Global Transformations
Politics, Economics and Culture

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In memory of Gisela Held and Margaret McGrew
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the context in which, and instruments through which, state power and authority are exercised. In this respect the globalization of production invites an uneasy balance of power between SIACS and MNCs in which the role and functions of national government are having to adjust to a new world production order.

5.9 Conclusion

Today, the globalization of production is organized in large measure by MNCs. Their pre-eminence in world output, trade, investment and technology transfer is unprecedented. Even when MNCs have a clear national base, their interest is in global profitability above all. MNCs have grown from national firms to global concerns using international investment to exploit their competitive advantages. Increasingly, however, they are using joint ventures and strategic alliances to develop and exploit those advantages or to share the costs of technological innovation. But the growing globalization of production is not limited to MNC activity, for over the last three decades there has been a significant growth in producer-driven and buyer-driven global production and distribution networks. The globalization of business is thus no longer confined to the MNC but also embraces SMEs.

MNCs, however, are the linchpins of the contemporary world economy. Around 53,000 MNCs account for at least 20 per cent (some estimate 30 per cent) of world output and on some estimates up to 70 per cent of world trade (Dunning, 1993b, p. 14; Strange, 1996, p. 47; Perraton et al., 1997; UNCTAD, 1998). Despite regional concentrations of production, transnational business networks span the three core regions of the world economy, linking the fortunes of disparate communities and nations in complex webs of interconnectedness. Contrary to the sceptics, MNCs are not simply 'national firms with international operations', nor are they, as the hyperglobalizers argue, 'footloose corporations' which wander the globe in search of maximum profits (Hu, 1992; Reich, 1991). Rather MNCs play a much more central role in the operation of the world economy than in the past and they figure prominently in organizing extensive and intensive transnational networks of coordinated production and distribution that are historically unique. MNCs and global production networks are critical to the organization, location and distribution of productive power in the contemporary world economy. This is reflected too in shifting patterns of global migration – people on the move – discussed in the next chapter.

One form of globalization is more ubiquitous than any other - human migration. At its simplest, migration refers to the movement of people and their temporary or permanent geographical relocation. People have always been on the move and they have moved great distances. There are many impulses behind these movements: victorious armies and empires have swept across and implanted themselves into new territories; the defeated and dispossessed have fled to defensible land and safer havens; the enslaved have been torn from their homes and relocated in the lands of the enslaver; the unemployed and underemployed have searched for work; the persecuted have sought asylum; and the curious and adventurous have always been travelling, drifting and exploring. This chapter examines historical forms of global migration through the conceptual lens outlined in the introduction. The key concepts that can be brought to bear on patterns of migration concern: their extensiveness; their intensity; their velocity; their impact on host and home, states and societies – impacts which display a considerable unevenness and arise, in part, from hierarchies of power among different migrant host groups. In addition, it is important to consider the infrastructures of transportation and communication and the institutions that sustain global labour markets and migratory flows.

William McNeill has argued that two distinctions, one geographical, one social, characterize most forms of migration in human history: central and peripheral migrations; elite and mass migrations (1978). Most often, elite migrations have been military-led conquests on the periphery of states and empires, followed by the settlement of border regions and marches by an aristocracy and their subalters. This may be accompanied by elite migrations of missionaries, merchants and bureaucrats as well as mass migrations of settling nomads and peasant agrarians moving on to new, less populated lands. McNeill distinguishes such migrations to the periphery from flows to the centre: elites migrate to the centres of political power and economic activity in cities and royal courts, while the rural poor and the skilled head for the city in search of work. McNeill's model is well suited to the greater part of human history in which centre and periphery, urban and rural provide a more accurate representation of political space than one demarcated by fixed political borders. Indeed, it could be argued that it was outward migrations that helped define and extend the outer limits of political control of a state or empire rather than the crossing of immutable political boundaries. To chart the geographical form of migrations prior to the advent of nation-states is to simultaneously chart the changing character and location of state boundaries and frontiers.
6.1 Globalization and Migration

Globalization, in this chapter, refers to movements of peoples across regions and between continents, be they labour migrations, diasporas or processes of conquest and colonization. In addition, we shall use the globalization of migration to refer to transoceanic or transcontinental movements which preceded the formation of nation-states: for example, the flows of enslaved Africans to the Americas from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century, prior to the existence of any recognizable African nation-states. Of course, not all cross-border migrations have been global in their extent. The exodus of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in the immediate post-Second World War era, or the flows from Iberia and Italy to Northern Europe in the 1950s, would count as a form of regionalization or regional migration, given the contiguity and clustering of the states and societies enmeshed in these flows.

If the geographical extensity of patterns of migration is variable then so too is the intensity of the flows established. By examining the size of migrations relative to home and host populations, an indication of intensity can be given. It also matters, as noted above, whether migrations are an elite or mass phenomenon. Such qualitative factors are important in weighing evidence of intensity. We have, therefore, tried to provide relative and qualitative measures of migration.

The rapidity or velocity of migration can be assessed in two ways. First, we can consider the movement of people across regions in given time periods, assessing the length of time a mass migration takes from its inception to its conclusion. Second, we can consider velocity in individual terms — the amount of time it takes a migrant to get from his or her original locale to a new host country. Clearly, changes in transportation technology have made a major difference in this respect.

What areas of social life do migration patterns, global or otherwise, intertwine with and transform? Much of the literature on migration focuses on the movement of labour. Yet what we are describing, first and foremost, is the movement of peoples not labour; even if, more often than not, their labour has been the key to their movements. The movement of commodified wage labourers responding primarily to the push and pull of market forces, of supply and demand, is only one facet, albeit an important one, of the mass movement of human beings around the planet. Migrations also interweave with, and are constitutive of, networks of political, military and cultural power (see chapters 1, 2 and 7). A casual glance at the origins of migrations suggests as much. Patterns of military globalization, of conquest and colonization, generate new streams of colonizers from victorious to defeated societies or of refugees from war zones to places of asylum. Accordingly, the impact of global and regional patterns of migration on host and home societies is, as we might expect, often multifaceted. Given that patterns of migration entwine with and transform patterns of economic, cultural and political interaction, we can expect impacts in all these domains.

Most obviously, migration has affected patterns of work and employment. However, we would be hard pressed to capture all the economic effects of migrations through issues of employment and work alone. For example, the large-scale migration of Hong Kong Chinese families and their capital to western Canada in the 1980s and early 1990s has not had its primary economic impact in the labour market. The transformation of business ownership, the housing markets and international trade patterns in contemporary British Columbia and Vancouver testifies to this. Similarly, the main impact on the Algerian economy of Algerian migration to France has probably not been a reduction in the level of domestic unemployment. This has been dwarfed by the impact of remitted hard currency on the balance of payments and the undermining of the official exchange rate through informal black market currency movements.

In addition, people move with their cultures. For the establishment of settlements and migrant communities creates a range of new social relationships between home and emigrant community, home and host societies that previously did not exist. The establishment of immigrant communities with or without extensive connections to their original residence creates and transforms patterns of cultural power and social identification. The presence of an immigrant community inevitably generates a point of comparison and contrast with indigenous cultures. The movement of people brings the movement of new ideas, religions, beliefs, etc., in its wake.

The movement of people, of course, does not occur in a vacuum but must be organized and coordinated across time and space. Migration requires infrastructures and institutions of transport, communication and regulation. The infrastructures of transport and communication affect the costs, risks, speed and scope of potential migrations. The existence of cheaper transportation and telecommunications affects the extent to which immigrant communities can maintain contact with their home societies. But beyond these kinds of infrastructure, migrations have been formally and informally coordinated and regulated. Even the flight of the dispossessed and the defeated will be formally coordinated by refugees or subject to intervention by host countries or international agencies. Contemporary migrants travel in a world in which international law has begun to impact on domestic legislation and international organizations monitor and intervene in migratory processes (see section 1.3.3 above). The extent to which both infrastructures and regulation have attained interregional or transcontinental levels will affect and shape the globalization of migration itself.

The stratification of global and regional migration can be analysed, in the first instance, in terms of the unevenness of origins and destinations. The unequal distribution of access for different groups in different places and the relative power of migratory flows and state agencies seeking to control and shape them can be thought of in terms of hierarchies of power. McNeill's distinction between elite and mass migration points not only to the different social composition of migrations but also to the differential capacities of different social groups to amass the resources for migration and successfully enter other societies and territories. This hierarchy of power among migrants is mirrored by the hierarchy of state power in which different states have differential capacities to control population movements, maintain the integrity of their borders and shape the structure of international migratory regimes.

These concepts provide a vocabulary for describing and comparing the major historical forms of global and regional migration. However, the quality of historical data available on migration varies from epoch to epoch and from state to state. The limits of state power in the premodern and early modern era are indicated by the minimal census data available on either the ethnic composition of states or levels of migration. In an era when so few people were citizens, why would states bother to count their numbers or origins? Calculations of the size of premodern and early modern migrations
People on the Move

People on the Move

must often be established from fragmentary and indirect measures; mainly from partial economic and shipping data. By comparison, the integrity of territorial borders and the distinction between citizens and foreigners is constitutive of the modern nation-state. Territorial definition and national identity are at the core of any nation-state’s existence and this is reflected in a more systematic collection of migration data, although due caution is required before making any generalizations (Wagner et al., 1991; Ritz, 1989; Zlotnik, 1989).

With these caveats in mind, section 6.2 sketches the scope and form of human migrations up to the end of the Second World War. We start by exploring premodern migrations which provide a context for understanding later developments. We then focus on the global expansion of European empires, and the global economic interactions they created. These empires, we argue, formed the basis of an era of global migration that was systematically different from earlier periods. That said, the era of global migrations between 1500 and 1945 was not uniform. We distinguish an early modern phase of geographically extensive but socially less intensive migration up until the end of the eighteenth century from a modern phase of largely extensive but socially intensive migration that was systematic during the period.

In section 6.3, we examine contemporary patterns of global migration. We argue that the 1990s global and regional migrations were approaching the geographical scale and intensity of earlier eras of migrations, but can be distinguished from their predecessors in terms of their distinctive geography, social composition and infrastructure. In section 6.4 we summarize the accumulated evidence, comparing and contrasting different historical forms of global migration and, in section 6.5, we examine differences in national emittance in these forms among the six SIACS which are the focus of this study. Following this, we explore the demographic, economic and political impacts of migration on nation-states, before finally assessing the implications of these flows and patterns for the autonomy and sovereignty of SIACS.

6.2 Historical Forms of Global Migration

The large-scale movement of people and peoples has an enormously long history (Fagan, 1990; Emmer, 1993). Since the emergence of the first rudimentary states over six thousand years ago human migrations have crossed political boundaries as well as extending and reshaping them. Mobile nomads have crossed continents and carved out empires. Some older polities have acquired an internal dynamism that allowed them to push outwards from the centre. Religion and economics have propelled missionaries and merchants across continents. Elements of these processes have been sketched in chapters 1 and 2 on the changing geography of states and warfare. Here we outline some of the main lines of global migratory history since the emergence of settled agrarian civilizations.

6.2.1 Premodern global migrations: extensity and intensity

The most important early large-scale migrations occurred in Asia. At their hub lay Chinese civilization with its fluctuating peripheries around a river valley core (Lee, 1978; Diamond, 1997). Periods of imperial expansion were accompanied by elite and mass migrations to previously peripheral areas in the north, south and west which reached their heights in the third century BC and the fourth and fifth centuries AD. Migrations were often sponsored and regulated by various Chinese states, implemented and organized by the army and accompanied by parallel, privately orchestrated migrations of a substantial size. In the twenty-five years before 200 BC, it is estimated that almost 2 million migrants moved under the auspices of the Han state. These immense migrations are comparable in size to the great migrations of the eighteenth and nineteenth century, though their geography is regional rather than global. Moving in the opposite direction nomad armies north of the Great Wall periodically amassed sufficient strength and organization to penetrate deep into China itself, as well as across the Asian land mass and as far as Europe and the Middle East. The Mongol empires that existed from the twelfth to the fourteenth century brought successive waves of warrior conquest and migrations, first to China where they formed the ruling dynasty, and subsequently further to the west. Indian civilization had been transformed by the military migrations of Aryans over a millennium before the birth of Christ, and the Islamic Moguls initiated extensive change again. However, no major outward military thrusts and accompanying migration were to emanate again from these lands prior to the nineteenth century. Finally, it can be noted that while all these early migratory movements occurred across already settled territories, simultaneously Polynesian islanders began processes of long-distance sea migration and island hopping, reaching unpopulated New Zealand at the turn of the first millennium and Hawaii and Easter Island a few hundred years later.

In the Middle East the rise of Islam, and the decisive moral and military edge it generated among nomadic Arab tribes, provided the greatest boost to outward migrations. Processes of nomadic conquest and settlement that transformed the human composition of the region were led by Arabs and then the Egyptians in the early centuries of Islam. These major movements were followed by smaller but important migrations southward into East Africa, westward from the Sudan into what is now Nigeria and by the rise of Turkish tribes in central Asia that eventually conquered Byzantium and formed the Ottoman Empire. Islam’s retreat from Iberia was balanced by expansion into the Balkans and across the Indian Ocean into the Malaysian peninsula and the Indonesian archipelago.

In Africa the desertification of the Sahara region between 3000 and 1000 BC separated sub-Saharan African migrations from North Africa and saw a steady flow of migrant peoples southwards from the Savannah to the West African forests. The Bantu-speaking peoples, who had settled in what is now Cameroon and Nigeria, began a complex process of migration, conquest and diffusion. As agriculturalists they acquired a demographic and military edge over Africa’s hunter-gatherers. With the acquisition of iron technologies in the fifth century BC, the pace of Bantu expansion rose, allowing
them to reach the Indian Ocean by 100 BC and Northern Natal around AD 250 (Curtin, 1997). Swahilis from Persia and the Gulf established a complex network of migrant communities, ports and trading stations along the East African coast from the twelfth to the fifteenth century. The Islamic Hausa people migrated from Western Sudan to what is now Northern Nigeria between 1300 and 1800, establishing new states and sultanates in the region. In the Americas the Aztecs, Incas and Maya in Mexico, Central America and the Andes, respectively, expanded periodically through conquest and migration right up until the arrival of the Spanish (Fernández-Armesto, 1995).

The civilizations of classical European antiquity saw the large-scale movement of Greek and Roman armies and settlers, the establishment of far-flung Phoenician colonies and a thriving trade in slaves across the Mediterranean basin, penetrating along its supply routes through North Africa, Mesopotamia and the Levant. Further north Celtic and German tribes from the Eurasian steppes spread across Europe north of the Alps. Patterns of European settlement were transformed by the ‘barbarian’ invasions and the collapse of the Western Roman Empire in the fifth century AD. Even then the barbarian kingdoms and their medieval successors ebbed and flowed with population movements for centuries: invasions from the steppes by nomadic Slav armies late in the first millennium AD fanned out into the Balkans, central Europe and central Russia; Islam advanced into Iberia in the eighth century; the Latin crusaders established settled states in the Levant; Scandinavians invaded and then settled in Normandy, England, Scotland, Iceland and Greenland; the medieval conquest, colonization and conversion of the Baltic and Baltic regions as well as northern Finland was undertaken by migrant Germanic military orders and peasants. Finally, the Jewish diaspora from the Levant spread across Iberia, Italy, France, England and Germany from the fall of the Western Roman Empire until the tenth century, after which successive expulsions from England (1069), France (1306), Spain (1492) and Portugal (1496) shifted the centre of gravity of Jewish settlement to the East, above all to Poland, Lithuania and the Ukraine.

Throughout the medieval period skilled labourers and artisans in the mining, metalurgical and textile industries gravitated to centres of production across the European continent (Bartlett, 1994). Ruling elites and military orders moved even more fluidly, by virtue of military conquest and dynastic alliances cemented by marriage: the Hohenzollerns transported themselves from the Italian peninsula to the Baltic; Norman aristocratic houses moved from Scandinavia through France to England and Sicily; the Habsburgs spun a web of marriage and kinship across the continent. Religious minorities were expelled on a grand scale during the wars of religion in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, including, most notably, 500,000 Huguenots from France.

### 6.2.2 Early modern migrations: regional and global

From the seventeenth century onwards, the dynamics of imperial conflict in eastern, southern and central Europe, between Austria, Prussia, Russia and the Ottoman Empire saw major displacements of ethnic groups across ever-changing boundarys. Mercantalist-orientated states and empires drew on flows of skilled labour—for example, the Dutch moving to Germany and England to conduct land drainage schemes; Peter the Great bringing artisans and gunsmiths to imperial Russia (Lucassen, 1987). Further, the massive movement of Russian peoples eastwards from the eighteenth century began a movement that culminated in the colonization of the Siberian hinterland of the Tsarist empire.

Most of these migrations, given our earlier definition of globalization, were regional rather than global in extent (though Islam’s African, European and South East Asian outposts do indicate processes of global migration). They tended to involve the reshaping of political boundaries and space, although there was some movement of peoples across boundaries. However, a case can be made that levels of migration significantly increased from the late sixteenth century onwards as a result of Europe’s changing economic and military dynamics (see chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4). The early years of European expansion were not marked by an easy or effortless dominance but by the precariousness of Europe’s technological and military edge and the minuscule level of actual migration that followed the conquest of the New World (Fernández-Armesto, 1995). The transoceanic extent of the European invasion may have geographically exceeded most earlier processes of conquest and migration, but its intensity and durability initially remained low. However, three patterns of global migration and movement emanating from, or controlled by, European powers heralded an era of migration that came to exceed its historical predecessors both in extent and intensity (see map 6.1 below). These migrations were the completion of the European conquest and population of the Americas and Oceania; the transatlantic slave trade that fuelled the economic development of the colonies; and the mass movement of Asian labour that replaced the labour flows extinguished by the termination of slavery.

### 6.2.3 The emergence of mass migration: from early modern to modern migratory patterns

While the dynamic of European migrations has displayed a multifaceted profile and a complex and fragmented geography we can capture many of the main elements of that process in what Alfred Crosby has described as the biological expansion of Europe: the movement of European peoples, flora, fauna and microbes to parts of the world that had been ecologically and socially separate from Europe for millennia—the Americas and Oceania (Crosby, 1983). It was the events of 1492 that began the transatlantic deluge, although the outward expansion of Europe had its roots some three or four hundred years earlier and had only been halted by economic and demographic collapse in the fourteenth century and the technological limits of European open sea navigation. What distinguished the American and Oceanic encounters is that Europeans faced so little military resistance or threats from the indigenous ecosystems. European expansion on a similar scale into the populated heartlands of Asia and Africa was checked for nearly three hundred years by a combination of the pre-existing density of population, the relative resilience of states and the hostility of the micro-organismal and macro-ecological environment. It is no surprise that the only significant and durable European migrations to Africa before the middle of the nineteenth century were located in the extreme north and south (Algeria, South Africa, Zimbabwe) and that, likewise, no enduring European settlement of the Asian land mass was achieved beyond the toeholds of colonial trading posts and emaciated bureaucracies. (On the very small size of Dutch emigrant communities in the Dutch East Indies, see Lucassen, 1995;
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I

We focus below on the extensity and intensity of human movements that followed in the wake of European conquest and colonization.

For much of the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries European emigration to the Americas and eventually to Oceania proceeded at a slow pace (Bailyn, 1986; Kenwood and Lougheed, 1989; Baines, 1991). In the first century and a half of Spanish domination, less than half a million made the passage across the Atlantic, while a mere 70,000 Portuguese had settled in Brazil (on Spanish emigration, see the claims of Mörner, 1976; and the scepticism of Altman, 1995). Populations of European descent in the Caribbean were also tiny. On the eve of the American Revolution the colonial population, in much the most populous European outpost, was no more than 2-3 million. No permanent European settlement had been established by this point in Oceania. The costs and risks of transatlantic migration and the precarious quality of the colonies themselves, and of the economies established across the ocean, saw to that. The majority of European migrants to North America were of British descent, yet total migration from Britain and Ireland to the North American colonies was a mere million by 1776, alongside smaller numbers of Germans, Dutch and Scandinavians. Some French emigration had occurred both to the USA and to Quebec further north. However, with defeat in the Seven Years’ War, the loss of American colonies and the cataclysm of the French Revolution, French transatlantic migration dwindled. The establishment of trading posts and coastal forts by the Dutch, Portuguese and Spanish in Africa and the Pacific in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had precipitated no more than a trickle of European migrants.

In the early nineteenth century the pace and scale of migration quickened. Cheaper, more regular, reliable transport was one reason for this. The cost of steerage from Europe to New York fell from around $40 in 1870 to $20 at the turn of the century (Zolberg, 1997). But the key reason for this torrent of migration was economic. On the one hand, there was a very large surplus of agrarian workers emerging in an industrializing Europe, and, on the other, there was the simultaneous and explosive industrialization of the land-rich but labour-scarce USA and other European-founded states and colonies. The great mass of transatlantic international migrations took place between the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the First World War. Total estimates vary from a high of 50 million between 1850 and 1914, to a lower estimate of approximately 46 million international migrants between 1821 and 1915; 44 million were from Europe and around 2 million from Asia. The vast majority headed for the Americas, and of those the majority headed for the USA. The bulk of the European movements actually occurred after 1880. Prior to 1880 11-12 million Europeans migrated, while 32 million left between 1880 and 1915 (Kenwood and Lougheed, 1989). That shift reflected a geographical change, with the majority of pre-1880 migrants coming from northern and western Europe, the majority after that from southern and eastern Europe, especially Italy. The British Isles provided over a third of all migrants in this period, and its proportion remained at a substantial level for some time to come. By comparison, German emigration declined after 1880.

Broadly speaking the British and Irish went to the USA, the white imperial dominions and the Caribbean; the Germans to the USA and in small numbers to Argentina and Brazil; the Italians to the USA and Latin America and the Iberians predominantly to Latin America. Southern and eastern Europeans flowed overwhelmingly to the USA. The active export of Europe’s rural poor was facilitated in a number of ways.

Restrictions on emigration were lifted in Britain, Sweden and Germany in the mid-nineteenth century, though the French state pursued more restrictive exit policies. State bodies, trade unions, philanthropic organizations and colonization societies all made financial assistance available. In the UK, the Colonial Land and Emigration Department, established in 1840, sold lands in Australia and used the funds to facilitate emigration. Local rates were also made available for pauper emigration. Similar models were followed in Germany, especially after the 1848 uprisings. After the 1850s financial assistance came predominantly from colonial administrations and interests, especially in Australia and Latin America, which struggled to compete with the pull of North America. Remittances from emigrants also proved a significant factor in aiding the further emigration of relatives (Kenwood and Lougheed, 1989). In these respects, patterns of migration came to be institutionalized.

While war and economic crisis were the key factors in ending these unprecedented transatlantic flows, political attempts to control them were already underway in the USA. Well before the First World War, racist sentiment and organized labour had conspired to limit and control migration from Asia to the USA. With the active support of many state governments, coercive controls over Asian migrants were established and calls for the termination of Asian migration grew louder, culminating in the 1920s with Supreme Court decisions that excluded Chinese, Japanese and Indian migrants from naturalization and the acquisition of US citizenship (Zolberg, 1997). After the First World War the shape of transatlantic migration was transformed as well. The USA began to limit European immigration drastically and draw on both illegal Mexican cross-border labour and the vast reservoirs of African-American and white rural labour in the south to supply the expanding industries of the north and east. In the two years before the First World War over 3.3 million people emigrated to the USA. By the mid-1920s this had dropped to around 300,000 a year and by the 1930s to less than 100,000 a year. The size of annual migrations as a percentage of total population dropped from 1.23 per cent in 1914 to less than 0.05 per cent for the years 1932–45 (figures calculated from Mitchell, 1983). A relatively higher proportion of European emigrants therefore headed for Latin America and Oceania, though the shift in absolute terms was small. Nonetheless, the 1920 census marked the demographic high point of white dominance in the USA.

6.2.4 The slave trade

The European conquest and population of the Americas was intimately tied to the other great mass movement in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the slave trade, the forcible movement of people overwhelmingly from sub-Saharan Africa across the Atlantic to the Americas and the Caribbean (Curtin, 1969; Fox-Genovese and Genovese, 1983; Blackburn, 1988, 1997). The demographic destruction of the Americas and the Caribbean created vast unpopulated empires in which land was plentiful and labour scarce. Despite the use of indentured European labour and the promise of economic opportunities, few Europeans were prepared to make the crossing in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Creating a labour force for the New World would initially require extensive coercion. The Atlantic slave trade persisted for over four hundred years, from the mid-fifteenth century to the mid-nineteenth century. It built on, and intersected with, an extensive slave trade in the Indian Ocean basin tying East Africa to the Middle East, the Ottoman Empire and European colonies in the Indian Ocean. As ever, data is sketchy, but estimates suggest that between 1500 and 1900 around 4.3 million people were taken from north east, east and central Africa to the Middle East and the Arabian peninsula (Clarence-Smith, 1989).

The European enslavement of Africans can be dated back to at least the 1450s when Portuguese sailors travelling the coast of Africa began supplying an emerging European market for house slaves. But it was the establishment of American and Caribbean colonies and plantation economies that provided the decisive economic push in the expansion of the slave trade. By the beginning of the eighteenth century the Portuguese were overtaken by the British, and squeezed by the French and Dutch, as the triangular relationship between Europe, Africa and the Americas was developed into a routine circuit of commodity exchange of manufactured goods, labour and agricultural produce. The number of Africans transported across the Atlantic is hotly disputed, and estimates have ranged between 5 and 20 million. Contemporary historical debate has settled on a figure of around 9–12 million people transported between 1445 and 1870 (see especially Curtin, 1969; and for that author’s most recent estimates, used here, Curtin, 1997). Roughly 325,000 slaves (3 per cent of total shipments) were transported in the sixteenth century, rising to 1.9 million (16 per cent) in the seventeenth and 6.7 million (58 per cent) in the eighteenth before declining in the nineteenth to 2.6 million (23 per cent).

Slave raids by both Europeans and Africans were conducted from the sixteenth century all along the sub-Saharan West African coast and they penetrated into the hinterlands: the extent of depopulation and social dislocation was immense, while the character of the ethnic, economic and cultural life of the southern USA, the Caribbean and the Iberian possessions of Latin America was transformed. The majority of slaves were destined for Brazil and the Caribbean. Over 4 million were shipped to Brazil over three centuries. From fewer than 300,000 slaves in the Caribbean in the early eighteenth century there were almost a million in French and British possessions a hundred years later. In 1835 around 20,000 whites and 300,000 black slaves were living in Jamaica, a ratio that was characteristic of European colonies in the Caribbean. In 1860, 34 per cent of the population of the southern US states were slaves: 3.8 million out of 11 million people in total (Kenwood and Lougheed, 1989). This demographic balance was not the result of substantially higher forced migration to the US; indeed less than 10 per cent of the slave trade was destined for the US. Rather, American slave owners devoted themselves more ruthlessly and systematically to the propagation of an indigenous slave population. It is clearly difficult to overestimate the enduring moral, political, cultural and economic consequences of this and the wider treatment of slaves.

6.2.5 Asian diasporas: indentured and contract labour

With the abolition and eventual decline of the slave trade in the mid-nineteenth century, the mass migration of Asian labourers – or the coolie system, as it was known – began to develop. This allowed colonial economies to replace slave labour and, in the case of Australia, acquire a source of ultra-cheap labour at the very moment that the use of convict labour from Britain was in decline (Tinker, 1974; Potts, 1990; C. Clarke...
et al., 1990). Coolie labour was generally based on short-term contracts bound by penal sanctions, linked to debts incurred in transit and invariably barbaric in its working conditions and levels of pay. Accurate estimates of the movement of Asian labour are difficult to come by. The seasonal and often illegal nature of the migrations further complicates an already fragmented picture, but it is clear that the late nineteenth and early twentieth century saw the large-scale movement of workers from India, China, Japan and Java to the USA, and to British, French, German and Dutch colonies in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean. This was truly a global migration.

Probably the most statistically significant migration in the nineteenth century was the movement of Indian workers. This migration comprised indentured labourers travelling to British and other colonies, shorter term contract labourers, clerical and administrative staff for far-flung British imperial outposts, and more independent elite migrations in pursuit of commercial opportunities. A middling estimate of the numbers involved suggests that between 1834 and 1897, 30.2 million people left India and 24.1 million returned, giving a net migration figure of around 6 million (Tinker, 1974; Potts, 1990). Segal suggests a lower figure for net migrations over the period 1815-1914 of around 3 million (Segal, 1993). The geographical scope of these migrations was immense. Within the Pacific region, Indians went to Burma, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and Fiji, 4.5 million arriving in Malaysia alone. Over 500,000 Indian workers migrated to British Caribbean possessions between 1838 and 1897, and over 200,000 went to French Mauritis between 1834 and 1867 (Vertovec, 1995). Indians also emigrated to Tanzania, Kenya, Malawi, Zambia, South Africa and Uganda (Thiara, 1995).

Comparable to these migrations were the enormous waves of Chinese migration – temporary, seasonal and permanent – across South East Asia and to the USA (and, to a lesser extent, Europe). In the USA they formed the backbone of the workforce that built America's railroads and dug the earth in the California gold rushes (Hui, 1995). Chinese workers could also be found on Dutch plantations in Sumatra, and in the cities of the Transvaal. Given the diversity and illegality of the coolie trade, data are inevitably fragmentary and there is considerable disagreement over total levels of migration. It has been suggested that, at its height, annual movements in South East Asia involved 750,000 people a year. Over the forty years between 1848 and 1888 Wang has estimated that around 2.35 million migrants left China (S. Wang, 1978). Segal has offered an estimate of 12 million migrants between 1815 and 1914 (A. Segal, 1993). This (lucrative) trade was run by Chinese business operating in the south of the country.

Japanese migration, some of which involved indentured labour, began in the 1860s when the Meiji Restoration ended centuries of self-imposed Japanese isolation from the rest of the world. In the 1870s there was a trickle of emigration from Japan to Hawaii and other South Pacific Islands. At the turn of the century domestic economic recession boosted emigration, and people began to flow towards the west coast of North America, both in Canada and California. After the First World War, US immigration restrictions diverted these mounting flows towards South America where substantial Japanese communities were established in Peru, Argentina and above all, Brazil: 188,000 Japanese migrants left for Brazil between 1908 and 1941 (Shimo, 1995). Official estimates put the total level of migration over the period 1900-42 at around 620,000 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1971). Immigration to Japan was much smaller than this. Official figures show that in 1910 there were only 15,000 foreigners resident in Japan, a figure that only grew to 54,000 by 1930. This constituted less than 0.1 per cent of the population. During the Second World War this figure rose dramatically as the increasingly repressive Japanese occupation of Korea brought many Koreans to Japan as labourers. By 1943 there were around 560,000 Koreans in Japan.

Finally, substantial numbers of Micronesians and Melanesians were forced into indentured labour. Over 250,000 Pacific islanders were recruited as indentured labourers for Australia, Peru, Fiji and Hawaii between 1840 and 1915 (Potts, 1990). The system of indentured labour was slowly abolished in the early twentieth century, but in the Dutch East Indies it persisted up to 1941.

### 6.2.6 Regional migrations and early industrialization

As we have already made clear, cross-border migration of labour in Europe has a long history. Moreover, these movements of labour were overlaid by the dynamics of empire and nation-building and the transatlantic migration process. Nonetheless, there is ample evidence to suggest that the industrialization of Europe in the late nineteenth century, the widening difference in performance of national economies and the construction of cross-continental railroads led to a new and intensified wave of regional migration.

Broadly speaking, we can divide the European continent into labour-importing countries and labour-exporting countries, though over time there was a blurring of the two categories. Sweden, for example, shifted from an exporter to a net importer of labour after the First World War. Germany and Britain, despite importing labour, continued to send migrants overseas in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The main recipients of migrants were Britain, France, Germany and Switzerland. The main exporters were Poland, Ireland and Italy. Spain and Portugal were hardly involved in these migrations but experienced steady outward flows to their ex-imperial Latin American possessions.

The most important destination country for European emigration was France, which had low levels of transatlantic emigration throughout the nineteenth century, relatively small migrations to colonial possessions and a rather slow pace of urbanization relative to other European states (Cross, 1983; Hollifield, 1992). It has been argued that 'the rural exodes that provided labour for English and German migration did not begin in earnest in France until the twentieth century. Thus French capitalism was forced to invent a working-class, in view of the unwillingness of rural workers to leave their farms, by importing labour from abroad' (Hollifield, 1992, p. 47). In coal and steel, foreigners formed the backbone of the workforce but they could also be found in agriculture, services and transportation. Alongside relatively small internal migrations, workers flooded into France from Belgium, Italy, Iberia, Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire as well as from Holland, Russia and Poland. Foreigners formed 1.1 per cent of the population in 1850, climbing to 3 per cent on the eve of the First World War and attained a high of 6.6 per cent in the mid-1930s: a figure not exceeded until the 1970s. In absolute terms this entailed an increase from 380,000 foreigners in France in 1851 to 1.16 million in 1911 (figures calculated from Mitchell, 1992).

Germany, by contrast, did not permit the levels of permanent migration and residence that the French allowed (Homze, 1967; Herbert, 1990). Immigration to Germany is unrecorded prior to 1900, and in the first decade of the century records show a mere
49,000, a figure climbing to 841,000 in the 1920s before collapsing again to 413,000 in the 1930s. These are almost certainly underestimates as seasonal workers from Poland were allowed into Prussia from 1880. They filled the vacuum left by German emigration to the cities and provided sufficiently inexpensive labour to maintain the precarious profitability of Junker estates. In 1871 around 0.5 per cent of the population was of foreign origin, but this had climbed to 1.9 per cent by 1910 – almost a quadrupling (calculated from figures in Mitchell, 1992). This marked the high point of voluntary emigration to Germany and the level of official foreigners declined until the mid-1950s. Those unfortunate enough to be in Germany at the outbreak of war in 1914 were forced to stay for the duration: a pattern of forced foreign labour replicated by the Nazis, with many more people involved, from 1939 to 1945 (Herbert, 1990). The low level of immigration to Germany contrasts with the higher levels of emigration. In the 1870s over 700,000 Germans emigrated, mainly to North America. This figure almost doubled in the 1880s before declining again to a mere 91,000 between 1910 and 1919 (calculated from figures in Mitchell, 1992; see also Nugent, 1995).

Britain continued to be a key source of transatlantic migration throughout the period of industrialization, but also began to receive significant inflows of workers as well (Foot, 1965; Garrard, 1971). The desperate situation of Ireland had generated a steady stream of migrants across the Irish Sea, replacing the gaps left in the labour market by Welsh and Scottish flows to the USA. From the late nineteenth century these flows were supplemented by the arrival of Eastern European and Russian Jews, Italians and Lithuanians. Emigration from the UK totalled over 2.2 million in the 1870s and the same again in the following decade. It fell off in the 1890s to only 1.7 million before rising in the first two decades of the twentieth century to 2.8 and 2.3 million a decade. Emigration began to slow in the early 1920s, with total emigration for the decade a mere 1.5 million before the US shut its doors; in the 1930s emigration fell to only 242,000. At its peak emigration was running at a level of 0.8-1.0 per cent of the total population annually. Immigration into Britain, by contrast, never exceeded 0.5 per cent of the population, even at its height in the years before the First World War. Nonetheless, total immigration to the UK in the decade 1910–19 was over 1.3 million, more than double the levels of the 1870s and three times the levels of the 1930s (calculated from figures in Mitchell, 1992).

Switzerland witnessed considerable levels of emigration during this period despite its own very rapid and successful industrialization after 1880 (figures from Norman and Runbolm, 1976; Mitchell, 1992; Gjerde, 1995). In the 1870s over 270,000 Swedes left for other countries (reaching levels as high as 1.2 per cent of the population emigrating annually). In subsequent decades the pressure continued with 363,000 emigrating in the 1880s and 233,000 in the 1890s. However, by the 1920s annual emigration had fallen to only 68,000, while in the 1930s it fell as low as 25,000 a year. Immigration to Sweden during this period was considerably less: 65,000 in the 1880s, 85,000 in the 1900s. However, immigration levels stayed fairly constant so that by the 1930s immigration actually exceeded emigration three times over.

### 6.2.7 Migration in an era of global war

For most of the long nineteenth century (1760–1914) economic forces were the primary movers of migratory flows. The early push of religious persecution and the pull of distant and exotic wealth in the seventeenth century gave way to the blunter realities of differential economic development, and opportunities in the Americas for many Europeans. For African slaves and Asian labourers, the economic squeeze was supplemented by military and legal coercion. While the slave trade had been halted in the nineteenth century the scope and scale of European and Asian migrations continued to escalate into the early twentieth century. These great waves of migration were brought to an almost complete halt by the First World War. When the smoke cleared in 1918 the situation was transformed; the demand for European, Asian and African labour in the colonies was in decline; a nationalist and exclusionary politics was on the rise in many states, and the restrictive immigration policies that flowed from this further slowed the pace of these older global migrations. Economic dislocation in Europe after the First World War, combined with the global economic downturn of the 1930s, ensured that levels of global migration remained very low throughout the interwar period (Zolberg, 1997).

In Europe significant population movements continued, driven by warfare and ethnic conflict. Poles headed from old Russian and Austrian Poland to the newly independent Polish state. Germans simultaneously decamped from western Poland and headed for the Weimar Republic. Russians fled the revolution, around 1.1 million leaving for Europe before 1922. Prior to the war Armenians had begun to flee Turkish persecution, which continued into the early 1920s and saw around half a million Armenians migrate. In the wake of the Greco-Turkish war of the early 1920s, 1.2 million Greeks left Turkey for Greece (Kulischer, 1948).

The First World War was fought predominantly between empires, and while nationalist conflicts and ethnic differences drove some migrations, they paled in significance against the impact of the Second World War and the uneasy peace of the early postwar era. During this war, huge numbers of people fled the advancing German armies while the Germans forced millions into concentration camps, mainly in Poland. With the conclusion of the war around 6 million ethnic Germans in Poland left for Germany and around 4 million left the Soviet zone of occupation for the West. Once again, as the Polish state’s borders shifted westward, 3 million Poles left eastern Poland (ceded to the Soviet Union) for the new Poland. And over 2.5 million ethnic Germans left Czechoslovakia for Austria and Germany.

In the immediate aftermath of the war significant forced migrations continued. Around 700,000 Palestinians were ejected from the newly formed state of Israel (B. Morris, 1987; Adelman, 1995); 15 million refugees were exchanged between India and Pakistan during and after partition; and in the early 1950s around 5 million Koreans fled from the north to the south (Zolberg, 1997). However, as we shall see, the power of economic forces to shape migration recovered its strength in the postwar era in Europe and the West in general, while state-building and war have become increasingly important generators of migratory flows in the developing world.

### 6.3 Contemporary Patterns of Migration

While the relative geographical extensity and intensity of pre-1914 and post-1945 migrations are closely balanced, there can be no doubt that the postwar era has seen a massive expansion in migratory flows relative to the interwar period. There is now almost no state or part of the world that is not importing or exporting labour (see
map 6.2). With the collapse of European and Soviet communism a swathe of new areas, previously sealed off, have become caught up in migratory flows. These flows are not exclusively towards the OECD states, though a significant component of them is. There are also major patterns of migration within South East Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. All these areas have become locked into both global and regional patterns of migration. In this overview we try to distinguish between the two, while describing their interrelationship.

6.3.1 The globalization and regionalization of migration

The contemporary era of migration begins with the end of the Second World War, which induced massive population displacements (see section 6.2.7 above). Charting the overlapping geographies and time-scales of the postwar migrations that followed is complex. In terms of intensity and geographical extensity, the most significant flows have been the economic migrations to OECD countries, in Western Europe, Oceania and North America. However, these migrations were not all of a piece.

In Western Europe, early postwar migration was often regional in its scope. European countries then became enmeshed in more extensive migrations. In the 1950s and 1960s, Belgium, France, Germany and Switzerland began active programmes of overseas labour recruitment, drawing first on the Southern European periphery before extending their reach to Turkey and North Africa. Sweden drew on its own Finnish northern periphery. Most of these migrants came as part of semistructured, semi-official guest-worker programmes and their migrations were intended to be temporary rather than permanent. Overlapping with these movements ex-colonial states furnished large global flows to France, Britain and the Netherlands. Given the colonial connection these movements were more permanent, and combined returning colonial administrators and settlers as well as indigenous colonial peoples.

In the mid-1960s emigration to Australia and North America began to take off; initially migrants came from Europe but these flows soon gave way to Latin American, Asian-Pacific and Caribbean movements. In this regard, while the global element of migrations to the USA and Australia has always been large, the regional component of migration flows has intensified as European flows have diminished and Mexican flows to the USA and Asian-Pacific flows to Australia have picked up.

The global economic downturn of the mid-1970s slowed Western European immigration as guest-worker programmes were terminated and immigration regulations tightened, though family reunions continued to maintain a significant level of immigration. Transatlantic flows were finally reversed as, for example, emigrants from Argentina and Brazil headed for Spain, Italy and Portugal. The Mediterranean states became labour importers as well as exporters and experienced their first wave of illegal immigration from North Africa and, in the Italian case, from the impoverished postcommunist Balkans. The 1980s saw an almost universal tightening of immigration and citizenship laws in Western Europe. In North America and Australia, by contrast, immigration escalated and showed an even more determined shift from people of European origin to people of Asian and Latin American origins. We consider these flows in more detail below.
6.3.2 The stratification of migratory flows

As opportunities to migrate to Western Europe declined in the 1970s, and the process of differential economic development became sharper in the developing world, new global and regional migratory patterns emerged. Among the most global of these were the migrations to the Middle East, where the 1974 oil price rises generated a phenomenal demand for labour in the oil-rich but sparsely populated states of the region (Seecombe and Lawless, 1986). Even so, intraregional flows cut across global flows. Large numbers of Egyptians and Tunisians migrated to oil-rich Libya from the mid-1960s onwards, though their status remained precarious and their numbers subject to the political whims of the regime. Palestinians formed an equally important component of the regional diasporas: already displaced by the formation of the state of Israel in 1948, the occupation of the West Bank in 1967 displaced them further. Migration involved movements to Israel itself on a day-by-day basis for work, as well as more permanent settlement in Jordan and contract labour in the Gulf states. A decade later the Lebanese civil war generated a similar diasporic exodus. The main labour-importing states in the region have been Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, as well as Iran and Iraq to the north. The main exporters have been Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, Lebanon and Sudan. The estimate for all migrants among these states prior to the Gulf War is around 2–3 million (A. Segal, 1993, based on Martin, 1991). In the early 1980s the declining revenues from oil, and fear over immigrants’ political allegiances (for instance, to anti-government Islamicist organizations) led to a downturn of these regional flows and to increasingly global labour recruitment from East Asia and South Asia. These new migrants were assumed by the region’s rulers to be more pliant. Indians, Bangladeshis and Pakistanis, including many highly skilled workers, began to move west, while women working as domestic servants and in service industries began to arrive from Sri Lanka and the Philippines. In Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates foreigners actually outnumber natives.

Patterns of migration within Asia show a similar combination of global and regional flows (Fawcett and Carifo, 1987; Skeldon, 1992; Fong, 1993). Prior to the 1970s, levels of migration, other than those to OECD countries, were low. In the 1970s migratory flows accelerated but shifted from European destinations to North America, Australia and, as noted above, to the Gulf states. In 1965 a mere 17,000 Asians emigrated to the USA; in the mid-1980s annual migration was around 250,000, constituting nearly 45 per cent of all legal migration to the US. By the late 1980s and early 1990s the numbers of Asians resident in the USA had climbed to 6.9 million, alongside 717,000 in Australia (4 per cent of the population) (US Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract, various years). New Zealand alone of the Anglo-Saxon states in the region did not receive substantial Asian inflows, though it did receive a steady flow of Pacific Islanders.

Within Asia the main labour importers since the mid-1970s have been Japan, Singapore, Taiwan and Brunei. Immigration was driven by their rapid economic development and tight domestic labour markets. In 1991 migrants made up 11 per cent of the Singaporean labour force. The main exporters of labour have been China, the Philippines, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Indonesia and Sri Lanka. South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and Hong Kong have exported and imported labour in roughly equal amounts. Alongside these economically driven flows Asia has also experienced very substantial refugee flows. In the early 1990s around half of the world’s 15–20 million refugees were located in Asia, displaced by the Indo-Chinese wars, the regional revolutions and civil wars of the 1960s and 1970s, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. By 1989 3.6 million Afghans had fled to Pakistan and over 2 million to Iran (Zolberg, 1997).

Sub-Saharan Africa has generated significant global flows of migrants in the post-war era, mainly to ex-colonial states: Nigerian, Tanzanian and Ugandan Asians have migrated to the UK; Central and West Africans to France; Zairians to Belgium (Curtin, 1978; Castles and Miller, 1993). However, the OECD has argued that these movements are dwarfed by regional migrations within Africa (OECD, 1993a). Regional labour migrations have flowed primarily to Nigeria, South Africa, Gabon and the Ivory Coast. The main countries of emigration have been Zaire, Angola, Mozambique, Cameroon and Botswana as well as all of the North African nations, though rarely have their emigrants crossed the Sahara. The scale of migrations of West Africans to oil-rich Nigeria is most sharply revealed by the level of expulsions that occurred after the economic downturn of the early 1980s. South Africa has provided the other major pole of migration, where a long-established tradition of labour importation to the goldfields of the Transvaal continues to operate. Migrants have come from Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi and Mozambique for over a century. Since the 1960s these migrations have declined as indigenous trade unions have strengthened their hold on the labour market. Foreign workers in the mining industry have declined from over 600,000 in 1960 to fewer than 400,000 in the late 1980s and numbers continue to fall. However, such is the economic disparity between South Africa and its northern neighbours that unorganized and illegal migration continues, disappearing into the vast, unpolicied townships of urban South Africa.

The scale of war and refugee movements particularly mark African patterns of migration (K. Wilson, 1995; Zeggey, 1995). Torn by wars of state formation and ethnic conflict in southern Africa and the Horn of Africa, particularly, Africa’s refugee population climbed from 300,000 in 1960 to over 1 million in 1970 and 3.5 million in 1981. UNHCR figures for 1990 refer to only 2 million international refugees in the continent, but this radically underestimates the numbers of displaced persons in Sudan — probably over 3 million (Curtin, 1997). With the cataclysmic events in Rwanda and Burundi in 1994–6 and the Sudanese civil war, the total refugee population of the continent probably now exceeds 7 million (see Curtin, 1997, for a discussion of this figure).

Latin America, as already noted, has shifted from being a continent of immigration to one of emigration (Balan, 1988; Castles and Miller, 1993). Between 1800 and 1970 around 21 million immigrants arrived in Latin America, overwhelmingly from Southern Europe and destined for Brazil and the southern cone states — Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, Argentina. In the immediate postwar years the last significant groups of European migrants arrived, including half a million Italians to Argentina between 1945 and 1957 and another 300,000 to Venezuela in the 1950s. Since then the pattern of Latin American migration has been threefold. First, there has been a steady increase in the levels of northwards emigration, legal and illegal, and principally to the USA (especially from Mexico and Central America). Second, there has been a much smaller flow of migrants to Southern Europe. Third, a growing array of regional migrations has occurred. Seasonal, agricultural migrations have been initiated between Colombia and Venezuela as well as between Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay and Argentina. Many of these are illegal migrations drawing on the Caribbean.
Finally, we turn to Eastern Europe, which up until 1989 was effectively cordoned off from regional and global migratory flows. With the collapse of communist states and their highly restrictive emigration policies, patterns of European migration at least have been transformed. The 1990s have witnessed over 2 million Soviet Jews emigrate to Israel. To the immediate east of Western Europe, Hungary, the Czech and Slovak republics and Poland have generated very little long-term migration. However, these states have increasingly become buffer zones, where migratory flows (that have begun further south and east, in the states of the ex-Soviet Union and in the Balkans) pause before attempting to travel further westwards. In 1991, Poland had an estimated 700,000 foreign workers, many seeking to continue their journey west. Further south the civil war in the former Yugoslavia has generated the largest numbers of displaced persons in Europe since the Second World War.

Alongside these global and regional flows of migrant labour a whole range of other flows of travellers and temporary migrants have developed in the years since 1945. The postwar era has seen an explosion in international tourism, increasing levels of business travel and expanding student exchange programmes (see chapter 7). In the last twenty years there have also been, as noted previously, increasing volumes of both refugees and asylum seekers (Zolberg et al., 1989; Widgren, 1993). The distinctions between these categories are ever more blurred, both in reality and in the murky world of national and international migration statistics. These movements of people occur between OECD and developing states and within the developing world itself. Their roots are complex. Some movements are the result of wars between states, but these make up only part of the refugee exodus. As Zolberg has argued, they are predominantly 'the by-product of two major historical processes – the formation of new states and confrontation over the social order in both old and new states' (Zolberg et al., 1989). The dynamic was overlain by the Cold War and superpower rivalry to produce a complex pattern of refugee movements. In the postwar era, refugees fled from communist revolutions in China (1949), from Eastern to Western Europe immediately after the war as well as after the uprisings in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968). The wars in Korea (1950–3) and Indo-China (1946–75) both produced a flood of refugees, while many Cubans steadily made the passage to the USA. UNHCR estimates suggest that the numbers of refugees in the developing world rose sharply as the process of decolonization and new state formation took off, from around 2 million in the 1950s to current levels of around 25–30 million. Of this total around 14–15 million are displaced persons within their own state (UNHCR, 1993; 1994, p. 3).

During the Cold War governments in the West viewed flight from the East as something to be encouraged. Liberal and open asylum regulations were part of the West's claim to moral and political superiority over the East. However, in the 1970s and 1980s the tumult of state building and state collapse in the South brought unanticipated numbers of asylum seekers to both Europe and North America. In 1973 the total number of asylum applications in the OECD was 25,000. In 1990 it had reached an annual level of almost 500,000. The cumulative total from 1983 to 1990 is 2.2 million people. Coupled with the tightening of immigration laws in the West over the same period, current trends suggest that at some point in the near future the number of asylum seekers will exceed the number of voluntary migrants presenting themselves at the borders of OECD countries.

### 6.3.3 Trends and patterns in contemporary migration: diversity and complexity

The contemporary era is witnessing a very complex pattern of overlapping and interacting global and regional migratory flows of both an economic and non-economic nature. At the centre of these global flows have been economically driven migrations to OECD countries initially at a regional level, from poorer to richer Western states, and then at a global level from the developing world. In the 1950s the flows were predominantly to Western Europe, but they subsequently shifted to North America and Australia. In addition, global migrations have focused on the Middle East. The other large migratory flows have been regional and have developed space from the 1960s within South East Asia, western and southern Africa, Latin America and within the Middle East.

Clearly, much contemporary migration is driven by the operation of increasingly transboundary labour markets created by both informal and ad hoc as well as formal and institutionalized arrangements. But from the late 1960s economic migrations were traversed by a rising tide of war-driven migrations, refugee movements and asylum seeking. While Western Europe and the USA have been touched by these global migrations, the vast majority have been regionally concentrated in areas of conflict in Asia and Africa. In addition, basic economic forces driving migrations have themselves frequently been overlain by political factors shaping the migration process. A variety of imperial connections and obligations have boosted the level of immigration into France, Britain and the Netherlands, determined its geographical composition and changed the terms on which immigrants enter these countries. Under constitutional obligation, the Federal Republic of Germany received a steady flow of Germans from the German Democratic Republic and East Central Europe. The same principles of citizenship that exclude the former from the immigration figures have massively inflated the numbers of those defined as temporary workers and dependants as the by-product of two major historical processes.

The historical pattern of migration for most European countries has been fourfold. First, there was a low starting point after the Second World War, temporarily raised by the shifting movements of the many displaced peoples generated by the war itself. Second, there was increasing growth in migration rates in the 1960s, accelerating in the 1960s and peaking somewhere in the early 1970s. The impact of the oil shocks on
economic performance, the fall in the demand for labour and the consequently bitter politics of immigration are clearly evident in the statistics. Third, after the mid-1970s, migration continued, if at slightly lower levels and driven more by family reunions than the push and pull of global economic factors. Fourth, in the 1980s, varying between countries, the rate of migration began to accelerate again. This intensified in the early 1990s as the economic booms in Western Europe, the post-1989 turbulence in East Central Europe and the former Yugoslavia and the creation of the Single European Market pushed levels of immigration back up again.

The USA attempted to keep a lid on immigration levels after the war using large reserves of African-American and rural labour as well the export of capital to absorb the consequences of full employment. The transformation of immigration legislation in the mid-1960s, abolishing regional quotas and allowing for extensive family reunion, did not result in an immediate upsurge in migration but, from the early 1970s onwards, the USA has seen a sustained wave of immigration that dwarfs even the high levels of German and French immigration. The sources of migration to the USA have shifted from Europe to the Asia-Pacific and Central and South America. Significant numbers of Canadian and Mexican migrants have given these new flows a regional dimension as well. Japan, by contrast, saw very little migration into and out of the country for most of the postwar era. It has retained a small foreign population, though the late 1980s this too was beginning to grow, mainly from illegal rather than legal sources.

Shifting historical patterns of migration have also been accompanied by changes in the make-up of the immigrant population and their employment opportunities. In the 1950s and 1960s most immigrants were destined for menial jobs in the public services and dirty jobs in the manufacturing sector. However, OECD employment in both of these economic sectors has either stagnated or shrunk in the 1980s and 1990s (see chapter 5). In effect, migration, like the economies of the West, has assumed elements of a postindustrial form. First, increasing numbers of migrants have gone into private service industries and domestic services, with a corresponding rise in the numbers, and employment, of female migrants (King, 1995). Second, alongside these flows there has been a steady movement of highly skilled, highly trained professionals, that is, elite migration. As multinational corporations have expanded their international operations (see chapter 5) and national immigration agencies have targeted highly skilled workers, these flows have climbed. They include movements within the West as well as a significant "brain drain" from the developing world to the West (Salt and Findlay, 1989; Salt and Ford, 1993). In the first few decades of the postwar era, the UN has calculated that international migration of highly skilled labour was around 300-400,000 people. The major sources of this burst of elite migration were India, China, Sri Lanka and Ghana. The USA absorbed 120,000 of these migrants and the UK and Canada over 80,000 each (A. Segal, 1993). Since the 1970s, the Gulf states have become key importers of highly skilled labour, but flows to the West continue apace with the addition of people from the Philippines, Pakistan, Argentina and Brazil.

6.4 Historical Forms of Global Migration: a Comparison

We can return now to some of the questions and issues with which we began this chapter (section 6.1), and attempt an overall comparison of global migration in the key historical epochs discussed so far. The very earliest long-range migrations occurred in a context in which states either did not exist or were minuscule and where the writ of political authority was significantly limited in scope. Economic pressures, ideological forces and inquisitiveness drove the first global migrations. With the establishment of settled centres of power, migrations tended to accompany the outward thrust of military might, occasionally preceded but more often accompanied by or followed by missionaries, traders and agrarians. The expansion of the Roman Empire and the Chinese Empire are examples of this. The expansion of the Islamic world demonstrates the importance of nomad military migrations that created new imperial centres from a nomadic starting point – the Aryans in India, the Mongols across Asia and the Barbarian invasions of Europe fit this pattern.

Viewed in this perspective the migrations that initially accompanied the outward push of European empire-building from the fifteenth century onwards are closer to the Chinese or Roman pattern of settled states expanding outwards. However, established imperial outposts and emigrant communities were separated from the metropolis by vast transoceanic distances and in that regard are closer to the network of Islamic states which spread out across the Middle East and around the Indian Ocean. But, unlike Rome, China or Islam, European empires in Oceania and the Americas encountered civilizations that they were able, quite literally, to obliterate, demographically and politically. This created the possibility of permanent mass migrations that exceeded earlier forms of imperial expansion. While military and cultural power remain significant factors in explaining these migrations, economic power attained a greater significance than in earlier epochs. Indeed, the demand for labour generated by this early imperial expansion was so great that the slave trade which accompanied it was not only larger than the earlier Roman or Arabic slave trades, but directed to the colonies rather than back to the metropole.

As the European empires have been dismantled by the formation of nation-states in the Americas and then through revolution and decolonization in Africa, the Middle East and Asia, migrations accompanying conquest and imperial expansion have shrunk. The abolition of the slave trade further diminished the importance of military power in organizing migration. The Asian migrations of the nineteenth and early twentieth century continued to feed the labour markets of imperial European outposts and its successor nation-states. However, the major transatlantic migrations from Europe to the Americas in the nineteenth and early twentieth century are more characteristic of contemporary migrations – in which citizens of one nation-state emigrate to another nation-state caught in the push and pull of differential economic development and opportunity. While war and conflict continue to generate refugee and asylum flows, the overwhelming majority of contemporary global migrations are economically driven, leaving political borders untouched. We return to the implications of these shifts for states’ capacity to control their borders and population later.

6.4.1 Historical forms: spatio-temporal comparisons

The migrations of the pre-Neolithic era in which homo sapiens reached every corner of the globe were as globally extensive as any subsequent pattern of migration; however, the numbers involved were minuscule, even when the very small global population
**Grid 6.1 Key historical flows of global migration**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key migratory flows</th>
<th>Premodern Pre-1500</th>
<th>Early modern Approx. 1500–1760</th>
<th>Modern Approx. 1760–1945</th>
<th>Contemporary Approx. 1945 on</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hunter-gatherers expand into previously unpopulated areas – latterly from North East Asia into the Americas and from East Asia through the Pacific Island chains</td>
<td>Settlers/colonists from Northern and Western Europe to colonies in North America, Latin America, Caribbean</td>
<td>Up to 1914, huge economic migration from Europe to the Americas and the newly colonized areas of Oceania</td>
<td>End of WWII and accompanying political settlements bring wave of intense regional migrations, expulsions, etc. (Germany, Poland, Israel and Palestine, India-Pakistan, Korea)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Eurasia-Africa, most migrations driven by agrarian empire building, mass movements in their wake either displacing or incorporating hunter-gatherers and weaker agrarian societies</td>
<td>Very small European migrations to East Asia, Southern Africa</td>
<td>Parallel overland migrations by Russian colonists into Central Asia and Siberia</td>
<td>Core migratory flows in this period are economic migrants to OECD states</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large-scale migrations of this form include the Roman and Greek empires, formation of Chinese civilization, southward drift of Bantu-speaking peoples in Africa</td>
<td>Slave trade from sub-Saharan Africa to the Americas and the Caribbean</td>
<td>Transatlantic and Indian Ocean slave trades peak before termination in the mid to late nineteenth century</td>
<td>After 1973 global and regional flows to the Middle East from North Africa, Southern Asia, South East Asia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some key large-scale migrations led by nomadic herding peoples pursuing new grazing lands and/or imperial adventures, including barbarian invasions of Europe (5th century); expansion of Arabic nomadic warriors; Mongol empires 12th century onwards</td>
<td>Slave trade from sub-Saharan Africa to North Africa and the Middle East</td>
<td>Up to 1914, complex mixture of Asian (Chinese, Indian, Japanese, Pacific Islander) migrations mainly tied/contract labour: within Asia; to European colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific; and to North America and some parts of Latin America</td>
<td>Highly skilled economic migrants on the rise, both staffing MNCs and considerable &quot;brain drain&quot; from South to North</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish Diaspora from Middle East across North Africa, Western Asia and Europe</td>
<td>By comparison, small-scale migrations within Europe</td>
<td>Differing levels of industrialization in Europe and Southern Africa drive regional labour migration</td>
<td>Post-colonial state formation and civil wars lead to increasing numbers of international asylum seekers, international refugees, regionally displaced persons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Increasing numbers of tourists, travellers, international educational exchange</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Grid 6.2 Historical forms of global migration**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extensity</th>
<th>Premodern Pre-1500</th>
<th>Early modern Approx. 1500–1760</th>
<th>Modern Approx. 1760–1945</th>
<th>Contemporary Approx. 1945 on</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Early population of the earth very extensive. Last uninhabited lands reached after the turn of the first millennium</td>
<td>Transatlantic settlers and slaving constitute new global flows</td>
<td>Man migrations now truly global in extent – European expansion and Asian diasporas incomparably global</td>
<td>Core economic migrations very extensive – global patterns of migrations to Europe, Australasia, North America, Middle East</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsequent migrations tend to be regional or local with the exception of great nomadic imperial adventures – Islamic Arabs, nomadic Mongols, etc.</td>
<td>Regional migrations within Europe and Southern Africa and from European Russia to Siberia</td>
<td>Regional migrations within and between Europe and Western Asia, South Asia, North Africa and the Middle East</td>
<td>Large regional migrations, within Africa, East Asia, Latin America</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>After WWI – reach of global flows contracts, post-WWI settlement and new nation-state formation create short-term, localized flows</td>
<td>Diversity of flows</td>
<td>Diversity of flows</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intensity</th>
<th>Premodern Pre-1500</th>
<th>Early modern Approx. 1500–1760</th>
<th>Modern Approx. 1760–1945</th>
<th>Contemporary Approx. 1945 on</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Generally low</td>
<td>Medium – slave trades and European colonization rising in intensity in 18th century</td>
<td>Up to 1914 very intense, especially in final years of 19th century</td>
<td>Medium but rising throughout the period</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waves of imperial and military adventures produce occasional and intense bursts of permanent settler activity</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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*continued*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Premodern Pre-1500</th>
<th>Early modern Approx. 1500–1760</th>
<th>Modern Approx. 1760–1945</th>
<th>Contemporary Approx. 1945 on</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Velocity</strong></td>
<td>Velocity of individual travel/migration low however, empire building and nomadic movements show almost unprecedented speed of collective movement and migration</td>
<td>Velocity of individual travel/migration low large-scale movements of entire nomadic societies terminated by growing relative strength of all sedentary/agrarian societies</td>
<td>Velocity of individual travel/migration medium and increasing</td>
<td>Velocity of individual and group travel/migration very high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Impact propensity</strong></td>
<td>Migrations intimately bound up with the formation and dissolution of empires and civilizations migrations create societies and borders rather than crossing them in general hunter-gatherers eradicated or incorporated by expanding agrarian societies</td>
<td>Main migrations to the New World constitutive of world historic shift; demographically, culturally, ecologically, politically</td>
<td>Transatlantic migrations serve as economic and political escape valve for industrializing Europe Migration serves as the human basis for the rise of the US state and economy</td>
<td>Europe at high point of ethnic homogeneity begins to acquire sizeable non-European minorities Europe averts some of the problems of full employment and ageing societies Impact on welfare expenditure and income broadly neutral US becomes more plural and more diverse All states faced by prospect of political and cultural redefinition of the meaning of national identity and citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Infrastructure</strong></td>
<td>Migration overwhelmingly by land – dependent on</td>
<td>Transoceanic shipping systems across the</td>
<td>Shipping systems mechanized and</td>
<td>Air travel transforms prospects for</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

existing roads and routes some maritime migrations across enclosed seas (the Mediterranean) or by island hopping (Pacific islands); transoceanic shipping and merchant migrations possible in the Indian Ocean

Atlantic, the core infrastructure of the era’s global migrations regularized; railways aid land movements economic migrants

**Institutionalization**

Organization either informal in hunter-gatherer societies or via elites, state builders and military organizations in agrarian/nomadic societies

Increasing organization of migration processes as colonial enterprise Development of early transatlantic chain migration Systematic economic organization of slave trades

Institutionalization increases as states acquire capacity to implement immigration policies in the late nineteenth century Commercial, public and voluntary institutions for recruiting labour and aiding passage established in Europe, North America, Asia and European colonies High institutionalization of transport systems, border control, labour markets However, this accompanied by increasing illegal migrations International refugee regimes and asylum agreements regulate war-induced migrations Increased surveillance of migration

**Stratification**

Hierarchies in this era between civilizations/societies as agrarian societies dominate hunter-gatherers and nomadic societies gain occasional power over sedentary societies

Slave labour, contract and indentured labour create clear hierarchies of power between organizers of migrations and migrants – both voluntary and involuntary

Slave labour, contract and indentured labour create clear hierarchies of power between organizers of migrations and migrants – both voluntary and involuntary Among migrants a hierarchy of ease of movement exists: high-skill migrants have more options than low-skill migrants, refugees and asylum seekers have still fewer State power over individual migrants rising, states’ power over collective mass flows may be diminishing
of the time is taken into account. From the emergence of settled agriculture to the early modern era, it is probably true to say that migrations were less geographically extensive than the very earliest flows but more substantial in numbers. As we have seen, this long era saw important migrations within the fluctuating boundaries of imperial systems and shifts of nomadic tribal peoples from steppe lands to settled agricultural plains, in turn displacing already established societies to more peripheral locations. The waves of Eurasian nomads who crossed into Europe are the clearest example of this, though similar movements occurred within Africa and on the Indian subcontinent. This era also saw the first major migratory diaspora – that of the Jews across the Levant, North Africa and Europe. However, while no continent or region was completely and unequivocally isolated from others, the degree of transoceanic interchange was very low. The Vikings’ attempted colonization of North America, for example, fizzled out in the tenth or eleventh century; they survived another two centuries in Greenland before being confined to their mid-Atlantic Icelandic redoubt. Perhaps the only truly global pattern of migrations combining military conquest, imperial expansion, missionaries and merchants were those associated with the expansion of the Islamic world. Predominantly elite in their social make up and small in their absolute scale, Islamic migrations were extensive in their reach, from Iberia and Morocco in the west, sub-Saharan Africa in the south, to Persia, northern India, and eventually to the Indonesian archipelago in the east. Thus most of the premodern era is characterized by regional migrations and associated displacements.

The migrations which accompanied, and which are in some sense constitutive of, modernity heralded a new wave of truly global movements of peoples. European expansion saw flows from all over Europe to North and South America, the Caribbean, parts of northern and southern Africa and Oceania. The slave trades were constituted by forced migratory flows from across Africa (though regionally concentrated) to North and South America and the Caribbean. The great nineteenth-century flows of Asian peoples channelled migrations from India, China and South East Asia along the conduits of European empire and American industrialization to the Caribbean, Africa, the United States and Canada and extensively within Asia.

How do contemporary patterns of migration compare in terms of their geographical extensity? The key feature of the contemporary era is economic migration to OECD countries. In Western Europe these began, primarily, as intra-regional migrations from Southern Europe to Northern and Western Europe. However, these movements were soon surpassed by migrations from ex-colonial possessions and states beyond Europe. For the first time significant incoming migratory flows were established between Western Europe and the Caribbean, the Middle East, North Africa, Latin America and South Asia. Similarly, in North America and Australia, where these migratory flows began later, the already global flows from Europe to the New World of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were accompanied and eventually superseded by flows from Latin America, the Caribbean and Pacific-Asia to North America and from Pacific-Asia to Australia. Moreover, all these OECD nations continued to experience intra-OECD migrations of skilled personnel staffing the nodes of an increasingly global economy. In the last twenty years these flows have been accompanied at a global level, by the movements of people from South Asia to the Gulf and Middle East.

Another dimension to the extensity of contemporary migratory flows is the many regional systems of migration that have emerged alongside these global flows. As we discussed earlier (section 6.3), regional migration has continued within North America and Western Europe but it has also taken off in Latin America, within Africa and across South and South East Asia. With the fall of European and Soviet communism and the end of their restrictive travel regimes a further swathe of the world’s states has been opened up to international migration. There are few states that do not experience the movements of migrants inwards or outwards in one form or another – though not all of those movements are global. Overall, contemporary migratory flows are probably more geographically extensive and more global than those of the premodern era and at least as extensive as those of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This, of course, tells us nothing about their relative intensity.

Accurate data for the intensity of migratory flows over long time periods is difficult to accumulate. The debate among historians suggests figures for the European migrations of the nineteenth to early twentieth centuries of around 45 million people. The estimates of the size of the slave trade are, given the unspeakable mortality rate on slaving ships, variable depending on whether we are counting Africans leaving Africa or arriving in the Americas. A mid-range figure of around 9–12 million from the early sixteenth century to the mid-nineteenth is probably the correct order of magnitude. The magnitude of the Asian diasporas of the nineteenth century also vary depending on whether we are counting permanent or return migrations. The historical consensus points to a figure of around 35 million people, returners and permanent migrants, over a hundred-year period, 1820–1920. However, the number of permanent migrants is much lower, perhaps around 12 million.

In terms of chronology the magnitude of total global migrations grew over the early modern and modern periods. Early European migrations to the Americas were small, as were those to Latin America and the Caribbean. The slave trade of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was certainly larger in terms of sheer numbers than the flows of the two prior centuries. However, the peak years for global migration during the modern period must be the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the forty years from 1880 around 30 million Europeans emigrated to the Americas and Australia, while the bulk of the Asian migrations took place at this time as well. The annual de-population rates for European nations, which provided most of the transatlantic migrants, were larger than those for Africa during the peak of the slave trade.

It is clear that the interwar years marked a radical reversal in the scale of global migrations. Transatlantic and Asian migrations almost ceased, while intra-European migrations declined rapidly. The more difficult comparison is with the contemporary era. Again, calculating gross migratory flows is hampered by the prevalence of return and short-term migration and large numbers of illegal migrants. Moreover, any comparison of these two great eras of migration needs to take into account the vastly larger populations of the late twentieth century. What follows is not in any way a definitive quantitative comparison but one that seeks to establish crude orders of relative magnitude. The three main countries of immigration in the postwar period have been the USA, Germany and France. Official data suggest that between 1945 and 1990 over 18 million people emigrated to the USA (US Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract, various years). However, this time-span does not include the substantial migrations of the 1990–5 period during which around 1 million legal migrants have entered the USA every year. Adding these would give a figure of around 25 million people in fifty years. This is still less than the 30 million who emigrated to the USA
from 1880 to 1920. However, there have also been very substantial illegal immigrations into the USA across the Mexico border from the mid-1960s onwards. Again, there are very considerable numbers of return migrations to consider here. A figure of around 1-1.5 million a year has been suggested for illegal immigrants to the US in the 1980s and 1990s, although this may be too high (Bustamente, 1989). Halving this estimate would boost the total postwar level of immigration to over 35 million people. However, the US population in 1990 stood at 248 million, while in 1900 it was only 75 million, and in 1880 only 50 million. Thus, we can reasonably conclude that contemporary migrations to the USA, while of similar absolute intensity, are of lesser relative intensity than those experienced at the end of the nineteenth century.

That said, the US migrations of that period were by some way the major migrations to Western societies. In the postwar era, they have been accompanied by very large migrations to European nations (for a similar comparison, with similar conclusions, see Morawska and Spohn, 1997). In the case of Germany, total gross migration for the period 1950–88 totalled 24.5 million, while those to France totalled 21.9 million. The UK, the Low Countries, Switzerland and Scandinavia add another another 25 million migrants over the same period. (Estimates calculated from SOPEMI, 1991 and earlier years; and Mitchell, 1975; 1992.) If one adds Australia and Canada, both of which have experienced large migratory flows, then the non-US total for the period 1945–90 is around 80 million. This gives an estimated total well over 100 million for postwar migrations to OECD countries, with the majority of those movements taking place in the thirty years between 1965 and 1995 – more than triple the great transatlantic migrations of the 1880s to 1920. European populations have increased more slowly than those of the United States, and the European component of migration is probably as intense as the American experience at the turn of the century – although this is diluted by the much larger numbers of return migrations concealed in the gross figures. In the end, it is a close call. The transatlantic surge of 1880–1920 was certainly more intense than the early colonial emigrations, the slave trade or the Asian migrations of the nineteenth century. It was probably more intense than the global flows of the postwar era – but only just. The comparison between nineteenth-century Asian migrations and contemporary ones is more clear-cut. The former were greater. However, intra-Asian migratory flows are only just beginning to mount as differential rates of economic development generate the preconditions for large movements of labour. If these migrations continue to expand and American migrations continue – and there is no sign of them abating – then the contemporary pattern of migration may supersede its predecessors in terms of intensity as well as extensity. Such trends would clearly be aided by the greater speed of individual and collective travel today. The development of modern communication and transport infrastructures has obviously increased the velocity of the movement of people, although how far this will lead to substantial changes in the gross and net flows of migration is uncertain at this time (see ‘velocity’ in grid 6.2; and cf. chapter 7 on international travel and tourism).

A systematic comparison of the impact of global migration is in some respects impossible. The early peopling of the remote corners of the world, the transatlantic migrations and European conquests and settlements were unique historical events that are totally unrepeatable and whose world historical impact is unassailable. A similar argument can be made for the slave trade, though the limited permanent settlement of Asian migration in the nineteenth century has left a slighter historical trail. Clearly, the effects of all these global and regional migrations have been immense. To gauge the impact of contemporary forms of migration we need to examine impact in relation to societies and economies that are radically different from the host countries of former times. This makes simple statistical comparisons almost irrelevant. But several important points can be noted.

The most obvious impact of migration is demographic, altering the composition and size of the population of both the source country and the recipient country. For modern welfare states such shifts have far-reaching implications – quite different than those in earlier epochs – for the level and provision of welfare services, housing and education as well as the operation of the economy itself. Conventional xenophobic wisdom has argued that the consequences of this are uniformly negative for host welfare states. Immigrants crowd out the indigenous poor and working class from the bottom end of the job market, overburden already dilapidated welfare systems and generally constitute an overall drain on the public finances. However, the evidence, such as it is, does not support this position. In most of the West, indigenous population growth has slowed to almost nothing and in some cases actually gone into decline. This has been accompanied by a major shift in the age structure of populations. As life expectancy has increased and the birth-rate has fallen the populations of many countries are undergoing a significant ageing. The impact of this on the total demand for and cost of welfare services and pensions is gathering pace. However, the impact of ageing on the labour force and labour market is made all the sharper by higher levels of early retirement, deliberate withdrawal from the labour market and an increasing amount of time spent by the young in full-time education and structural unemployment. Thus the dependency ratio of those in work to those not in work or outside the labour force has begun to creep upwards, placing fiscal pressure on welfare states (see Swan et al., 1991). Immigration is currently making a significant contribution to population growth and thus alleviating some of the ageing problems in OECD countries (OECD, 1993a). Net immigration is the most important absolute and relative contributor to population growth in Austria, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, Sweden and Switzerland. Migration matches the contribution of indigenous population growth in the USA, Canada, Australia, Greece, Norway and the Netherlands. Finally, migration is a small contributor to demographic change in France, the UK, Belgium, Portugal and Spain. Moreover, in the few systematic studies of the contribution of immigrants to welfare through taxes paid set against the benefits received, no conclusive evidence exists to suggest that benefits received outweigh contributions (Borjas and Trejo, 1993; see also the overview of research in Tapinos and de Rugy, 1993). Indeed, in Western Europe and Canada the impact of immigrants on the welfare state may actually be positive (Simon, 1984, 1989; Akbari, 1989).

By comparison, the economic impact of historical patterns of migration on the labour market and the broader economy is more difficult to establish (for an overview see Tapinos and de Rugy, 1993). The estimation of the impact of migration on wage rates and overall economic performance in host economies is fraught with problems of definition, data gathering, model building, etc. The quantitative work that has been done can be considered at best equivocal (we will return to this issue in section 6.6, with reference to qualitative research). On the other hand, for migration ‘source’ countries there has been an obvious economic benefit in the reduction of domestic unemployment (Ghosh, 1996). Studies of South Korea, Pakistan and Sri Lanka all point
to the considerable impact of contemporary migration in reducing unemployment (ILO/ UNDP, 1988). However, migration may well draw on people who did not participate in the domestic labour force, and in that respect leave high levels of unemployment undiminished. Contemporary migration, in comparison with previous epochs, also tends to cream off some of the most skilled and educated parts of the workforce, impoverishing the domestic economy. The UNDP reports that India, China, South Korea and the Philippines alone lost 145,000 scientifically trained workers to the USA between 1972 and 1985. But, as in the nineteenth century, the main economic benefit of contemporary migration is the reverse flow of remittances from workers to their home country. In 1990 developing countries received a gross flow of $46 billion linked to migrants and net income of $37 billion (UNDP, 1994). Given that a very considerable volume of these flows does not pass through official channels, total remittances are likely to be much higher and, thereby, exceed official development aid flows to these states (see Atalik and Becley, 1993).

6.4.2 Historical forms: organizational comparisons

In terms of transportation, it is reasonably clear that air travel has superseded the oceangoing ship as the main means of global migration today. Some regional migrations continue to cross land borders – particularly the passage of people from Mexico to the USA. However, shifts in types of transportation have not altered, indeed they may have enhanced, the concentrations of migration flows through key points – airports, certain cities, etc. As a consequence, migratory flows to the West now encounter a more formidable and institutionalized set of border and entry controls than was ever possible on long, unpolicied land borders in an era when citizenship documents were rare and thinly spread.

The slave trade and the movements of Asian labour were organized ‘from above’ by an alliance of colonial planters and administrations and, in the case of Chinese and Indian migrations to North America, by railroad companies. In the nineteenth century colonial ministries in Europe and colonial authorities abroad combined with philanthropic societies and charities to steer the movement of European emigrants to the ‘New World’. In the postwar era in Europe, the state has continued to be central to organizing and regulating migrant flows, but it is not colonial offices but employment ministries that have been key to this. Alongside these agencies, depending on the character of policy-making in a given country, representatives of capital and labour have also been involved, particularly from those specific industries where labour shortages have been sharpest. Placement agencies and recruitment firms have sprung up in sending states, indigenously organizing the flow of labour, legal and illegal, to receiving states. Once again, these organizations have combined with more spontaneous pressures for migration, and with the process set in train, have had to channel and organize family reunions as well as fresh immigration.

At an international level the degree of regulation of the migratory process remains nugatory. Although the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers has been increasingly regulated by international treaty and agreement, no codified international regime or body of law has emerged to regulate the movement of labour that bears any comparison with those regulating trade and capital movements. The International Labour Organization (ILO) since its inception in the early twentieth century has sought to establish basic rules regarding the treatment of labour (and is now advocating a declaration on fundamental rights in this regard). But only in the European Union has any stringent international legal framework for labour been established, although even this depends on national enforcement. At the national level stronger policing of borders and more stringent regulation of migration have sought to restrict the international mobility of peoples. At the same time, migrants confront more restricted rules for acquiring citizenship rights (see Hollifield, 1992).

These developments reflect a distinct shift in the patterns of stratification between nineteenth-century and late twentieth-century migrations. Whereas in the nineteenth century the direction of migratory flows was generally north to south, today it is primarily south to north, and east to west. This has had significant consequences for European states, in particular, as new levels of immigration have brought new patterns of social stratification. This is starker in the cases of Sweden and Germany. In both states, the percentage of foreigners in the population in the late nineteenth century was very low: 0.1 per cent in Sweden and 0.5 per cent in Germany. Both figures grew in the following thirty to forty years, peaking at 0.4 per cent in Sweden in 1920 and 1.9 per cent in Germany in 1910. The interwar years saw decline, before the rapid and explosive growth of the postwar era. Between 1960 and 1990 the percentage of foreigners in the population grew from 2.5 to 5.6 per cent in Sweden and from 1.2 to 8.2 per cent in Germany. At the same time, both have acquired a significant number of non-European and black migrants for the first time (historic data calculated from Mitchell, 1975; 1992; recent data taken from SOPEMI, 1991 and earlier years; 1992).

Britain shows a similar trajectory, complicated by the level of naturalizations achieved by people coming into the UK. The 1990 data suggest a foreign population of around 3.3 per cent of the total, but this conceals very visible and very significant ethnic communities with British citizenship. Britain, like Germany and Sweden, is a multiethnic if not multicultural state in a way it never was in the nineteenth century. France is slightly anomalous given the very high levels of inward migration and low transatlantic migration experienced in the nineteenth century. The foreign population in France made up 2.1 per cent of the population in 1870, climbing to 6.6 per cent in the 1930s before declining again to a postwar low in the 1950s. Migration recently has massively expanded that percentage so that foreigners constituted 6.4 per cent of the population in 1990 (historic data calculated from Mitchell, 1975; 1992; recent data from SOPEMI).

Data for Japan are difficult to calculate but we can safely argue that contemporary levels of immigration are historically unprecedented. The USA, as we might expect from our discussion of intensity, has been a multiethnic state since its inception and foreigners constituted an exceptionally large 13.9 per cent of the population in 1870, rising to a peak of over 14 per cent in 1910. The collapse of interwar immigration combined with rapid indigenous population growth saw the figure fall to around 6 per cent in the postwar era. However, the recent immigrations have begun to push that figure back up to above 8 per cent, and with illegal immigration it may well be over 10 per cent. Immigration in the first half of the 1990s was running at a historically unparalleled rate (measured as immigrants per 10,000 of the population) and there is no sign of a radical downturn (historic data calculated from Mitchell, 1983 and US Department of Commerce, 1972; recent data from SOPEMI). Moreover, the US may be approaching a level of ethnic diversity greater than in the nineteenth century –
diversity that is not simply intra-European and African but increasingly Hispanic and Asian as well.

However, these trends alone do not disclose the considerable differences in the cultural experience and social connections of migrant groups. A useful distinction made by Castles and Miller is between the formation of ethnic minorities and that of ethnic communities (1993). In the case of the former, ethnic groups are not only segregated in the labour market and in residential ghettos but experience significant social, cultural and political exclusion. They will tend to exist as marginalized groups on the fringes of a defensive and indigenous society that denies immigrant communities full or even partial citizenship and does not accord them a significant or rightful place in a broader cultural experience and social connections of migrant groups. A useful distinction made between conceptions of national identity and citizenship.

But nearly all countries lie somewhere between the two poles. They hold that Australia tends towards the model of ethnic communities, while Germany is closer to the model of multicultural nation. Ethnic communities, by contrast, exist where ‘immigrants and their descendants are seen as an integral part of a multicultural society which is willing to reshape its cultural identity’ (Castles and Miller, 1993, p. 195). In fact, as the authors argue, no nation has groups which fit either category completely, nor do these ideal types capture the different experiences of different ethnic groups in the same nation. By nearly all countries lie somewhere between the two poles. They hold that Australia tends towards the model of ethnic communities, while Germany is closer to the model of multicultural nation. Ethnic communities, by contrast, exist where ‘immigrants and their descendants are seen as an integral part of a multicultural society which is willing to reshape its cultural identity’ (Castles and Miller, 1993, p. 195). In fact, as the authors argue, no nation has groups which fit either category completely, nor do these ideal types capture the different experiences of different ethnic groups in the same nation.

Castles and Miller outline four models of citizenship in Western countries which serve as proxies both for attitudes to citizenship and national identity and for clusters of public policies that emerge from that cultural context: immigration policies, naturalization policies and educational and cultural policies. Those four models/strategies are: illusory; exclusionary; republican-imperial; and multicultural. Illusory attitudes to immigrants are not so much a citizenship model as the deliberate disregard of immigrant communities. In both Japan and Italy state authorities and politicians have turned a blind eye to substantial illegal immigration. This does not mean of course that the civic status of migrants is acknowledged but is subordinate to that of citizens of the host country, and political exclusion. They will tend to exist as marginalized groups on the fringes of a defensive and indigenous society that denies immigrant communities full or even partial citizenship and does not accord them a significant or rightful place in a broader cultural experience and social connections of migrant groups. A useful distinction made between conceptions of national identity and citizenship.

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Finally, the multicultural model of citizenship is one in which immigration is usually permanent and the transition to citizenship assured. In its ideal form it envisages a civic nationalism in which identities are plural or hyphenated and in which earlier immigrant cultures are redefined in the light of new waves of immigration. This is, of course, a very idealized model, and Castles and Miller acknowledge the severe asymmetries of power and legitimacy displayed, for instance, in the USA between the dominant white culture and the plurality of Hispanic, Black and Asian cultures and groups. They argue that Canada, Australia and Sweden come closest to this model/strategy of citizenship.

While the storm of nationalist politics and the tumult of identity, citizenship and legitimacy have raged much more intensely in the developing world (and in the ex-Soviet states), all of our six case study countries have and continue to be concerned by these issues. Economic uncertainty in the postwar years combined with an incapacity to come to terms culturally with the presence of large numbers of non-Europeans have meant that the strategies of citizenship and national identity pursued in Europe and America have all come under attack (Lithman, 1987; Solomos and Wrench, 1993). Looking at one end of the spectrum, Sweden demonstrates that even the seemingly most entrenched multiculturalism has been prey to these forces. In Sweden, official multiculturalism has been expressed though generous naturalization provisions and asylum and welfare policies for immigrants. Second-language schooling and generous social security arrangements have stemmed from the inclusive universalism of Swedish social democracy. Having made its political fortunes as the vector of a cross-class universalism enshrined in the Swedish welfare state, social democracy with its ideology of egalitarianism was unlikely to tolerate exclusion on the grounds of ethnicity. However, the financial and ideological pillars of an inclusive social democratic welfare state have become shaky, and in turn the treatment of immigrants and the nature of Swedish multiculturalism have come into question. With the mounting presence of immigrant communities and precipitous economic and political uncertainty, the early 1990s saw the emergence of explicitly racist nationalist groups and a more diffuse xenophobic populism.

If Sweden has seen the rise of racist nationalism in recent years it is no surprise that those states with a less inclusive model of citizenship have experienced a similar political fate (Harris, 1990). Germany and France began the process of postwar immigration with more exclusionary notions of national identity and these have helped feed a more sustained and powerful far right politics, principally Die Republikaner in Germany and the Front National in France. Similar movements combining protest politics, disaffected elements of the working class and elements of the middle classes have emerged in Belgium, Austria and the Netherlands, while many of these sentiments were submerged within the Legga Lombarda in Italy. In Britain, the electoral fortunes and organizational capacity of the far right has been somewhat truncated by the hurdles of the electoral system and the occupation of much of this political territory by right-wing sectors of the Conservative Party.

America stands somewhat astride of these trends. Ethnicity and national identity have been a contested terrain since the inception of the USA. Moreover, the rejection of the older assimilationist melting-pot model of American identity was initiated not by new waves of immigration but by the explosive protests of the civil rights movement in the 1960s. This indigenous conflict has fuelled subsequent debates about American identity and about the contrasting republican-assimilationist and multicultural models. Though the roots of these conflicts are different from those of the European debate,
there are similarities in the response. America has seen a revival of white supremacist, an increasingly strident attitude towards illegal immigrants and reassertion of the supremacy of the WASP culture challenged by the upheavals of the 1960s. The success of the Californian 1997 referendum on reducing state benefits and services for undocumented aliens indicates a new acceptance of a very draconian and exclusionary model of citizenship.

6.5 Migration and National Enmeshment

It is clear from the global picture of postwar migrations that, compared to the prewar situation, nearly all six case study countries have become labour importing rather than labour exporting. While emigration has continued from all six it is, with the exception of the UK, at lower levels than those experienced in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Immigration in various forms has been the dominant contemporary pattern of enmeshment in migratory flows for these countries.

At the end of the Second World War the USA had in place a variety of restrictive immigration laws passed in the interwar years as well as more restrictive wartime measures. These were relaxed somewhat in the late 1940s to accommodate some 200,000 displaced persons and refugees who settled in the USA. Further restrictive legislation was passed in the 1950s, seeking both to limit the overall total of immigration and restrict it as far as possible to Northern Europeans by the imposition of country-specific and hemispheric quotas (Riemers, 1985; Portes and Bach, 1985; Borjas, 1990).

The bulk of official immigration into the US during this period was from Europe and totalled a mere 1.2 million people from 1946 to 1955. Amendments to the 1950s legislation in the 1960s and 1970s increased the official immigration quotas to a total of around 300,000 persons a year: still small by pre-1914 standards.

However, the story of postwar US immigration demonstrates the ultimate failure of this legislation, both in terms of the actual volume of immigration and the skewed quota system, designed to keep Eastern and Southern Europeans, Latin Americans and Asians out. Not only did immigration flows continue unabated, they massively accelerated in the 1970s and 1980s, and their geographical origins fundamentally switched from the historic transatlantic passage to northward flows from Latin America and the Caribbean and transpacific flows from Asia. In the 1980s the rate of immigration—permanent and temporary, legal and illegal—exploded in the US. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of illegal immigration in the US case. US agencies deported around a million people a year in the 1980s, predominantly Mexican, for inadequate documentation. Some estimates suggest that for every person caught at least four to five slip through the net. This implies an annual flow of something in the region of 4–5 million people, of whom many have effectively assumed permanent residence (Johnson and Williams, 1981; Bustamente, 1989). More restrained estimates suggest that permanent illegals add 200,000 to the US population each year (Papademetriou, 1991). Permanent legal settlement tells a similar story, growing from around 500,000 persons a year in 1980 to over 1.5 million in 1990. Of that number only 112,000 were European compared to 679,000 Mexicans and 338,000 Asians. As a consequence of this surge, the official number of foreign residents, which fell from 6.8 per cent of the population in 1950 to 4.7 per cent in 1970, had grown to over 8 per cent in 1990 and continued to grow throughout the decade (older data calculated from Mitchell, 1983; more recent data from SOPEMI). Taking illegal immigration into account it is quite possible that the figure now exceeds well over 10 per cent of the population and is thus approaching the levels experienced at the turn of the century.

France has continued to experience considerable immigration (SOPEMI, 1991 and earlier years; 1992; Freeman, 1979; Hollifield, 1992). From an initially low level of immigration in the early 1950s, annual immigrant flows constituted over 2 per cent of the labour force in the early 1960s. This rate climbed steadily through the 1970s to 7.7 per cent in 1985, after which it has remained at a high level (older data calculated from Mitchell, 1975; 1992; more recent data from SOPEMI). Moreover, the inclusion of pre-independence Algeria in metropolitan France disguises the level of migration from North Africa to France prior to Algerian independence. Early waves of temporary labour came from Italy but were soon replaced by flows from Iberia, and then Turkey, North Africa and French West Africa. The growing wealth of Southern Europe, and the process of French decolonization, underlay that change. In 1975, Italians, Portuguese and Spanish immigrants made up 50 per cent of the foreign population in France and North Africans 33 per cent. By 1992 the respective figures were 31 per cent and 39 per cent, while the numbers from Eastern and Central Europe, as well as migrants from ex-French African colonies, had grown substantially. By 1982 the number of foreigners in France constituted 6.8 per cent of the French population (SOPEMI). Although there are some demographic differences between host and immigrant populations these have narrowed and thus the size of the foreign population as a percentage of the total population is a reasonable guide to the make-up of the labour force. Throughout the 1980s this fluctuated around 6–7 per cent although it was much higher in certain industries and much lower in others. For example, in the auto industry foreigners made up over 18 per cent of the workforce at the end of the 1970s (Hollifield, 1992).

Official German data show almost no immigration in the late 1940s. After this there is a steady flow of around half a million immigrants each year in the early 1950s, rising to over 800,000 a year in 1965 and peaking again at over a million in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Castles and Kosack, 1985; Hollifield, 1992). This growth slowed down in the late 1970s and early 1980s before gathering pace again through the late 1980s and 1990s. German data are complicated by the different ways in which the migration of ethnic Germans from East Central Europe and those fleeing the GDR have been classified by comparison to the migration of temporary workers. German immigration data does not include the latter. This serves to underestimate the level of immigration to the Federal Republic relative to other European nations. By contrast, the very restricted terms on which non-ethnic Germans have entered the country, and the failure (until 1998) to award German citizenship to second-generation immigrants, especially the very large number of second-generation Turkish-Germans, inflates migration and size of foreign population data in Germany relative to other European nations.

The initial wave of temporary workers in the 1950s were Italians with a certain number of other Southern Europeans. The sealing of the Berlin Wall in 1961 rapidly accelerated an already clear trend of inward migration of temporary workers as the influx from the East became a trickle. By the 1960s these flows were being replaced by workers from Yugoslavia and above all other places from Turkey. Rates of immigration relative to population peaked in the early 1970s, dropping from around 4 per cent of the population to a low of 1.7 per cent in 1975, after which rates hovered around 2
of economic growth that began in the 1950s these ceased. Indeed, a reversal soon occurred as many people of Japanese ethnic origin living in South and North America began to return home. The Korean population, expanded by forced movements during the Second World War, remained in Japan and numbered around half a million people – less than 0.5 per cent of the total population. In the 1980s the level of emigration, especially temporary emigration, has increased as skilled Japanese labour has followed the export of Japanese capital to Europe, the USA and South East Asia. This has been matched by a growing flow of unskilled labour, mainly illegal, and overwhelmingly short term, to Japan. By the late 1980s thousands of people from Pakistan, India, the Philippines and Indonesia were making their way to Japan in order to fill the host of poorly paid service jobs. The numbers of illegal immigrants refused entry annually increased fivefold, while annual expulsions of illegal immigrants tripled from 1986 to 1991, standing at an annual level of 35,000 a year (OECD, 1993a).

Overlapping with these trends in economic migration, different countries have had different experiences of flows of refugees and asylum seekers. Overall Europe has taken around four-fifths of all OECD asylum applicants and North America the rest. Japan has received hardly any asylum seekers at all. Within North America the US has taken the lion’s share of applicants and seen numbers rise from 20,000 in 1983 to a 1989 peak of 100,000. Refugee and asylum policy has been closely tied to foreign policy, with almost anyone from a communist state during the Cold War being accepted. In the postwar era up to 1989, the US accepted 473,000 people from Cuba and 411,000 from Vietnam. The exodus of Haitians and Cubans produced record levels of asylum applications to the US in 1994. Within Europe it is Germany, with the strongest economy and most liberal asylum laws, that has received the greatest numbers of asylum seekers. In 1981 Germany accounted for 65 per cent of all asylum seekers in Europe, falling to 47 per cent in 1991. However, the absolute increase is enormous, from 107,800 in 1980 to over 750,000 in 1991. In the four years 1988-91 Germany received asylum applications from over 670,000 people. France, Sweden and the UK have experienced the same rising trend; between 1980 and 1991, applications rose in France from 18,000 to over 50,000, in Sweden from 6,000 to 41,000 and in the UK from 9,000 to 57,700. In proportionate terms both France and Sweden have taken in around 10 per cent of asylum seekers each (Sweden has less than a fifth of the population of France) and the UK a little less.

6.6 Globalization, Migration and the Nation-State

What are the implications of contemporary global and regional migrations for the autonomy and sovereignty of nation-states? A number of tentative arguments can be made with respect to the decisional, institutional, distributional and structural consequences of contemporary patterns of global migration for SIACS in particular. First, the flow of illegal and undocumented migrants, economic and non-economic, demonstrates the limited capacity of many nation-states to secure independently their own borders. Second, those states that have extended surveillance of their borders have been unable to stem the flow of illegal migrants. Third, the growth of international attempts to control or coordinate national policies with respect to migrations demonstrates a recognition of the changing nature of state autonomy and sovereignty and the
necessity to increase transborder cooperation in this domain. Fourth, in the realm of economic and cultural policy, migration has transformed the domestic political milieu within which SIACS must operate: the collective strength and pattern of alliances of political actors has changed; and migration has reshaped political interests and perceptions of these interests. Finally, migration has altered the kinds of policy options available to states and the balance of costs and benefits that those policies bear. We explore each of these claims below.

6.6.1 Decisional impacts: border controls versus surveillance

The capacity of SIACS to seal their borders has never been perfect. Prior to the last two centuries, states had been demarcated by the amorphous and permeable grey areas of frontiers, marches and peripheries in which sovereignty gradually dissolved rather than being abruptly truncated (see chapter 1). States have always tried to control the movement of peoples through these regions and have been concerned with patterns of peripheral settlement and population movement. European states have a long and dishonourable record of forced expulsions − the Jews and the Huguenots, for example. However, it is anachronistic to compare these states' policies with contemporary forms of border control. For states, as chapter 1 shows, have only recently acquired the capacities of border control in their contemporary form − as fixed, intentionally determined boundaries demarcating the precise territorial writ of a given state's sovereignty. It is only with the emergence of nation-states and their borders that the bureaucratization and documentation of citizenship − passports, visas, etc. − have become widespread and states have acquired the bureaucratic means to try and control inward migration flows.

Contemporary forms of border control were pioneered in the USA in the late nineteenth century. The concentration of immigrants in oceangoing ships in a few key harbours on the east and west coasts of the USA meant that a greater concentration of state resources could be brought to bear on migratory flows than is possible over long land borders. While the development of reception centres, passport control and immigration criteria were developed in this era, they initially served a very open immigration policy. It was only with the tightening of US immigration policy in the interwar years that this apparatus was put to the test. The precipitous drop in emigration to the US suggests that these administrative and coercive innovations − which have been progressively adopted by all nation-states − increased the power of states relative to migratory flows. In the postwar era these bureaucratic systems have had to cope with greatly increased migratory flows and a greater diversity of international travellers. Permanent migrants arrive with contract workers. There has been a phenomenal increase in international tourism, asylum seekers, students, family reunions, etc. Increasing numbers and the increasing complexity of these bureaucratic categories have strained the capacities of border control agencies. Tourists can overstay and students can disappear into the population after their course ends (Zolberg, 1993). In liberal democratic states, checks on the intrusiveness of immigration controls have made these loopholes wider.

While international air traffic has kept migratory flows fairly concentrated, illegal and legal migration is still occurring across land borders, which are as prohibitively expensive and geographically difficult to control as ever. The USA, in particular, cannot meaningfully patrol its long Mexican border. The problem is considerable for Germany and France as well by virtue of their long land borders: unlike the situation with the US–Mexico border, these fall partly within the European Union and are in effect open borders. However, as migration to the island states of Japan and the UK demonstrates, physical barriers are becoming less and less relevant to border control. Levels of illegal migration appear to be climbing in the West. Both Japanese and American agencies report return rates of about 20 per cent. Despite these efforts, the ILO estimates that there were 650,000 illegal immigrants in Germany in 1991 and 600,000 in Italy, and perhaps 2.6 million in Western Europe as a whole (Böhning, 1991). There are probably more illegals in southern California alone than this.

All Western European countries tightened up their immigration legislation and enhanced policing powers in the 1970s and 1980s. These measures included strict sanctions on airline carriers; tighter visa requirements; denying access and the due process of law to asylum seekers; and the active penalization of undocumented aliens. Yet none has been able to reverse the broad tide of rising migratory flows from illegal cross-border entry, though they may have contained its growth.

Given this shift, states have turned to a variety of forms of internal surveillance and control of the composition of their populations. In most SIACS there are legal, constitutional and political obstacles to giving the police major powers to stop and check identities on suspicion. Where those powers have been allocated they have often resulted in abuse of civil liberties or regular and systematic discrimination against visible minorities. As a consequence, liberal democracies have tried to control illegal migration by controlling access to the labour market. This includes an increasing tendency to penalize employers using illegal labour. However, even in the US where this has been a fairly direct strategy, it seems to make only a marginal difference. One of the reasons this reflects the limits of state institutions and the resources and technologies available to them and the failure of those same agencies to enlist the support and cooperation of social actors who might aid them (Castles and Miller, 1993).

Three important aspects of state sovereignty and autonomy are illuminated by the discussion of border control and surveillance. First, the balance of collective power between states and migrants − particularly those who seek to evade border controls − has shifted over time. The powers of SIACS have been increased by the establishment of immigration agencies, the documentation of citizenship and the funneling of migrants through harbours and airports. But the capacity of migrants to evade the grasp of the state has also risen as overall numbers of travellers have increased, and as the increase in tourism and student exchanges has opened more loopholes in immigration agency practice. Second, SIACS' capacity to implement policy is not always, indeed is rarely, dependent on the state's absolute autonomy from and power over social actors − such as employers using illegal labour. Rather, SIACS can only successfully implement their public policy objectives when they have secured a reasonable degree of cooperation from social actors. In the case of illegal migration, they have often failed to do so. Third, immigration policies cannot be seen in isolation from other policies affecting the labour market. Some states have intervened in the domestic labour market with the consequence that the employment of foreign and undocumented labour has become more attractive. In the US particularly, the erosion of organized labour has made such recruitment easier, while in France and Germany the high social security
costs of employing registered and legal workers have encouraged the use of foreign workers as a way of evading contributions.

6.6.2 Institutional impacts: international cooperation and policing cross-border migration

SIACS wishing to regulate these contemporary migratory flows have been forced to engage in forms of international cooperation to stem the flows at source, either through development and economic aid, or through international policing efforts. The development model, controlling push factors in the migration process, has mainly been conducted at the level of rhetoric or within organizations that are comparatively powerless, like the European Parliament. While Japan has explicitly engaged in training and investment projects in South East Asia with the aim of limiting flows, there is little to suggest a broader shift in Japan’s or anyone else’s aid and development policies: rather, there is a gradual shrinkage of budgets. Collective attempts at refugee and migration regulation have been equally limited so far. The EU has made some progress on this through the Schengen agreements; the former where banishment orders and controls on asylum seekers contravened the Geneva Convention on refugees; the latter where the inclusion of Greece as a ‘safe third country’ for asylum seekers did not accord with the German judiciary’s estimation of Greece’s human rights record.

6.6.3 Distributional impacts: differential patterns of employment and prosperity

Studies of the impact of immigration on overall wage rates in a host economy, and the differential impact of immigration on the wage rates of different class and ethnic groupings in national labour markets, suggest marginal but arguably constructive impacts (see the survey in Ichino, 1993). As immigrants fill the bottom rungs of the labour market, the native workforce moves into higher paid employment. This is certainly the view of research done in Europe in the 1960s and early 1970s and for contemporary Canada, Australia and the US (Borjas, 1987, 1990, 1993).

A more detailed picture of the economic consequences of migration for host economies can be gleaned from qualitative considerations. The impact of migration is clearly dependent on the precise character of the immigration in the first place. Migrants cannot be considered as a homogeneous mass when their economic impact is assessed. Conversely, there will be widely differing consequences for different groups in the host economy. There is considerable polarization among immigrants in host labour markets. In many OECD countries a significant percentage of foreign workers are highly skilled professionals, often from other Western countries. At the other end of the scale immigrant workers take some of the most insecure, poorly paid and lightly regulated jobs.

6.6.4 Structural impacts: national identity and national citizenship

People do more than work. The structural impact of economically driven migrations inevitably spills over into social, cultural and political domains. European countries now have significant black populations for the first time. The USA has of course had a black, Hispanic and Asian population for a long time, but here too the numbers are rapidly rising. Mostly among the poor there is also a common pattern of residential location (though enclaves of well-off immigrant communities do emerge in host countries). Immigrant communities have clustered in large cities and within those cities have formed concentrated ethnic neighbourhoods. In Britain, Afro-Caribbean and Asian communities have concentrated in London, Birmingham, Bradford, Liverpool, Bristol...
Globalization, Culture and the Fate of Nations

Few expressions of globalization are so visible, widespread and pervasive as the world-wide proliferation of internationally traded consumer brands, the global ascendancy of popular cultural icons and artefacts, and the simultaneous communication of events by satellite broadcasts to hundreds of millions of people at a time on all continents. The most public symbols of globalization consist of Coca-Cola, Madonna and the news on CNN. Whatever the causal and practical significance of these phenomena, there can be little doubt that one of the most directly perceived and experienced forms of globalization is the cultural form. Despite the complexity of cultural interactions between societies over the last three thousand years, the intensifying movement of images and symbols and the extraordinary stretch of modes of thought and modes of communication are unique and unparalleled features of the late twentieth century and the new millennium. There is no historical equivalent of the global reach and volume of cultural traffic through contemporary telecommunication, broadcasting and transport infrastructures.

6.7 Conclusion

Contemporary patterns of migration are more geographically extensive than the great global migrations of the modern era, but on balance are slightly less intensive. There have been considerable shifts in the technological and social infrastructure of migrations across these eras. In terms of enmeshment, Western European states have acquired their most multiethnic character to date, developing significant non-European immigrant communities. Japan has acquired significant foreign communities for the first time, while America is returning to levels of foreign population not experienced since the height of immigration in the years before the First World War. The autonomy of nation-states is being redefined by the impact of past legal migrations and the continuing impact of illegal migration. SIACS' capacity to patrol their borders and police their population is no longer adequate when measured against the tasks required. International cooperation has not as yet made the achievement of these tasks much more feasible. Moreover, notions of citizenship and national identity are being renegotiated in response to contemporary patterns of global migration and cultural globalization. But in many cases the trajectory of these negotiations is far from clear.

7.1 Analysing Cultural Globalization

Contemporary debates have thrown up three broad categories of argument about the nature and impact of cultural globalization (see the introduction). Hyperglobalizers of various kinds describe or predict the homogenization of the world under the auspices of American popular culture or Western consumerism in general. As with other forms of globalization, hyperglobalizers are matched by sceptics who point to the thinness and ersatz quality of global cultures by comparison with national cultures and to the geopolitical faultlines of the world’s major civilizations. Those taking a transformationalist position describe the intermingling of cultures and peoples as generating cultural hybrids and new global cultural networks. We will return to aspects of these debates later, but it is clear that these accounts are predominantly about the impact of contemporary cultural globalization on national communities. This raises three problems. First, there is a tendency for the advocates of such positions either to exaggerate or to underplay the breadth and depth of contemporary forms of cultural globalization. In the absence of a systematic framework for describing cultural flows across and between societies, rather than just investigating their impact, no proper assessment of cultural globalization can be made. Second, few accounts offer a satisfactory conceptual purchase on historical questions. Most assume a world in which global flows of culture are to be contrasted with flows and institutions at the national level. While this is of central relevance to contemporary debates, it is of little use in tackling the world before nation-states