of transitional countries (e.g. Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus) currently hamper a rapid improvement of their welfare systems.

Key words: Regime typologies, Welfare research, Sociology, Demography, Values

1. INTRODUCTION

„*Gallia est omnis divisa in partes tres, quarum unam incolunt Belgae, aliam Aquitani, tertiam qui ipsorum lingua Celtae, nostra Galli appellantur.*“ Already before Christ, a renowned ethnography applied a trisection typology for describing Europe beyond the ancient "iron wall" - the Roman Limes. Since Julius Caesar "*Comentarii de bello gallico*" (1990), trichotomic classifications enjoy highest popularity, even in the field of welfare research.

Undoubtedly the most influential recent proposal has been provided by Gøsta Esping-Andersen in "The three worlds of welfare capitalism" (1990) where distinguishing between a) the *Social-democratic* (primarily the Nordic countries), b) the *Conservative* (mainly the continental European corporatist countries), and c) the *Liberal* (or residual) welfare regime,¹ typified by the anglo-saxon countries and including as well the former colonies of the U.K. or Switzerland.

Esping-Andersen theoretically underpinned his work with considerations that have been developed already during the early post-war period by Thomas H. Marshall (1963; 1996), and particularly Richard Titmuss (1963; 1974), both affiliated with the London School of Economics and Political Science, of which William H. Beveridge had been director in the interwar period.

In this tradition, the different institutional and conceptual arrangements of (Western) European welfare states were either labeled according to the leading founders of corresponding policies (*Beveridgeian* vs. *Bismarckian* countries, or *mixed countries* which combine tax-based and means-tested provisions with work related social insurance systems), or - according to Titmuss - as a) the *residual*, b) the *industrial achievement-performance*, and c) the *institutional redistribute welfare model*.

The succeeding comparative research in this field mainly focused on the growth of the welfare state as a response to two fundamental developments, namely "the formation of national states and their transformation into mass democracies after the French Revolution, and the growth of capitalism that became the dominant mode of production after the Industrial revolution" (Flora and Heidenheimer 1981: 22). By consequence, the academic interest prioritized macro-sociological explanations of these long-term processes on the background of so-called "grand theories" (Toqueville, Weber, Marx,

¹ Regime is defined as a set of norms, rules, procedures and institutions which constrains the behavior of the members of the regime. "To talk of 'regime' is to denote the fact that in the relation between state and economy a complex of legal and organizational features are systematically interwoven." (Esping-Andersen 1990: 2).

Durckheim, or Rokkan), and in particular on the concept of *modernization*.² These theories neglected the impact of the micro-level of individual actors as well as that of endogenous causes, and were, by consequence, blind for intercultural or inter-country differences, variations, and heterogeneities. The success of Esping-Andersen's approach can be reduced to the fact that he stroke exactly on this Achilles' heel of modernization theory.

Notwithstanding, Esping-Andersen rapidly has incurred mentionable criticism. The most important points are that it remains unclear whether regimes obtain the status of ideal-types (Weber), or if his classification is a "Realtypologie" (real-types; see Kohl 1993). Esping-Andersen intermingled in this respect cross-sectional empirical evidence with far-reaching generalizations. Claus Offe pointed out that he bases his considerations on a rationalistic understanding of politics leading to an optimistic voluntarism regarding the impact of political regulations (1996). If modernization theories tend to overrate dynamics, then Esping-Andersen is omitting a historical perspective and follows a snapshot strategy (Borchert 1998). He furthermore was attacked from the feminist camp (Lessenich and Ostner 1998) because of neglecting issues such as gender and the family.

If trying to summarize the most prominent derivatives in welfare regime research (see also Arts and Gelissen 2002), one can speak of five relevant developments: a) In an empirical perspective the *number of regimes* has been increased or at least differentiated. b) Where Esping-Andersen's - in line with Titmuss - concentrates mainly on the Public-Private-Mix of welfare provisions and taking into account the dimensions of de-commodification and social stratification, there recent approaches amplify the *number of dimensions*. c) current analyses expanded also the *accounted policy fields* (e.g. gender, health, family). d) Furthermore, *additional countries* have been regarded. Finally, one can observe e) a trend to *reduce the hiatus between the modernization-theoretical and the typological approach*.

Ad a) The objection whereupon the three worlds of welfare capitalism are under-complex was tested on the one hand empirically. From a mere methodological perspective detected Obiger and Wagschal (1998) in their re-analysis of Esping-Andersen's data at least four or five clusters. More rele-

² Modernization - or nowadays globalization - is closely linked to liberalism. The notion of modernization comes from a view of societies as having a standard evolutionary pattern, as described in the social evolutionism theories. Each society would steadily evolve from barbarism to ever greater levels of development and civilization. The more modern states would be wealthier and more powerful, and their citizens freer and having a higher standard of living. Relevant correlates are therefore processes like industrialisation, secularisation, and individualization. This view was advocated in the social sciences for many decades by Max Weber (occidental rationalization and bureaucratization) and Talcott Parsons who stressed the importance of societies being open to change and fighting against reactionary forces which restricting development.

vant were the arguments mentioned by Leibfried (1992), Ferrera (1993, 1996) van Kersbergen (1995) and Bonoli (1997) according to which there exist fundamental differences within Esping-Andersen's Conservative cluster. Similar to the division of the Beveridge-Cluster into a Anglo-Saxon and a Nordic sub-type, these authors split the more developed Western European countries from the Southern European countries. However, from a functionalist perspective one may argue that these sub-types are both anchored in the catholic value system. Consequentially, these country differences are gradual and real-typical rather than general and ideal-typical (Flora/Kuhnle/Urwin 1999 or Fux 2002). Castles and Mitchell (1996) and Korpi and Palme turned their attention also on the political-cultural differences between liberal (e.g. US, CH) and radical countries (e.g. AUS, NZ) and deduced corresponding regime types.

Ad b) Esping-Andersen lays his focus mainly on two analytical dimensions, namely the level of de-commodification and social stratification. More recent proposals add various other dimensions depending on different theoretical considerations. Leibfried (1992) or Castles and Mitchell (1993) introduced poverty and poverty oriented policies or benefit equality (e.g. taxation) as additional dimensions. Siaroff's proposal (1994) answers to the objection of neglecting the gender dimension and considered new indicators such as the family orientation of the welfare system or female work desirability. Ferrera (1996), Bonoli (1997), or Soede et al. (2002) applied differentiated institutional dimensions (e.g. eligibility rules, benefit formulae, scope of policies). This obviously incomplete list was supplemented by further dimensions such as governance (Korpi and Palme 1998) or values (Fux 2002).

Ad c) As already mentioned, the gender-blindness of Esping-Andersen's approach led to typologies which either integrated gender and family related aspects into the setting of relevant dimensions (e.g. Leibfried, Korpi and Palme or Soede et al) or restricted their classifications on particular policy fields such as gender policies (Siaroff 1994; Künzler 2002) or family policies (Fux 2002).

Ad d) Beside technical reasons like lacks in appropriate comparable data, it was for utmost half a century common sense that the welfare state has to be taken as a project of the Western hemisphere in the sense of a response to the particular developmental problems of capitalism and modernization. Comparative research made therefore hardly any effort to analyze the particularities of Eastern European welfare systems. Early attempts to situate transition states started³ in the late 1980s and focused the margins of the welfare state (e.g. family policy) rather than central institutions (e.g. social in-

³ Among such attempts one should mention the first round of PPA-surveys where besides the former GDR also Hungary and Czechoslovakia participated.

surances). During the last decade hampered the rapid social and political change in junction with multiple uncertainties of the people comparative analyses. Actually, one can find a joint effort attempting to make up this leeway.

Ad e) Probably the most important shortcoming of Esping-Andersen's approach is, that he does not provide an exhaustive explanation of the historic growth of European welfare regimes on different trajectories. His empirical analyses mainly reflect the situation in the post-war period and particularly the late 1980s and suppose a far-reaching path-dependency of national welfare policies. Jens Borchert (1998) argues that is essential to integrate a historical-genetical perspective where different 'critical junctures' in certain periods such as the genesis of Western European welfare states before World War I, the reconstitution of these policies during the interwar period and the current reforms in many countries would be analyzed separately and contrasted with a mere typological approach.

In this respect, it is expedient to refer to Stein Rokkan's and Peter Flora's (Flora et al. 1999) approach, which is linking a functionalist theory of modernization with a conceptual mapping of European welfare states. In other words, they elucidate the developments just as the current shaping of different welfare regimes as a result of four historical junctures, namely (1) the Reformation-Counterreformation movements of the 16th and 17th centuries, (2) the national revolutions of the post-Napoleonic era, (3) the industrial revolution, and (4) the international revolution of 1917. These critical junctures created country-specific sets of cleavages which determine a country's social and political conditions until the present. Therefore Rokkan as well is assuming a path-dependency, even if this has been transposed to a higher level.

According to Rokkan's approach, the following divides and cleavages assign the conceptual map of Europe. The edict of Milan (313 AD) separated the Eastern and Western Roman Empire. In the Eastern European countries with autocephal orthodox churches as well as in the areas conquered by the Muslims accrued autocratic political systems while in the Western countries a political constitutionalism became the predominant feature. The corresponding clientelism (or paternalism) characterizing the Eastern trajectory hampered subsequently the processes of democratization and economic growth.⁴ Regarding the private sphere, a major distinction of the countries with a Byzantine heritage is their prevalence of patrilinear kinship systems (e.g. lineage-centered naming and forms of settlement) as well as the principle of principle of seniority whereby siblings were ranked according to their age, and the firstborn male child receives all or his parents' most significant and valuable property. In many regions of eastern and southeastern Europe, a

⁴ Clientelism is obviously also a phenomenon that could be found in other rural peripheries such as e.g. the South of Italy.

gendered division of labor supported the persistence of these male-dominated structures and thus patrilinear systems of kinship. Arranged marriages were frequent and the penetration of principles of church marriage laws was comparatively weak. Furthermore, the proportions of multi-generational and complex households are significantly higher than in Western parts of Europe (Therborn 2004). Not by accident, this divide between the East and West Roman Empire fits quite well with Hanjal's (1965) line between Trieste and St. Petersburg separating the Eastern and Western marriage patterns.

Although Rokkan's original conceptual map ends with the Iron Curtain, the four above-mentioned junctions can easily be applied to Eastern Europe as well (Aarebrot and Berglund 1995). He identifies first a North-South axis based on the integration of state and church in the aftermath of the reformation. The Protestant countries in the North represent a far-reaching integration and subordination of religious leadership to the state and led to the formation of state-churches. In the mixed Protestant and Catholic countries as well as the secularized Catholic countries (e.g. France, Belgium) the state gained to a great extent the autonomy from religion, albeit on the individual level the Roman Catholic doctrine influenced the thinking and behaviors of the citizens. Both, the Protestant countries as well as in the secularized Catholic countries, successfully isolated religious interest from governance.⁵ The counter reformation Catholic countries, by contrast, let observe a dualism between the religious and the secular authority and the Roman church retained an often conflicting influence on state interests and governance. The lacking secularization furthered on the micro-level of individuals ambivalences and even anti-etatist attitudes. In the Orthodox and Muslim countries finally, there is an amalgamation of religious leadership and state's power which is moreover often linked with strong clientelist ties. In other words: In these areas secularization is still at odds with religion.⁶

The second axis identified by Rokkan passing from West to East is based on the strength of political centre formation, the city networks and trade routes and therefore linked with the third critical juncture, namely the industrial revolution. In the centre, we find the city-belt countries, which are characterized by an early outset of the industrialization and the growth of strong commercial city networks and trade routes on the one hand, and weak political centres on the other hand. The weakness of the state has been balanced out by co-opting the main interest groups by means of consociational devices.⁷

⁵ The conflict between state and church over control of the school system during the nineteenth Century illustrates this issue.

⁶ According to Aarebrot and Berglund (1995: 217) secularization in Russia and Turkey could only take place after Lenin and Atatürk and served rather to strengthen the non-democratic option in the same way that religion had legitimized traditional authoritarianism during the old regimes.

⁷ This strategy is well documented in the literature under the terms of e.g. "verzuiling" in the Netherlands; "familles spirituelles" in Belgium or "Proporz" in Switzerland.

The city-belt is running from the North of Italy (Venice, Milan) across the Alps and along the Rhine to the Low Countries and the industrial centres of Great Britain.

These countries are on both sides surrounded by Eastern and Western empire states, characterized by an early state-formation with strong political centres and weak commercial city networks. In the West, one has to mention Denmark, UK, France, Spain and Portugal. In the East mainly the historical Empires of Russia and Turkey and - as designated by Aarebrot and Berglund - the Eastern Defense Empire States Sweden, Prussia-Germany and Austria-Hungary. The latter crumbled later to a large group of countries which could be further broken down into sub-groups according their religions. In the wake of the international revolution (Rokkan's fourth critical juncture) and by the creation of the "iron wall", most of these split-offs were re-unified under the communist regime.

On the bases of these three fundamental divides, the growth of different welfare regimes can be reconstructed as follows. In the Northern European countries with strong but from the Roman church broadly independent political centres, where furthermore the social-democratic labour movement has been integrated into political decision-making, generous redistributive and equality-oriented welfare systems developed early. Similar welfare systems developed later also in the former communist countries, although these were much more imposed on the population by authoritarian regimes and neglected the heterogeneous cultural particularities of these countries. Because of the state's pivotal role, this path of modernisation can be tagged as etatistic trajectory.

Countries sharing the experience of Roman Law and Catholic doctrine anchored their welfare systems in the principle of subsidiarity. Instead of an encompassing state, institutions on lower levels - particularly the family - were clearly the favoured as major welfare actors, since in the tradition of natural justice the family is seen as the gamete of the state. However, there exist distinct interpretations of the concept of subsidiarity. Within the non-secularized counter-reformation countries, the family or kinship networks are functioning as principal welfare providers. Mostly corporatist and comparatively poor welfare instruments serve as supplements whenever the primary networks fail. Targets of corresponding policies are equity and fostering civil society rather than equality and social integration. Welfare systems in the Orthodox countries and the Muslim areas are likewise, but due to the traditional authoritarianism, kinship ties are of a pronounced clientelistic nature. Thirdly, also the secularized Catholic countries follow the same path but with the distinction that the concept of subsidiarity has been detached

from its religious origin and has been reinterpreted in a more secular way,⁸ and that due to the primacy of the state, refined welfare systems on an average level of social expenditure could develop. I would like to designate this second path of modernization the familialistic trajectory.

In the city-belt states neither strong political centres nor strong bureaucratic apparatus developed. Because of the early industrialization and the salient position in trade and commerce, a powerful bourgeois patriciate arose which is on the one hand characterized by its openness and tolerance and on the other hand by a pronounced trust in the market. In all of these countries, liberal constitutions were established, even if in some of the city-belt countries political power has been splittled up to different interest groups. The combination of liberalism and cooptation of heterogeneous interests led to complicated decision-making processes, which obviously hampered the growth of generous welfare systems. Residual social policies are based in self-responsibility of the individuals and trust in the capacities to self-organize their interests. Therefore we label this feature the etatistic trajectory.

To resume our considerations, we can state first that Esping-Andersen's typology of welfare states was path-breaking since he could show that the growth of welfare systems is not only a response to fundamental societal developments, but that there exist distinct solutions how countries can manage the challenging issues of structural disparities and risks, individuals are confronted with. Although his proposal secondly has been criticized (e.g. that the number of regimes are too small, that his argumentation is based on a snapshot of Europe in the 1970s and 1980s only, that he intermingles ideal-types (in the sense of Max Weber) and real-types and neglects the dimensions of gender and the family), we also should take into account that his major results have been confirmed by various alternative typologies that are based on different theoretical backgrounds. Thirdly, there are mainly two reasons to scrutinize here this typology, namely the problem linked with his ahistorical explanation (see: path-dependency) and the necessity to enlarge the focus on Eastern European countries, which have until now not examined in utmost all regime typological studies. In positive terms: the destination route of our approach attempts to reduce the hiatus between structural-functionalist modernization theories and regime-typological approaches. Starting point is Stein Rokkan's conceptual map of Europe. This allows in particular to transpose path-dependencies to a macro-analytical level or, in other words: to reduce similar types of welfare systems to similar historical conditions. On this background, hypotheses can be formulated on the current state and future growth of the welfare state in Eastern and Western Europe.

⁸ Franz Schultheis (1988) has reconstructed this with due diligence for France, showing that the French family policy emerged out of the struggles between paternalist, natalist, and familialist interest groups.

2. THEORETICAL PRELIMINARIES AND DESIGN OF THE ANALYSES

Obviously, the current structure of a country's welfare system is not the result of accidental structural and cultural conditions. Actors on the macro-level (such as political interest groups, governments etc.) as well as on the micro-level (individuals and families) are considered as embedded in a network of interdependent relations. Both evaluate societal processes and react on each other's demands. The outcome, namely the implementation of particular welfare policies is therefore the result of a complex trade-off between subsystems, where the actors refer on external factors (e.g. historical cleavages, cultural traditions and values, the economy and social-structural pre-conditions), as well as they evaluate earlier activities and those effects. The government, just as families and individuals, are considered to be rational actors trying to balance their limited resources⁹ and the behavioral outcome within this bargaining. Such a "discourse" or "dialogue" between actors on different levels is called a system of dynamic interdependencies (see Fig. 1).




Figure 1. Model of dynamic interdependencies

Esping-Andersen constructed his typology (in line with the power resources approach) on the background of three interacting factors, namely (1) the nature of class mobilization, (2) class-political action structures, and (3) the historical legacy of regime institutionalization (1990: 29). The latter is measured (a) by the level of de commodification and (b) the kind of stratification and solidarities.¹⁰

In order to avoid a class deterministic explanation, we apply the following factors: By dividing between the socio-cultural background on the one hand,

⁹ The configuration of cleavages, cultural traditions, and social-structural conditions are the resources that restrict the scope of action.

¹⁰ De commodification means the degree to which a (social) service is rendered as a matter of right, and the degree to which a person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market (Esping-Andersen, 1990: pp21-22). In addition, he takes into account which social stratification system is promoted by a certain social policy and whether the welfare state builds narrow or broad solidarities.

and structural preconditions on the other, we consider (a) a set of values. Regarding the structural dimension, (b) a country's economical performance, (c) the human development, and (d) the governance will be taken into account. These four groups of external variables cover the four poles of Talcott Parsons AGIL-scheme. In order to appoint the pivotal actors, we select (e) polity variables (e.g. development of the party composition of the cabinet) as well as (f) policy variables and (g) indicators measuring politics. The latter covers views of the parliaments on demographic issues and corresponding policies. Policies are obviously the core dimension. In this regard we lay the focus on the level and the structure of social expenditure, further on gender and family related policies. Unfortunately, comparable data which would allow to describe policies on lower levels (e.g. voluntary associations, individuals) are lacking. Their role and impact will be regarded indirectly via the structure of welfare provisions. As concerning the outcome we concentrate (h) on previous behaviors that is expressed in major demographic indicators. Finally, we include (i) female labor force participation as an important dimension of the actual behavior. The analyses cover mainly the period 1990 to 2002. All variables, operationalizations, and sources are listed in the annex (Annex-Table 2).

2.1 Scope and design of the study

We already mentioned the major aim of this article, namely to contribute to a reconciliation of structural-functionalist modernization theories and regime-typological approaches. From this background, the scope of the following analyses and the main hypotheses can be formulated.

Modernization means the long-term process of social change. The social structure developed towards functionally differentiated societies and traditional economies were replaced by modern social organizations and technology. In line with these structural trends, also liberal-democratic political ideals diffused just as secular and materialist values promoting new styles of living that are based on an individualist and achievement-oriented culture. Obviously, the growth of modern welfare regimes is systematically interwoven with the modernization of societies. Although structural-functionalist theorists stressed the universal or global scope of corresponding developments, one should not overlook, that modernization also supports national particularities as well as their identities.

Regarding our research topic, we assume that modernization does not necessarily imply a convergence both in structural as in cultural respect. On the contrary, we hypothesize that mainly three distinct trajectories of modernization can be separated (see Figure 2). A first path is characterized by stressing the structural aspects of modernization, targeting to guarantee or at least to

improve equal opportunities for all citizens. As shown in the introduction, an essential prerequisite for this etatistic trajectory are strong and secularized political centres. A second path focus on cultural modernization and intends particularly to refine individual independence and freedom of choice. Pluralism regarding the social-structural development emphasized individualist values and a residual welfare system where more obligations are imposed to the responsibility of the individuals determines the individualistic trajectory. A third pattern of modernization centers the value security and intends to reconcile the legacy of tradition with the promises of modernity. The corresponding welfare system reverts much more to intermediate organizations (e.g. voluntary associations, civil society) and intergenerational solidarity. To prove whether these three trajectories can be validated defines a first objective of this study.




Figure 2. Trajectories of modernization

A deliverable based on our interpretation of Rokkan's approach in the introduction was a conceptual map according to which the Eastern and Western European countries can be clustered into nine groups. A second objective is to lessen the number of groups and to examine the hypothesized correlation with the above-mentioned trajectories.

We refer in our analyses to a relatively broad sample of about 40 countries¹¹, which goes beyond those participating in the DIALOG-project. To situate the 14 countries involved in the Population Policy Acceptance Survey indicates a further objective.

¹¹ Europe as defined here includes all countries up to the borderlines of Russia. Excluded are only small countries (e.g. Liechtenstein, Gibraltar, San Marino, Monaco). Where possible, FRG and the former GDR were separated. Few countries must be excluded in single analyses because of lacking data.

Welfare typologies have been built by clustering countries on the basis of very different indicators.¹² Here, we choose the following three-step design: First, we apply principal component analysis on each of the before-mentioned nine dimensions in order to group the countries according their scores on the main factors. Secondly, we analyze the grouping by means of correlations assuming that an assumed isomorphism on the four poles of the AGIL-scheme, the three dimensions measuring the welfare policies and the two behavioral dimensions is indicating a latent construct, namely the three postulated trajectories of modernization. Finally, all factors will be entered into a cluster analysis in order to validate the typology. Such a design provides obviously neither a causal explanation nor allows it an examination of particular impact hypotheses. Nevertheless, we expect a fruitful validation of our theoretical considerations.

A striking finding of the present literature on welfare regimes is the relative robustness of the different classifications (Arts and Gelissen 2002: 151ff). But to which cluster belong the speedy developing Eastern European countries? In this respect, an additional analytical brick can be useful. Robert Cliquet pleaded for a "resources-restrictions-behavior" model (Cliquet et al. 1992), according to which particular thresholds or facilities could disturb the correspondences between the social-cultural framing on the one side and the behavioral outcome on the other. This idea is valuable for our purpose since assuming that within the group of the late transition countries the current economical situation hampers the implementation of requisite adjustments of their welfare systems. On the other side we expect particularly in the Eastern European Catholic countries a rapid rapprochement towards the cluster of their sibling countries in the West.

¹² The indicator variables widely vary according to the theoretical assumptions of the authors. In the following, there is a list of indicators used in selected typologies. *Esping-Andersen*: Decommodification, Stratification; *Leibfried*: Poverty, social insurance and poverty policy; *Castles and Mitchell*: Welfare expenditure, Benefit equality, Taxes; *Siaroff*: Family welfare orientation, Female work desirability, Extent of family benefits being paid to women; *Ferrera*: Rules of access (eligibility), Benefit formulae, Financing regulations, Organizational-managerial arrangements; *Bonoli*: Bismarck and Beveridge model, Quantity of welfare state expenditure; *Korpi and Vogel*: Bases of entitlement, Benefit principle, Governance of social insurance programme.

3. EUROPE'S CULTURAL ZONES

In order to operationalize the European value system, we applied Likert-type scales as well as single items. Inglehart's scales measuring secular-rational values, self-expression, and postmodernism set up the main dimension, namely traditional vs. modern (Inglehart and Baker 2000). As an indicator to separate the territories following the familialistic trajectory, we developed a familism-scale measuring the strength of family ties. Furthermore, the proportions of the major religious denominations and the church attendance has been entered the analysis. In addition, political attitudes, the valuation of authoritarianism (government orientation), competition, achievement-orientation, and equality, were taken into consideration.

The results, summarized in table 1 confirm that the traditional (authoritarian, orthodox)¹³ vs. modern and religious vs. secular (self-expression, familism) span the main axis of Europe's cultural map. These explain 27.4% and 23.1% of the variance. A third factor splits Catholic vs. Protestant countries (12.95). Further factors - both are significantly weaker - are defined by the variables competition and achievement, and equality, Islam and political attitudes, respectively.


Table 1. Items indicating Europe's value system (PCA factor scores)

		Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5
Secular-rational values	<i>secular</i>	0.95	-0.07	0.04	-0.03	-0.04
Government orientation	<i>gov</i>	-0.92	0.02	-0.01	-0.03	0.14
Postmaterialism	<i>postmat</i>	0.88	0.16	-0.04	-0.18	0.20
Orthodox	<i>ortho</i>	-0.77	0.06	0.29	-0.25	0.11
Self-expression values	<i>s.exp</i>	0.03	0.95	0.13	0.05	-0.03
Church attendance	<i>attend</i>	0.16	-0.80	-0.49	-0.07	-0.13
Familialism	<i>fam</i>	0.29	0.76	0.31	0.22	0.00
No denomination	<i>none</i>	-0.16	0.62	-0.17	-0.37	-0.07
Catholic	<i>cath</i>	0.26	-0.29	-0.85	0.09	-0.12
Protestant	<i>prot</i>	0.53	0.19	0.66	0.23	-0.25
Competition	<i>compete</i>	-0.27	0.12	0.21	0.86	0.06
Achievement	<i>achiev</i>	0.42	-0.03	-0.30	0.69	0.31
Equality	<i>eq</i>	0.07	0.03	-0.14	0.19	0.79
Islam	<i>muslim</i>	-0.16	-0.42	0.35	0.14	0.60
Left orientation	<i>left</i>	-0.22	0.21	0.22	-0.46	0.58
Variance explained		27.4	23.1	12.9	9.7	8.3

In figure 3, these findings will be visualized by means of a biplot, which locates the variables (and factors) as well as the single countries in one single graph. The results fit surprisingly well with our theoretical considerations. We first can observe that the Nordic countries as well as the liberal and the economically more developed Catholic countries rank highest on the modern

¹³ In brackets significant correlating variables.

side, in strong opposition to the Balkan countries and the late transition states. The former groups, however, differ on the second axis. The Scandinavian and the liberal countries are more secular than e.g. Belgium, France, or Austria, which in this respect correspond with the Southern European countries as well as the Eastern European Catholic group. One exception has to be mentioned. The Czech republic is comparable with the other Eastern European Catholic countries as concerning the degree of modernization, but is more secular. Aarebrot and Berglund (1995: 218) had shown, that Czechoslovakia already in the Inter-War Period belonged to the highly secular countries. We furthermore can take from the figure that among the Eastern European countries the religious legacies are highly relevant. The Protestant countries (Eastern Germany, Estonia, and Latvia) indicate a similar degree of modernization, but are more secularized. Again, the communist legacy obviously furthered the secularization of the Balkan and the late transition states, independently from their strong traditionalism. A distinct position takes Turkey by combining religiousness and traditionalism. In general, one can state that these results fully support our theory-based grouping as formulated in the introduction.



Legend:
 F-1 to F-5 : rotated factors of the principal component analysis
 Variables/scales (greyed) : see details in Table 2 and Appendix ;
 Country short-keys : see details in Appendix;
 DIALOG-countries are framed
 Missings (due to lacking data) : ALBA, CYP, DK, GR, LUX, RU

Figure 3. A cultural map of Europe (biplot)

4. ECONOMICAL AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, AND GOVERNANCE

Because of the internal congruence in the results, we discuss the results of the economical resources, the human development and the governance in a joint way. The Principal component analysis of the economical indicators, namely the wealth of the countries (GDP/c), the unemployment rates, and the inflation, there is a very strong first factor (explaining 54% of the variance), while the second factor (inflation) separates mainly the late transition countries from all others. The Principal component analysis of the human development indicators, the Gender empowerment measures and the governance indicators even led to one single factor indicating a strong East-West gradient.

Table 2. Economy related indicators (PCA factor scores)

		Factor 1	Factor 2
GDP per capita 1995	<i>gdp_c_95</i>	0.91	-0.31
GDP per capita 2002	<i>gdp_c_02</i>	0.90	-0.33
GDP per capita 1990	<i>gdp_c_90</i>	0.90	-0.28
GDP per capita 2000	<i>gdp_c_00</i>	0.90	-0.33
Unemployment rate 2000	<i>unempl_00</i>	-0.83	-0.39
Unemployment rate 1995	<i>unempl_95</i>	-0.69	-0.49
Inflation 1992	<i>infla_92</i>	-0.60	0.34
Inflation 2000	<i>infla_00</i>	-0.11	0.87
Inflation 2002	<i>infla_02</i>	-0.17	0.85
Inflation 1996	<i>Infla_96</i>	-0.25	0.83
Variance explained		54.0	25.5




Figure 4. Economical and social development vs. modernization

The economical performance and the social development are highly correlated with the degree of modernization (Figure 4). Regarding the economical performance, countries are equally distributed. By contrast, the social devel-

opment shows still a gap between East and West, and between the late transition countries and the other European states. Due to deficits regarding gender equalization as well as governance, Turkey is clearly an outlier. These findings indicate that the advanced Eastern European countries make up their economical leeway while the social modernization runs more inertly.

5. DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS AND THEIR EVALUATION BY THE GOVERNMENTS

Two aspects are focused in this section. On the one hand, we attempt to cluster the countries under observation according their demographic structure and on the other hand, we analyze the governmental views on recent demographic developments and whether they assess corresponding policies as necessary.

Nineteen demographic indicators measuring population growth, dependency rate, migration, marital behavior (rate and age at first marriage), fertility (TFR and extramarital fertility), divorce, and life expectancy were entered into a principal component analysis. A first factor (34.9%) indicates whether a country experienced the second demographic transition or not, and particularly the strength and diffusion of post-transitional conditions, namely a decrease and postponement of marriages, (early) increasing extra-marital births rates, an a high life-expectancy. This factor splits the Western and Eastern hemisphere. The scores rank highest in the Northern European countries followed by the liberal countries, the Western Catholic countries and the South of Europe. The second factor (24.0%) covers reproductive behavior and shows highest scores in the Balkan and Islamic territories followed by the Nordic countries. Degraded at the bottom are the Easter European Protestant countries. A weaker (14.5%) third factor is related mainly to migration. Loadings are highest in the West and South of Europe as well as in Turkey. Finally the fourth factor (6.4%) covers ageing and divorce behavior. Scores are highest in the Protestant countries, both in East and West.

The genesis and diffusion of a new demographic regime since the 1970s, known as the second demographic transition constitutes a process which is caused according to van de Kaa (2002) or Surkyn and Lesthaeghe (2002) by firstly the social-economic progress in society, secondly a population's cultural endowment and thirdly, technological improvements and their application. Insofar, there is no doubt that demographic trends are correlated with modernization. However, as we want to illustrate, this connection is obviously not that simple.

Table 3. Factors related to the demographic development (PCA scores)

		Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4
First marriage age 2000	<i>marage00</i>	0.940	-0.034	0.050	0.235
First marriage age 1990	<i>marage90</i>	0.938	0.012	0.116	0.190
Life expectancy (m) 2002	<i>lexp02_m</i>	0.894	-0.066	0.280	-0.020
Marriage rate 1990-2000	<i>df_marr</i>	0.835	0.278	0.135	-0.215
Life expectancy (f) 2002	<i>lexp02_f</i>	0.832	-0.349	0.224	0.112
Extramarital births 1990	<i>extra90</i>	0.611	0.176	-0.572	0.447
Pop. growth 1995-2002	<i>pop95_02</i>	0.544	0.522	0.448	-0.079
TPFR 1995	<i>igf95</i>	0.072	0.941	0.174	-0.017
TPFR 2000	<i>igf00</i>	0.326	0.866	0.065	-0.023
TPFR 1990	<i>igf90</i>	-0.415	0.838	-0.117	0.108
Dependency rate 2002	<i>dep_r02</i>	0.420	-0.763	-0.058	0.176
Migration solde 1990	<i>migs_90</i>	0.234	0.101	0.843	0.187
Extramarital births 2000	<i>extra00</i>	0.398	0.038	-0.702	0.547
Pop. growth 1990-1995	<i>pop90_95</i>	0.356	0.563	0.665	-0.188
Migration solde 1995	<i>migs_95</i>	0.433	0.012	0.567	-0.256
Migration solde 2000	<i>migs_00</i>	0.458	0.165	0.549	0.097
Dependency rate 1990-2000	<i>dif_dep_r</i>	0.023	-0.068	-0.100	-0.739
Divorce rate 2000	<i>div_r</i>	0.229	-0.133	-0.088	0.683
Marriage rate 2000	<i>marr00</i>	0.210	0.422	0.341	-0.521
Variance explained		34.9	24.0	14.5	6.4

The first demographic factor covers major elements of the post-transitional regime - or the individualistic family model as called by van de Kaa and Lesthaeghe. The scattergram with the scores of this factor on the one axis, and modernized values on the other shows a significant correlation. Reproductive behavior (factor 2), however, seem to be - at least at first glance - independent from modern values. An in-depth analysis, which would go beyond the scope of this article could probably show that e.g. temporal structures could have an intervening impact (see e.g. Fux 1994).¹⁴

Factor three that covers migration processes is of different nature. Here, we assume that migration soldes can be seen rather as short and medium-term responses on country-specific labor market conditions.

As concerning the relationship between divorce (factor four) and modernization, we observe at least that in both Protestant country groups the scores are highest. Furthermore, if instead of modernism (factor 1 of the value system) the degree of secularization will be plotted against the fourth demographic factor, we get a correlation, even if it is rather weak. As we know from comparative legal studies, the civil law in Protestant countries is significantly more tolerant towards divorce than this is the case in the Roman law tradition.

¹⁴ For example: The commencement of the new demographic regime varies country by county. The behavioral adjustment with such new conditions frequently causes a rapid drop in fertility followed later on by a recovering phase. On the basis of cross-sectional data, such processes cannot be detected.




Figure 5. Demographic trends (1st and 2nd factor) vs. modernization

In order not to overload this article, we outline only briefly the results of the analyses on the evaluation of demographic trends by the government as well as the correlation between the composition of the national cabinets and modern values.

As concerning the former, there is evidence that countries where the second demographic transition started comparatively early and where the new demographic conditions are consolidated, is the government scarcely concerned about the ongoing processes. We observe furthermore that these views cover mainly the factual demographic issues. E.g. in countries with a pronounced immigration, ageing, or mortality these obvious topics are also a matter of political concern. By consequence, we find a correlation between the indicator of modernization and the evaluation of demographic trends (1st factor) which encases a significant gap between East and West. Also the party-composition (the poles of the first factor are formed by pure social-democratic and pure post-communist regimes) indicate a similar correlation.




Figure 6. Governmental views on demographic trends and cabinet composition vs. modernization

6. WELFARE STATE AND BEHAVIORAL OUT-COME

We already mentioned the broad variety of dimension with which the structures of welfare systems are measured (see footnote 12). Here, we focus on the following dimensions: (a) the extent or generosity of benefits (total social expenditure), (b) the welfare targets (exp. by old-age, health, family, unemployment, others), (c) the benefit formulae (universal or targeted) measured via the coverage of provisions and variables indicating whether policies are gendered or equality-oriented and if provisions are parity-specific or not, (d) the structure of family related policies (enrollment, allowances, leave schemes), (e) the governance of welfare policies as a (obviously weak) indicator for the delegation of obligation to a plurality of lower-level institutions (expenditure for administrative purposes).

Table 4. Factors related to the welfare state development (PCA scores)

		Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4
Total social expenditure	<i>exp_tot</i>	0.90	0.21	0.18	0.16
Fathers entitled to leave	<i>male_leave</i>	0.87	0.09	-0.01	-0.06
Total expenditure: health	<i>exp_health</i>	0.81	0.16	0.25	-0.04
Total exp.: unemployment	<i>exp_unemp</i>	0.80	0.17	0.04	0.11
Total exp.: age, survivors	<i>exp_old</i>	0.77	0.12	-0.02	0.07
Enrollment 0-3, 2001	<i>enrol01</i>	0.75	-0.29	0.24	0.03
Enrollment 0-3, 1993	<i>enrol93</i>	0.74	-0.26	0.21	0.02
Total expenditure: families	<i>exp_fam</i>	0.71	0.42	0.38	0.08
Child allowances	<i>kizul_ppp</i>	0.69	-0.02	0.23	0.25
Index Maternity leave 1993	<i>ind_93</i>	0.07	0.89	0.09	-0.07
Coverage maternity leave	<i>l_cover_ind</i>	0.35	0.69	0.20	0.05
Index Maternity leave 2002	<i>ind_02</i>	0.01	0.68	0.31	0.09
Parity specific allowances	<i>parity</i>	0.22	-0.63	0.49	-0.06
Coverage child allowances	<i>a_cover_ind</i>	0.21	0.16	0.77	0.27
Total duration leave	<i>leave_tot</i>	0.18	0.24	0.67	-0.17
Total exp.: administration	<i>exp_admin</i>	0.04	-0.16	-0.10	0.89
Total exp.: other purposes	<i>exp_oth</i>	0.20	0.30	0.18	0.83
Variance explained		39.9	15.3	9.3	7.2

The Principal Component Analysis (table 4) of these wide set of indicator led to four factors whereat the first showing the generosity and the scope of welfare activities is by far the most influential (explained variance: 39.9%). A second factor (15.3%) covers mainly the strength of the family dimension within the welfare systems, particularly the generosity of parental leave schemes. The child-orientation of family policies forms a further factor (9.3%) and finally the centrality of the state creates a fourth factor (7.2).

The result regarding the extent of national welfare systems supports the obvious North-South gradient of total social expenditure (Figure 7). The Northern European countries, followed by the secularized Catholic countries

in the West developed generous provisions systems. The Eastern European Catholic and Protestant countries run on average positions, while in the Balkan states, the late transitions countries and Turkey the extent of welfare provision is poorest.




Figure 7. Welfare expenditure by policy field and country 1995

Figure 8 widens this basic dimension by indicating differences in the scope of welfare policies is clearly linked with modernization. The less modernized groups (Balkan, late transition and Islamic countries) focus their welfare system mainly on the issue of old age, while the most modernized countries let observe a outbalanced structure of all distinct policy areas.




Figure 8. Target differences of welfare policies

Items deriving from the PPA-dataset allow specifying how individuals evaluate the structure as well as the trends of national welfare policies. As indicator we selected the proportion of respondents answering that the government is paying actually less attention to single welfare areas than in the recent past (figure 9).¹⁵ Two findings are worthwhile to underline. First, the answers indicate a general satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the government in the sense that the population does not really differentiate between policy areas. On other words: the political norms on which national welfare systems are based (therefore the grounds for distinct regime types) seem to universal and are shared by the individuals. There is no indication that the population wishes to change the previous paths. Secondly, we observe a gradient which is correlated with the degree of modernization, even if the small number of countries vitiates such a general assertion.




Figure 9. Perception/evaluation of policies by individuals

So far, these results allow a discussion of the major differences between countries regarding the scores in the before-mentioned factors. We first observe that on the first factor both, the Nordic countries as well as the economically advanced and secularized Catholic countries are to be found. By contrast, leading on the second factor (strong family dimension) are the Nordic states. This difference can be explained by the fact that the former dispose not only on the most generous, but also on universal systems covering all relevant policy areas in a well-balanced manner. These differences are furthermore fully congruent with our theoretical considerations insofar, as these support the idea of different trajectories in the development of modern welfare systems. Therefore the extent of welfare provisions on the one hand and the corresponding arrangements that are based in country specific legacies on the other should be kept apart. Furthermore we observe that the third factor (strong child-orientation) shows high-

¹⁵ Bases are the variables ci2a to ci2i (without ci2h), which is available in the PPAS data-set, but not for all countries. We standardized the data by age and restricted the samples to people younger than 55 years.

est scores in the Catholic Eastern European territories. This indicates that these countries were successful in establishing a welfare system during the communist that was congruent with their particular cultural prerequisites. Finally, the liberal countries where more welfare obligations are delegated to a plurality of lower level institutions rank - as expected - highest on the fourth factor. Again, the results of this Principal Component analysis is fully compatible with our theoretical considerations.

The following figure 10 illustrates the correlation between the degree modernization and the strength of the welfare state¹⁶. We assume a non-linear structure by taking into account that cultural modernization could develop even if particularly weak economical conditions hamper the implementation of welfare instruments. We clearly find the assumed ranking order, namely that the Nordic countries, as well as the liberal states and the economically developed and secularized Catholic countries are in the pole position, followed by the group of Eastern European Catholic countries. Particularly the late transition countries ranking lowest. This finding supports the resources-restriction-behavior model, as formulated by Cliquet.

By considering one single dimension (female labor force participation), also the correlation between the structure of the welfare state and the behavioral outcome finds support. Again, we plead for a non-linear association, due to the same reasons. A closer look on this figure exposes on the one hand the general correlation between behavior and modern values. On the other hand we can take from the graph that the chosen trajectory is of relevance. Regarding female labor force participation, obviously gendered welfare systems (there is no obligation to qualify them as conservative as Esping-Andersen is doing) create significant differences in the outcome. The Secularized Catholic countries for example, let observe here an equally high cultural modernization, but lower participation rates than the Nordic countries as well as the liberal ones.




Figure 10. Welfare state arrangements and female labor force participation vs. modernization

With the discussion of these dimensions we finish our empirical tour d'horizon and proceed finally to some concluding remarks which can be documented with a cluster-analysis in which all analytical dimensions (all factors) were entered¹⁷.

¹⁶ Because all factors support our theoretical underpinnings, we document only the first factor.

¹⁷ Because of technical reasons we must exclude Turkey and therefore the Islamic world from this analysis.

7. CONCLUSION

Our considerations are based on the conviction that there exists something like a "basso continuo" structuring the development of European countries. Its name - modernization - refers to baseline trends such as first the democratization of wealth due to the processes of industrialization and tertiarization, secondly the secularization of the value system and therefore a continuous spread of values such as equality, freedom of choice, and security and finally a trend towards individualism in the sense of increasing valorization of achievement and self-responsibility. Obviously, the welfare state is an important midwife of modernization. However, in contrast to structural-functionalist modernization theories as formulated in the 1970s, we assume that there exist distinct trajectories of modernization and by consequence also distinct welfare regimes. The approach of Stein Rokkan who developed a conceptual map where differences in the form of modernization were reduced to the configuration of historically grown cleavages can easily widened to Eastern Europe. Linking up with this approach, we attempted to carve out nine country-groups, which differ mainly in their cultural legacies as well as their social-structural prerequisites. In a subsequent step we to reduce the number of groups based on the hypothesis that there are three trajectories which on the one hand are based in different focal values (equality, freedom of choice, and security) and on the other on the focal actors, which could be either the state, lower-level institutions and particularly the family, and finally the single individual. We argue that also the current welfare state arrangements are bases in this framing. In order to empirically underpin this view, we consecutively discussed a number of dimensions whereas these dimensions are anchored in a macro-sociological actor-model. The before-mentioned results strongly confirm our hypothesis.




Figure 11. Final cluster solution

If we finally discuss the solution of a K-means cluster analysis where all factors were taken into account (figure 11), we can summarize the findings as follows. First, we find a relatively

dense cluster following the etatistic trajectory. These are the Nordic states. Secondly, there are also a "family of nations" (Castles and Mitchell 1993) in the Eastern hemisphere where the late transition countries are characterized by the persistence of rather traditional structures which stand, however, in opposition to a secularization due to their communist legacy. The two other clusters are much wider and show market internal differences. These are first the countries with a Catholic history. These can be subdivided into those who secularized and developed strong welfare systems based on the concept of subsidiarity. Furthermore, the non-secularized countries (counter-reformation countries) let observe much weaker welfare systems. These prioritize the family as an important actor in this respect. Mutual self-help within the family is partly a substitute of the welfare state. Both sub-groups can be seen as variants of an familialistic trajectory of modernization. We also can show that most of the Eastern European Catholic countries that currently are shuffling off the legacy of their former communism, tend to prefer this trajectory as well. Some of them (e.g. Slovenia) already reached on most dimensions the level of Southern European countries. In strong contrast a sub-group of the former communist countries, namely those with a Protestant history, tend to develop rather in the lines of the etatistic trajectory. One group of countries is less easily to detect. The liberal countries located in the European city-belt are characterized by a strong cultural modernization. But due to the weakness of the state and the dominant role of the market which hampered the implementation of strong welfare instruments, these are imposed to mix a highly modern and pluralized culture with partly (phenotypically) traditional forms in behaviour. In our figure, this group who follows an individualistic trajectory, is located just between the Protestant and the Catholic hemispheres.

A final remark pertains the Eastern Catholic countries. If Max Weber detected that the spirit of Protestantism was the driving force for the development of modern capitalism, we found in our analyses gentle hints that their spirit of Catholicism could be an important force in the forthcoming process of European convergence in the field of Welfare policies.

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9. ANNEX

Annex-Table 1. Country short keys

Country group	Short-key	Country (PPA-countries outlined)
1 Northern European Countries	DK	Denmark
	ISL	Iceland
	N	Norway
	S	Sweden
	SF	Finland
2 Liberal countries (see: city-belt)	CH	Switzerland
	NL	Netherlands
	UK	United Kingdom
3 Eastern European Protestant C.	D-est	Germany (former GDR)
	EST	Estonia
	LAT	Latvia
4 Western European Catholic C. (secularized)	A	Austria
	B	Belgium
	D	Germany (former FRG)
	F	France
	LUX	Luxembourg
5 Northern and Southern Peripheries (non-secularized Catholic Countries; incl. Greece and Cyprus)	CYP	Cyprus
	E	Spain
	GR	Greece
	I	Italy
	IRL-n	Northern Ireland
	IRL	Ireland
	P	Portugal
6 Eastern European Catholic C.	CRO	Croatia
	CZ	Czech Republic
	H	Hungary
	LIT	Lithuania
	PL	Poland
	SLO	Slovenia
	SR	Slovak Republik
7 Balkan countries	ALBA	Albania
	BOS	Bosnia
	MAZ	Macedonia
	MONTE	Montenegro
	SERB	Serbia
8 Late Transition Countries	BELA	Belarus
	BG	Bulgaria
	MOLD	Moldova
	RU	Romania
	UKR	Ukraine
9 Islamic countries	TR	Turkey

Notes:

Countries mentioned but not included in the Analyses: **US** = United States; **NZ** = New Zealand; **AUS** = Australia; **CAN** = Canda; **JAP** = Japan.

Greyed = PPA-countries

Annex-Table 2. Variables and operationalizations

label	Source	Operationalisation
Cultural variables		
cath	1,2,3,	Proportion of Catholics, %, (ca. 2000)
prot	1,2,3,	Proportion of Protestants, %, (ca. 2000)
ortho	1,2,3,	Proportion of Orthodox, %, (ca. 2000)
muslim	1,2,3,	Proportion of Muslims, %, (ca. 2000)
none	1,2,3,	Prop. without denomination, %, (ca. 2000)
attend	3,	Regular attendance at relig. services, %, (ca. 1997)
secular	3,	Scale: secular-rational (+) vs. traditional (-) values Country's factor scores, (1995-98) based on PCA using 5 items ¹⁸ : („god is important in respondent's life“; „It is more important for a child to learn obedience and religious faith than independence and determination“; „Abortion is never justifiable“; „Respondent has a strong sense of national pride“; „Respondent favours more respect for authority“).
s.exp	3,	Scale: self-expression (+) vs. survival oriented (-) values Country's factor scores, (1995-98) based on PCA using 5 items ¹⁹ („Respondent gives priority to economic and physical security over self-expression and quality-of-life“; „Respondent describes self as not very happy“; „Respondent has not signed and would not sign a petition“; „Homosexuality is never justifiable“; „You have to be very careful about trusting people“).
fam	3,	Scale: familialism, % with strong (upper quartile) family orientation Likert-scale based on 6 items (1995-98) ²⁰ : „Family is important in respondent's life“ (v4); „Parents' duty is to do the best for their children even at the expense of their own wellbeing vs. Parents have a life of their own and shouldn't be asked to sacrifice their own wellbeing for the sake of their children“ (v13); „Marriage is an out-dated institution“ (v94); „More emphasis on family life“ (v115); Abortion (Dummy: justified or not) (v199); Divorce (Dummy: justified or not) (v200).
postmat	3,	% postmaterialists (1995-1998) Index based on the Inglehart's 12 item Materialist/Postmaterialist values battery ²¹
left	3,	% with a left-wing orientation (v123: 1-3), (1995-98)
eq	3,	% opting for more equality (v125: 1-3), (1995-98)
achiev	3,	% opting for achievement (v126: 1-3), (1995-98)
gov	3,	% opting for strong role of the government (v127: 1-3), (1995-98)
compete	3,	% strongly opting for competition (v128: 1-3)
Economical variables		
G90-G02	4,	Gross domestic product per capita (PPPs in US-\$) 1990 to 2002
gdp_90b02	4,	<u>dito</u> : Increase of GDP/c 1990-2002 (abs. Values)
mean90_96	4,	<u>dito</u> : Mean annual increase of GDP/c 1990 to 1996 (in %)
mean97_02	4,	<u>dito</u> : for 1997-2002
infla_92	5,	Inflation rate 1992 (in %) <u>dito</u> : infla_96, infla_00, infla_02
Gini	5,	Family income Gini-Index (ca. 2000)
unempl_95	4,	Unemployment rate 1995 (%) <u>dito</u> : unempl_00
Demographic variables		
pop90_95	6,	Population growth 1990-1995 (average annual increase in %) <u>dito</u> : pop95_02
pop_2002	6,	Population on 1 st January 2002 (in 1'000)
migs_90	6,	Net migration solde 1990 (per 1'000 av. pop.) <u>dito</u> : migs_95, migs_00

¹⁸ As scale construction concerns, see Inglehart/Baker2000.

¹⁹ As scale construction concerns, see Inglehart/Baker2000.

²⁰ The scale is similar to the familialism-scale developed by Lesthaeghe/Meekers 1986.

²¹ See: Inglehart/Abramson, 1999.

dep_r02	6,	Dependency ratio 2002 (65+ of 15-64)
dif_dep_r	6,	Average per cent point difference of dependency r. 1990-2002
marr00	6,	Total first marriage rate for females below the age of 50, 2000
df_marr	6,	Per cent point difference: TFMR 1990-2000
marage90	6,	Mean age of women at first marriage 1990, <u>dito: marage00</u>
div_r	6,	Per cent point diff. in female first marr. age 1990-2000
extra90	6,	Extramarital births 1990 (per 1'000 births) <u>dito: extra00</u>
igf90	6,	Total period fertility rate 1990; <u>dito: igf95, igf00, igf02</u>
lexp90_m	6,	Life expec. at birth men 1990 <u>dito: lexp90_f(em.), lexp02_m, lexp02_f</u>

Social development variables

hdi_90	7,	Human Development Index 1990, <u>dito: hdi_95, hdi_00, hdi_02</u>
dhdi9095	7,	hdi95 minus hdi90, <u>dito: dhdi9502</u>
gov_96	8,	Governance Index 1996 (civil rights, political stability, Efficiency of the government, quality of regulations, rule of law, and anti-corruption) 1996; <u>dito: gov_98, gov_00, gov_02</u>
GDM_92	7,	Gender related Development index 1992, <u>dito: GDM_98, GDM_02</u>
GEMP_98	7,	Gender empowerment measure 1998, <u>dito: GEMP_01</u>

Views on population policies variables

Vw_frt96	9,	View on fertility 1996, <u>dito: Vw_frt03</u>
Po_frt96	9,	Policy to modify fertility 1996, <u>dito: Po_frt03</u>
contra96	9,	Access to contraceptive methods 1996, <u>dito: contra03</u>
w_pop96	9,	View on population growth 1996, <u>dito: Vw_pop03</u>
Po_pop96	9,	Policy on population growth 1996, <u>dito: Po_pop03</u>
age96	9,	Ageing of the population 1996, <u>dito: age03</u>
exp96	9,	Expectation of life 1996, <u>dito: exp03</u>
Vw_imm96	9,	View on immigration level 1996, <u>dito: Vw_imm03</u>
Po_imm96	9,	Policy on immigration level 1996, <u>dito: Po_imm03</u>
Vw_emg96	9,	View on emigration level 1996, <u>dito: Vw_emg03</u>
Po_emg96	9,	Policy on emigration level 1996, <u>dito: Po_emg03</u>

Policy variables

kizul_ppp	10,	Family allowances 2002 (PPPs in US-\$)
leave_tot	11,	Total parental leave (in weeks)
f_gdp_93	4,	Family cash benefits (in % of GDP, 1993), <u>dito: f_gdp_98</u>
m_leav93	11,	Maternity leave (1993, in weeks) , <u>dito: m_leav02</u>
pay93	11,	Percentage of wage replaced (1993, in %)
ind_93	11,	Index Maternity leave (1993, duration*wage replacement) <u>dito: pay02</u>
Parity	11,	Parity specific child allowances (Dummy)
enrol93	12,	gross enrollment rate of the public early (0-3)childhood education (1993, in %) <u>dito: enrol01</u>
l_cover_ind	2,11,	Coverage maternity leave (2002, entitled to leave in % of all women), ows computations
A_cover_ind	2,11,	Coverage child allowances (2002, entitled for allowances in % of all women), own computations
exp_old	4,13,14,	Total expenditure for old age and survivors, (2002, in % of GDP)
exp_health	4,13,14,	Total expenditure for health (2002, in % of GDP)
exp_fam	4,13,14,	Total expenditure for families (2002, in % of GDP)
exp_unemp	4,13,14,	Total expenditure for unemployment (2002, in % of GDP)
exp_oth	4,13,14,	Total expenditure for other purposes (2002, in % of GDP)
exp_admin	4,13,14,	Total expenditure for administration (2002, in % of GDP)
exp_tot	4,13,14,	Total social expenditure (2002, in % of GDP)
male_leave	12,	Fathers are entitled to parental leave (2002, Dummy) Gauthier 2004

Polity variables

G90_r	15,	Right-wing in % of all cabinet posts 1990, <u>dito: G95_r, G00_r, G00_r, G02_r</u>
G90_c	15,	Centre part. in % of all cabinet posts 1990, <u>dito: G95_c, G00_c, G00_c, G02_c</u>

G90_1	15,	Social-democratic and other left parties in % of all cabinet posts 1990, <u>dito: G95_1, G00_1, G00_1, G02_1</u>
G90_pc	15,	(Post-)Communist parties in % of all cabinet posts 1990, <u>dito: G95_pc, G00_pc, G00_pc, G02_pc</u>

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Annex-Table 3. Variables and operationalizations

	Values					Econ.		Dev.	Demography				Views		Welfare				Polity				LFP
	F-1	F-2	F-3	F-4	F-5	F-1	F-2		F-1	F-1	F-2	F-3	F-4	F-1	F-2	F-1	F-2	F-3	F-4	F-1	F-2	F-3	
A	0.73	-0.41	-1.25	1.07	-0.01	1.22	-0.02	0.82	0.57	-0.59	0.55	0.56	-0.78	0.17	0.85	0.05	-0.25	0.31	-0.32	1.74	-0.18	0.79	58.7
B	0.82	0.35	-1.09	-0.63	0.31	0.84	-0.39	0.64	0.20	-0.53	0.48	0.69	-1.32	-0.32	1.48	-1.30	-0.21	0.59	-0.50	-0.11	0.34	1.23	51.1
BELA	-1.30	0.34	0.41	-0.92	-0.97	-0.35	4.43	-2.07	-1.23	-0.09	0.01	-0.01	1.23	0.35	-0.38	0.35	-1.84	-0.86	1.62	-0.08	1.02	-0.78	45.3
BG	-1.03	0.31	0.38	-0.64	0.24	-1.19	-0.39	-1.66	-0.70	-0.78	-1.17	-0.62	1.17	-0.01	-0.86	0.24	-0.63	-0.75	0.42	0.59	1.10	1.16	47.5
CH	1.37	0.65	-0.23	1.42	1.07	1.70	-0.06	0.96	0.63	-0.59	1.36	-0.26	-0.99	0.90	0.46	-0.51	-1.13	2.90	-0.40	0.32	-0.41	0.34	71.6
CRO	-0.49	0.17	-1.66	1.76	0.69	-0.94	-0.66	-1.06	-0.20	-0.61	0.06	-1.39	1.42	-0.61	-1.60	0.62	-0.05	3.66	0.00	-0.66	-2.34	-0.98	48.9
CYP	-0.48	-0.46	0.16	-0.06	1.35	0.57	0.22	-1.09	0.37	1.31	1.67	-1.38	1.04	1.17	-0.86	-0.39	-0.40	-0.30	-0.24	0.47	0.28	1.24	59.1
CZ	-0.19	1.54	-0.64	1.96	-1.25	0.08	0.01	-0.30	-1.01	-0.71	0.53	0.63	0.42	-1.11	-0.86	0.23	1.10	-0.52	0.26	-1.41	0.75	2.11	57.1
D	1.34	0.60	0.12	0.68	-0.04	0.85	-0.36	0.80	0.40	-0.81	1.73	0.38	-0.98	0.78	1.31	-0.66	1.06	0.51	-0.16	-1.34	1.04	3.08	58.8
DK	1.24	0.26	1.76	0.39	-0.31	1.22	-0.17	0.95	1.56	0.55	-0.67	0.23	-1.30	0.29	1.42	1.64	-0.12	0.84	-0.95	-0.79	-0.65	-1.13	72.6
E	0.45	-0.37	-0.71	-1.68	0.57	-0.33	-1.02	0.49	0.54	-1.13	1.08	0.26	-0.19	0.17	0.58	-0.48	-1.16	-0.39	-1.41	3.23	0.83	-1.26	44.9
EST	-0.79	0.96	0.80	0.35	-1.16	-0.59	-0.16	-0.50	-0.84	-0.42	-1.76	1.14	0.03	1.22	-0.76	-0.60	1.84	-0.55	0.40	0.54	-0.52	0.20	57.9
F	0.92	0.77	-0.77	-1.14	1.03	0.56	-0.58	0.39	1.19	0.22	-0.59	0.04	-0.41	1.59	1.40	-0.50	1.07	-0.50	-0.63	-0.74	-0.08	0.39	55.8
GR	-0.59	-0.07	-0.14	-0.23	1.06	0.03	-0.26	-0.18	0.10	-1.25	1.08	-0.85	0.90	1.53	0.27	-1.34	-1.43	0.05	-1.73	-1.34	1.18	-1.13	42.7
H	-0.27	-0.47	-0.53	1.11	-0.54	-0.24	0.08	-0.47	-0.77	-0.32	0.21	0.43	0.96	1.20	-0.61	0.68	2.03	0.40	-0.34	0.29	-0.49	0.42	49.8
I	0.71	-0.28	-1.01	-1.08	0.72	0.58	-0.53	0.13	0.70	-1.49	0.40	-1.38	-0.96	0.30	1.01	-0.95	-0.87	-1.43	0.04	0.20	-0.40	1.31	42
IRL	0.62	-2.33	-1.05	0.22	-0.91	0.54	-0.26	0.65	0.67	1.09	0.10	-0.10	-0.54	-1.73	0.51	-1.41	0.53	0.56	-0.15	-0.24	-1.56	-0.24	55.2
ISL	0.99	-0.24	1.96	1.26	-0.37	1.32	0.14	0.99	1.92	2.07	-1.61	0.56	-1.11	-0.87	1.37	1.05	-0.19	0.84	-0.13	1.33	-0.76	0.48	79.8
LAT	-0.81	0.97	0.30	0.30	-1.31	-0.51	-0.02	-0.92	-1.73	-0.52	-0.25	2.84	0.71	0.11	-0.63	0.00	0.36	0.46	0.77	-0.23	-2.03	-0.25	56.8
LIT	-0.79	0.13	-1.21	0.68	-0.02	-0.64	-0.11	-0.79	-1.31	-0.26	-0.71	-0.05	0.23	0.91	-0.71	0.07	-1.03	-0.29	1.13	0.23	-1.26	-0.25	57.2
LUX	1.11	0.66	-0.48	-0.84	0.27	2.50	-0.08	0.81	0.56	0.08	1.82	0.65	-0.71	0.60	1.12	-0.94	0.45	-0.87	-0.11	1.85	-0.16	1.35	51.5
MAZ	-1.33	-0.09	0.33	0.55	1.22	-2.76	-1.77	-1.05	-0.46	1.38	-0.06	-1.67	-2.79	-2.16	-1.06	0.23	-0.28	-0.57	1.62	-0.08	1.02	-0.78	40.8
MOLD	-1.97	-0.33	0.90	-1.34	-0.31	-1.36	0.24	-2.20	-2.32	0.47	-0.67	0.41	1.46	-1.16	-1.30	0.23	-0.38	-0.53	1.62	-0.08	1.02	-0.78	54.2
N	0.93	-0.02	1.73	0.12	-1.05	1.53	-0.12	1.19	1.04	0.66	-0.48	1.11	-1.00	-0.51	0.80	1.43	0.55	-0.73	-1.05	0.45	0.17	-0.45	73.9
NL	1.38	0.92	-0.17	-2.29	-0.24	1.10	-0.08	1.05	0.59	-0.01	0.56	0.13	-1.30	0.29	1.04	-0.14	-1.07	-0.40	-0.38	0.63	-0.16	0.79	64.7
P	0.41	-0.21	-1.31	-0.54	0.56	0.28	0.03	0.26	0.42	-0.46	-0.07	-1.07	-0.30	0.74	-0.57	-1.13	0.31	0.63	-0.58	-1.23	-0.60	-0.73	60.8
PL	0.09	-2.16	-0.63	-1.19	-1.21	-0.73	-0.29	-0.53	-0.85	0.02	0.23	-0.61	0.46	-0.92	-0.31	-0.45	1.23	-0.78	-0.11	0.44	0.35	-0.12	46.4
RU	-1.38	0.03	0.43	-0.25	0.30	-0.71	0.84	-1.49	-1.01	-0.39	-0.42	-0.82	1.37	-0.23	-1.08	-1.25	1.25	-0.04	-1.33	0.14	0.65	-0.89	51.8
S	1.48	0.56	2.17	0.21	-0.41	0.74	-0.29	1.13	1.24	0.32	-0.13	2.34	-1.21	-0.53	1.34	2.87	-0.31	-0.05	-1.87	-0.32	1.70	-0.84	73.4
SF	1.57	0.75	1.19	-0.02	0.57	0.41	-0.65	1.05	0.92	0.28	-0.33	0.34	-1.21	-0.33	0.89	1.83	0.10	0.04	-0.76	-0.54	-0.38	-0.48	66.1
SLO	-0.20	0.36	-1.09	0.54	0.29	-0.03	-0.04	-0.12	0.40	-0.73	-0.52	-0.42	0.63	1.25	0.44	-0.51	0.47	0.02	0.52	-0.18	-1.10	0.30	58.6
SR	-0.44	-0.08	-0.65	0.76	-1.01	-0.71	-0.56	-0.72	-1.16	0.03	0.43	0.23	0.94	1.72	-0.36	0.88	1.00	-0.53	0.63	-0.32	-1.38	-0.15	51.4
TR	0.03	-2.44	1.62	0.80	2.77	-0.55	1.86	-2.01	-1.46	3.63	0.77	-0.49	-5.24	-0.65	-1.61	-0.50	-2.03	-0.66	0.00	-2.17	0.56	-0.87	26.6
UK	0.62	-0.03	0.67	-0.76	-0.87	0.79	-0.26	0.80	0.62	0.11	-0.08	0.73	-0.99	-0.85	0.31	0.15	-0.37	0.47	-0.97	-2.06	0.23	-0.37	66.3
UKR	-1.64	0.50	0.23	-0.67	-0.78	-1.15	1.73	-1.82	-1.48	-0.44	0.13	0.27	1.92	-1.23	-1.12	0.31	0.45	-0.39	1.62	-0.08	1.02	-0.78	50.7

LFP = Labor Force Participation rate; greyed = PPA countries; bold: imputed data