the structure of media in Parsons' original model (the level of individual actor interests and transactions and the level of collective institutionalization). The power of the generalized medium concept as an analytical tool largely derives from the way that it focuses attention on the "feed-back" relationship between these two structural and functional levels as they affect each other through their mutual involvement in dynamic social processes. I have attempted to demonstrate by the analysis of several examples that this approach is capable of throwing new light even on such classical anthropological problems as gift prestation and moiety organization. I believe, however, that the potential applicability of the concept in social anthropology is far wider than even these examples would indicate.

Sociological Inquiry

The System of Solidarities

(A Working Paper in General Action Analysis*)

Rainer C. Baum

Oriented to current needs in modernization theory this paper proposes a conception of solidarity distinct from the concept role-expectation. Following Beetham's lead on religious evolution, it traces the emergence of a solidarity subsystem of society as intercontingent with the differentiation of culture, society, personality, and behavioral organism. Constituting a working paper in general action analysis, the evolution of solidarities in terms of their production, maintenance and organization, as well as their disposal to a wide array of human organizations is interpreted as a process increasing in complexity and contingency. Evolutionary trends of convergence and divergence are specified for some kinds of solidarities; historical continuity or evolutionary invariance is specified for others.

Introduction

Common parlance assigns the term solidarity a quaint connotative aroma. In "capitalist" countries it evokes images of the rise of the labor movement long ago. In "socialist" countries it still serves, if somewhat worn by age and over-use, as a symbol of political legitimation in the form of "workers' solidarity." But in sociology it has been and must be a central analytical concern. And yet here it remained relatively underdeveloped both theoretically and in empirical research. Perhaps there is a connection, but whatever it may be, the discipline can ill afford such continued relative neglect if it is to move out of a long-standing impasse in one of its "classical" and core concerns, viz. the theory of social change in evolutionary perspective.

The lag of theoretical development concerning solidarity is evident where one would expect the very opposite, a main effort and a consequent considerable advance beyond Durkheim. This is the work of Talcott Parsons and his associates. In their work, amazingly, the integrative subsystem of society has remained one of the least charted of the four functional "boxes." Contributing one modest step towards an analytical cartography of that box constitutes the objective of this paper.

It is true that Parsons "unpacked" the classical dichotomies of Durkheim and Tonnies already in 1951. But this was a move from mechanical and organic solidarities to the pattern variable schema. An explicit concern with a solidarity subsystem, the societal community, appeared only in 1960, was oriented to the meaning of types of role-categories that articulate persons with territorial location and essentially got stuck with that approach, never moving yet towards an internal four-function subsystem by 1971.

Mayhew, on the other hand, turned to a conception of solidarity distinct from role,

*Responses to an earlier draft included extensive written comments from Andrew Effrat and Victor Lida and other communications from John Marx, Ronald Robertson, and Shmuel N. Eisenstadt. They have my gratitude and appreciation.


developed a typology, and moved some steps towards specifying conditions of equilibrium for such solidarities treated as a system. But though it shows some traces of that character, his is not a four-function typology of solidarities which action theory requires. This is not all that Parsons and his co-workers have had to say about the solidarity problem. Action theory as a whole revolves centrally about the problem of integration of action and solidarity is at its core. But next to Parsons' media theory and pertinent discussions of the problem from different perspectives, the above is all there is when it comes to systematic conceptualization.

There is clear-cut evidence that an adequate conceptualization of solidarity has not occurred elsewhere in sociology either. This evidence exists in an unresolved two-hundred year old debate over the question whether or not and in what ways modernization eventuates in convergence among societies leading to the emergence of universal global man. Worse, post WW II empirical research has so far failed to move this debate off its inconclusive dead center. One reason for this impasse has been a failure of the openness and neglect of Bendix' clarion call that a sociologist's interest in modernization must focus on changes in the way that societies produce and organize solidarity which, while controversial, is easier said than done so long as the concept solidarity remains underdeveloped. Elsewhere I have attended to its development presenting four functional types of solidarities with specified hypotheses concerning evolutionary convergence, divergence, and invariance for the appropriate categories. However, constrained by an opportunity of empirically testing these hypotheses with survey research in a cross section cross-national design, this effort had to remain at a relatively rudimentary level. Here I can attempt a more thorough grounding of these hypotheses.

A secondary objective also deserves mention. Whereas Parsons and Mayhew emphasize the complexity and flexibility of the modern solidarity complex in the direction of a gain in the capacity to include groups into the societal community, I shall stress the logical corollary: growth in the capacity for exclusion.

The direct stimuli for the present effort came from two sources. One was Mayhew who supplied four types of solidarity and hence the invitation to develop a four-function system of solidarities. The other was Grune's evolutionary perspective on social movements based on a combination of Bellah's work on religious evolution and Smelser's theory of collective phenomena. Central to that analysis was the idea that "objects of commitment" for the dénouement developed and proliferated in tandem with the differentiation of the general action system as outlined by Bellah. The implicit invitation to me here was to use a concept of "object of communitarian" to relate it to Bellah's evolutionary schema and see what could be said about the evolution of the societal community as a four-function internally differentiated subsystem of society with internal and consummatory, hence integrative, significance for society as a whole. Such evolution must involve a growth of "objects of communitarian" in: (a) number, (b) mutual distinctiveness as cultural templates, (c) autonomy and yet interdependence, and (d) complexity in their organization.

Organized into two parts, the first of this effort presents matters of definition and an overview concerning the exploitation of Bellah's lead. The second then develops a model of solidarities that unfold in distinctiveness and complexity of organization as one moves from primitive to modern societies.

I

Turning to definitions, broadly there are four: (i) solidarity; (ii) action and experience; (iii) evolution as used in diachronic functionalism; and (iv) convergence, divergence, and evolutionary invariance.

Defining Solidarity

Solidarity can be defined as the sharing of action and/or experience on the part of two or more actors concerning the relation that obtains among them. Actors can be individuals-in-roles or larger collectivities involving corporate actors whether de jure or de facto. That formulation presupposes that actors can take each other as shared objects of orientation relatively independent of their situation. Their social bond can be an object of orientation as if it were a distinct and separate part of the world. Principally sharing covers interests on the one hand and identities on the other. Producing solidarity involves mutual translation processes between these two, eventuating in a sense of "we-ness" resting on a perceived fit of communitarian, contrast, and complementarity between actors. Solidarity serves to gratify need-affiliation for personality and simultaneously supplies trust as a general mechanism of complexity reduction to social systems.

Analytically, solidarity is a result of an action of selection. Motivated personalities relate to each other, hence constitute a social bond, by selecting patterns of meaning from a cultural symbol reservoir. They can either rely on their experience as members of a common culture in constituting their relation or they can jointly act in selecting meanings that then define their mutual relatedness, or do both. Thus, as conceived here, solidarity requires three analytical categories: motivated actors, a stock of culture, and objects of communitarian selected from that stock on which to generate a sense of belongingness. Therefore some differentiation of culture, social system, personality, and behavioral organism, i.e. of the four subsystems of the general action system, is presupposed before

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solidarity can become constituted. Hence, a “solidarity problem” exists already at the most primitive level of the organization of human action. Like the problem of meaning, the problem of belonging and some sense of choice about it stands at the birth of mankind.

However, how much choice and, above all, the number of bases on which to decide it are a function of the division of labor in the broad sense of the term. To take a clear example from the modern world, forging a bond of occupational identity presupposes the exact differentiation between the occupational, the political, the territorial-local, and the cultural-religious spheres at the societal level. Differentiation in society is the necessary condition for cultural supplies to operate as items of selection for constructing specialized senses of solidarity. Even primitive man was a Meadian actor, capable of reflectiveness about self, other, and the world; but the low division of labor hardly ever pressed him towards serious reflection and its attendant problems of choice. It took the greater differentiation of the general action system together with the development of specialized roles attending to cultural productions that made it possible and necessary to constitute different types of solidarities and to decide when and with whom to implement them.

Defining solidarity by reference to a double function, viz. the gratification of need—Affiliation for personality on the one hand and the provisioning of trust to the social system on the other, also yields a convenient spot to specify in what sense this is a working paper. So conceived, solidarity is clearly a product of mediation. This involves the role of the generalized media of interchange in analyzing the evolution of solidarities as the ideal theoretical strategy. However, the present state of Parsons’ media strategy remains too underdeveloped to accomplish this.11a Serving an interest in abstract theory conception this paper intends to be preparatory. It provides that which theoretical conviction compels me to “trust” is the subject of mediation, viz. objects of commonality. But a simultaneous commitment to empirical theory commands me to go beyond that topic. And that, hopefully, will also show how it came about that modern men have acquired an unsurpassed capacity for mutual abandonment as well as acceptance and inclusion.

**Defining Action and Experience**

Solidarity as defined involves the terms action and experience. Here Luhmann’s


and is so enabled to produce at a lower level an innovatory element, in this case a sentence. Now, general action theorists have developed two basic images of hierarchically organized levels of socially meaningful action as a system. One of these, quite analytical, is Smelser’s seven levels of specificity; another, more empirical, Parsons’ four levels of organization of society, the technical, managerial, institutional, and societal. Experience and action as contingent learning processes would apply to either.

Experience and action involve differential uses of time and information with respect to given components of socially meaningful activity at a given level of its organization. As to time and information, one can either save or spend them. Saving time and information about a component of action—be that facilities, organization, norms, or values—at a given level of organization means treating that element at that level as a given, i.e., as a piece of experience, and orienting to lower level components with an interest in their improvement. Spending time and information on a given component at a given level of organization in the system takes as problematic that component at its level. Subjecting it to action which in the present sense is complexity reduction, then means searching for its fit at that level and scrutinizing the implications of such better fit for higher levels of organization of the action system. Thus experience involves taking for granted higher level components and reworking lower level components in the general action system. Action involves the reverse: taking for granted the operation of lower level components and seeking better organizational solutions among higher level components. Underlying this image of learning processes is the old saw that not everything can be relearned and reorganized at once and that learning chances in a given area are maximized when the functioning of other areas can be taken for granted. Because some parts of the system keep functioning and make necessary resources available to others, these others can apply efforts at reorganization. If technical and perhaps managerial level processes keep functioning, units operating on the reorganization of the institutional and societal level processes are enabled to reorganize. Conversely, innovation at the lower level becomes more probable to the extent that higher level organizations keep operating. But through time once reorganization at a given level has succeeded, it must be followed by step-wise readjustment of lower or higher components as the case may be. Put in such abstract terms, the contingency between experience and action as learning processes is neither difficult to see nor especially a novel idea. The utility here will involve a number of uses for theory construction. First, action and experience in terms of their differentiation of fusion lend themselves to distinguish major stages in the evolution of the action system from intermediary or preparatory stages. Second, action and experience involve different uses of time and information. So long as such uses are consonant, viz. either jointly saving time and information, or jointly spending both, learning takes place and does so both up and down the hierarchical organization of a system of action. But when such uses are dissonant involving the saving of one and the spending of the other, then learning comes to a relative stop. Third, this makes it possible to isolate types of solidarity fully subject to learning and hence to evolutionary rationalization and others partially but crucially exempt from such evolution at least after the stage of historic societies.

Defining Evolution

Action theory shares with systems theory in the functional mode of the general conception of evolution. Accordingly, in interdependent living systems evolution is a process of change concerning three objects: the system under study, its environments, and the contingent relation between the system and environments such that the system gains in autonomy as regards its dependency on environments. Autonomy here means capacity of the system to select its dependency. Evolution has occurred when a gain in autonomy or self-steering capacity with respect to contingency on environments can be demonstrated. Evolutionary process involves partial selection of elements from environments and their incorporation and organization inside through internal system differentiation in the service of functional specialization. The only special feature of action theory is that evolution emerges as a product of binary fission as for example from household economy to "occupational complex" on the one hand and the "motivational tension-management specialized family" on the other. Bellah’s work on religious evolution used here as a main source of critical facts deviates from that practice. Neither did it treat the differentiation of personality and behavioral organism. But one can use that work without recasting it extensively.

Defining Convergence, Divergence, and Evolutionary Invariance

The common reference point for these three phenomena is economic, political, communications, and educational development as indexed by standard socioeconomic demographic measures such as GNP/capita, occupational structure, political office proliferation, miles of roads, literacy levels etc. Then convergence denotes a growth in similarity of solidarity as one moves from less to more developed sites whether across societies or within them. Divergence simply refers to the opposite, viz., growing dissimilarities in solidarity as an accompaniment of development. Invariance, finally, denotes the absence of changes in solidarity as a function of such socio-economic development.

Applying Bellah’s Evolutionary Schema: A Synopsis

One can exploit Bellah’s account of religious evolution by, first, postulating a correspondence between differentiation at the general action level and the development of functionally specialized solidarieties. When culture differentiates out of myth the necessary symbol reservoir for a distinct socio-moral solidarity is given. Once society becomes a distinct object of potential commonality the symbol repertoire permits constituting distinctive auto-telic, “belongingness for its own sake” solidarity. When personality etc.


16Bellah, R.N. op. cit.; Parsons, T. Societies...op. cit., p. 28.
behavioral organism differentiate "out" the symbols for the constitution of distinct and differentiated political and instrumental solidarities are given. Each of these solidarities then permits organization with function-specialization for the social system. But this is only requisite development in the cultural control matrix and nothing emanates from ideas alone. Consequently, second, development in Parsons' "conditions hierarchy" here confined to the division of labor in the broad sense must provide relevant facts concerning conditions that press for regulation through cultural symbols.

The case of usury illustrates the relation between Parsons' control and conditions hierarchies. As is well known, lending money for money, i.e. on interest, was initially a deep moral dilemma in the Christian world. It was first articulated with helping. In that form it was subject to the dictates of the ethic of brotherly love which one would violate by making a profit from helping. Now, again as well known, the this-worldly ascetic component of Christian dogma eventually resolved the issue by legitimating loans rendered on interest which became of enormous significance in economic development. Clearly, however, and this is the point of the illustration, such cultural regulation became possible only after social conditions had developed to the point of posing a moral dilemma in the first place. Therefore sufficient factor mobility in the economy and sufficient monetization of exchange was a necessary precondition before culture as a control mechanism could operate on the dilemma. The institutionalization of products of differentiating change therefore rests on developments in both the control and the conditions' hierarchies that happen to fit. As to critical facts concerning developments in the conditions' hierarchy, this analysis will focus primarily on stratification and changes in the economy.

Such a double perspective on the simultaneity of change in relevant controls and conditions permits the analysis of the evolution of solidarities as if it were a product of a binary fission process because it yields two criteria, one applicable to the control, another to the conditions' hierarchy, that distinguish intermediate and main stages in that evolution. A main stage is one characterized by the institutionalization of functionally specialized solidarities because developments in the control and conditions' hierarchies met just right. An intermediate stage is one that lays the ground for such institutionalization by providing the necessary cultural supplies but does not bring it about because of deficits in the required degree of the division of labor in society. Main stages provide objects of commonality uniformly oriented to with differentiated experience and action. Intermediary stages provide objects of commonality heterogeneous in this respect, some subject to differentiated experience and action and others subject to fused action and experience (designated as A//E and A+E respectively below in Table 1). At an intermediary stage the deficit in necessary social conditions "causes" fused action and experience as a necessary restriction on learning what would be too risky to implement given the lack of mastery over environments.

Using Bellah’s terms, the primitive stage is a main stage because there is one orientation complex, a cosmos composed of all four components of general action, subject to differentiated experience and action. Primitive man is a Median actor capable of reflection concerning meaning and belonging. As such the primitive human condition is an evolutionary product relative to protohuman forms of organized action. But the

joint underdevelopment of both the available symbolic reservoir and the division of labor, confined here to age and sex lines, effectively prohibits the conception and the engagement in functionally specialized objects of commonality. Solidarity is of one piece covering economic, political, expressive and religious aspects of belonging.

Religiously the archaic stage is characterized by polytheism. This constitutes some concentration of the meaning problem relative to the previous stage. With sacrifice and worship gods and men interact with greater intentionally. Supported by the emergence of craft literacy and some priestly roles culture becomes a separate object of commonality subject to differentiated experience and action. But with multiple gods significantly lacking in ordered inter-theistic relations, this is a meaning complex shot through with uncalculable vicissitudes. The resultant uncertainty concerning a meaningful human condition are partly counterbalanced by the fusion of action and experience concerning a "this-worldly complex" (society + personality + organism) as a separate object of commonality. With two objects but the differentiation of action and experience confined to one, this makes the archaic an intermediary stage. In the conditions' hierarchy archaic societies are characterized by a social development that mirrors the intermediariness of their cultural situation. This is the birth of stratification in the format of a two-class system. An incipient development across the long axis of the social system, stratification, as yet no more than differential concentration of resources and responsibility in their disposal, marks the emergence of a collective actor capable of exercising will. But a two class system with "generalized superiors" and "generalized inferiors" does not permit the emergence of specialized solidarities beyond the hierarchized and non-hierarchized categories. Neither on the cultural nor on the social system plane has the problem of contingency been sufficiently concentrated to find organized expression in four-function differentiation.

The historical stage concentrated the source of ultimate meaning contingency in the form of monism. This very concentration facilitated the additional differentiation of experience and action concerning "the world below" (viz. society + personality + organism) which makes the historical a main stage. Social stratification is subject to the differentiation of sacred and secular rulership. Both exist in mutual contingency as regards their legitimation. To be sure, full differentiation in terms of separate hierarchical organization of resources and control over them was only a characteristic of the Christian Occident. But the idea of role differentiation for the differential assumption of responsibility for religious and worldly affairs was a general characteristic of the historical empire society. The conjunction of transcendental religious symbols and functionally differentiated stratification for sacred and secular affairs made available two functionally specialized objects of commonality and institutionalized two functionally differentiated solidarities, one religious - expressive, the other econo-politic. Now the contribution of the conditions' hierarchy is particularly easy to see. The presence of two function-specific elites means the existence of two chains of authority relations, each with a special

- 39Parsons, T. Societies...op. cit., p. 28.
set of obedience norms. Potentially, non-elites are subject to mobilization through two channels and to engagement with their corresponding solidarity networks. In this perspective the two distinct lower strata, the urban and the rural, which Bellah describes in his four-class model as characteristic of this stage are not very important. In general they too were subject to these two solidarity engagements, and that is what counts for present analytical purposes.

The early modern or Reformation stage brought about the principled abrogation of all ascensive bases for differential standing on the presumed capacity for salvation. At the general action level this implies the culmination of the full differentiation of self and society making both objects of moral significance not only for the elite but now for the general population as well. Henceforth one had a perception of a unique personality over and above any combinations of roles assumed in a life-course. Given the absence of the invention of an IQ, though, the self was still an object of relative fusion of personality and organism with a corresponding lack of differentiation of action and experience attached to it. This marks it as an intermediary stage on one count. On the conditions hierarchy there was the first real development of the capitalization of agriculture. It signaled a social condition of peculiar receptivity for the individualism so strongly emphasized in religious change. The attendant concentration of city and rural wealth indexed an incipient further differentiation of stratification for consumption on the one hand and for production on the other. But before industrialization with the vast majority of the population still locked into household-economies there was insufficient capacity to fully differentiate and institutionalize distinct production and consumption relations. So the only new object of commonality made available was one of a relatively fused production-consumption relations set.

The modern stage begins here with the establishment of industrialism. Culturally this was accompanied by the elaboration of the IQ and hence the full differentiation of a separate concern with motive (personality) on the one hand and with human skill competence (organism) on the other. In recruitment to the occupational complex as well as preparation for it (admission to schooling) this constituted a new object of commonality on which a genuinely differentiated solidarity, viz. instrumental solidarity, came to rest. Concomitantly there emerged an auto-telic expressive solidarity organized around the consumption of the new surplus made available by an industrialized economy. Important here too was the development of consumption elites in high and lowbrow culture. Both industrialism and mass culture thus made possible the institutionalization of the last two function-specific solidarities, the instrumental and the auto-telic. These differentiated out of the eco-political and the religious-expressive respectively. Thus both cultural controls and societal conditions made possible the provisioning of four separate objects of commonality and the institutionalization of their corresponding differentiated solidarities, viz. the instrumental, political, auto-telic expressive, and the religious.

This should suffice for a synopsis of the analysis to follow. Table 1 presents it in summarized format.
Solidarity in Primitive Society

Some “differentiation between experience of the self and the world which acts upon it” stands at the beginning of the human condition. It separates religious men who could but passively endure the limitations imposed by the conditions of their existence and humans who can to some extend “transcend and dominate them.” Thus some capacity to perceive a gap between what is and could be, itself an evolutionary product, stands as the birth of mankind. But in primitive society men cannot yet interpret that gap as tragic. Apparently, culture, society and self are so much fused that some “vague sense of immemorial misdirection” is all there can be. In Luhmann’s perspective applied here, this means that while there is differentiation of action and experience, the objective world serves as a target of either remains relatively wholistic. There is but a sense that cosmological order is sometimes not all it could be in existential reality. But men cannot identify some special aspect of the human condition which somehow “misfunctions”, and, a fortiori they lack the capacity to assign responsibility for which malfunctioning. With the division of labor confined to age and sex, primitive human life alternates between the humdrum of daily-life sustenance activity, gathering, hunting and the like, and ritual activity. And both kinds are treated as timeless, fixed, and given routines, essentially beyond manipulation. For “there is almost no element of choice, will or responsibility.”

If we ask what kind of solidarity system is possible in this type of society, the following four characteristics suggest themselves. First, solidarity here is to the greatest extent a sharing of experience, that is, mutuality of reliance on reduced complexity, not joint effort geared to its reduction. Only a small portion involves sharing action and experience. Secondly, there seem to be but two kinds: non-ritual and ritual solidarities. In the former men took each other and their meaning for granted orienting to the conditions of nature; in the latter the attention focus was reversed, talking conditions for granted and belongingness as somehow problematical, i.e. involving action as well. If so, sharing experience in the non-ritual category operated on some code of saving information about belongingness, while sharing ritual experience and action meant spending information about man’s relatedness to man. This interpretation is premised on the acceptance of the function of ritual as serving integration. But, thirdly, in view of the timeless, fixed and prescribed givenness of both types of solidarities, one cannot as yet distinguish genuinely instrumental and consummatory solidarities. The latter presuppose treatment of time as a resource that can be manipulated. And if there was almost no element of choice will, or responsibility then this means that time did not constitute a resource subject to deliberate allocation. Fourthly, ritual and non-ritual solidarities were certainly organized in time, but in an alternating way signalling a timeless cycle without either end or beginning. So constituted primitive man was an ahistorical creature. Belongingness was not much of a choice. In principle and for the most part in practice, a category was either born into the two sets of solidarities and then he belonged, or he was not and then he did not belong. Inclusion was as nearly ascribed and given as anything else.

31Bellah, R.N., op. cit., p. 361.
32Ibid., p. 363.

Defining some capacity for reflection as the beginning stage of the human realm, of course, precludes total ascription as a characteristic of this primitive solidarity system. Some flexibility was present. As the proverbial anthropologist and his “experience” shows, some foreign category could be included in membership provided some place could be found for him in the kinship code. But the exceptional nature of such an event makes clear just how fixed a cake of custom one is dealing with here.

It must also be emphasized that solidarity, i.e. sharing a special sense of belongingness existed but in marginal form. Where neither persons, their relations, nor a sense of choice of meaning patterns connecting the two can be manipulated, a solidarity problem in the sense of a decision as to who belongs to whom, on what criteria, does not, strictly speaking, exist at all. So what separated ritual and non-ritual activity when it came to belonging was at best minimal differentiation between the external and the internal dimension of a human action system. This must have involved some differential use of information about alter. One could take alter for granted and then concentrate on “nature,” the non-ritual humdrum of daily-life. Or one could take “nature” for granted and the alter-ego contiguity on meaning as problematical in some minimal sense of an immemorial misdirection. Then one was in the ritual catagory of behaving, and this involved sharing experience and action. But without a sense of history and no choice in belonging together in different ways, there was no sense of a difference between instrumental and consummatory relations. So, one is left at this stage with two forms of relating to other. One involved saving information about other making it possible to concentrate on sheer survival. The other, in addition, involved a little self-conscious information spending about other and hence “acting out” to the fullest extent possible what the cosmological order implied; and then contingency on nature was suspended. The solidarity order could not really be threatened. Only the whole socio-cultural and external order was subject to being overwhelmed by unanticipated “behavior” from some part of the cosmos. Staying in ritual according to a prescribed time code could mean subsequent death by starvation when something “somehow” behaved erratically. But that was a result of some immemorial directive hidden source somewhere in the cosmological order itself.

For summarization here and purposes of contrast, Figure 1 (on next page) presents a schematic overview of solidarity in primitive society.

This schema highlights, perhaps exaggerates, two characteristics about solidarity in primitive society: (i) the absence of time as a critical resource in belongingness and hence the inexistence of an instrumental-consummatory dimension in social relations; and (ii) the near-complete inability to experience a problem of solidarity and act on it. Perhaps then this overview constitutes a simplification to the point of a caricature. But for all that, it should serve as a useful contrast showing just how tremendously complex the solidarity problem and its management became at later stages.

Solidarity in Archaic Society

The most important critical advances of this stage are the birth of the goods in the cultural control matrix and the birth of stratification in the conditions hierarchy.
polity. Hence, the political and military elite on top and “generalized inferiors” below. Therefore, this was stratification in its most rudimentary form. This stage only institutionalized the differential distribution of resources and the differential allocation of responsibility for their disposal. For all its “intermediariness” in the present context, the archaic stage was therefore quite significant in that it brought forth one of Parsons’ six evolutionary universals. But stratification comprised two as yet quite fused functions: the political (g) and that of collective identity maintenance (i) as diagrammed in Table 1.

Such greater contingency on the problem of meaning and its attendant social structural development of stratification thus signified the incipient differentiation of solidarities along the external-internal cleavage in the familiar four-function paradigm. A “problem of solidarity” had been born, and in response to it, general belongingness began to differentiate into a solidarity of hierarchical dependence on the one hand and another of horizontal-segmental “equitabilianism” on the other. For there was no way to organize differential stratification obligations and rights as a mere extension of the kinship web. Thus the newly emerging hierarchical and horizontal ties that cross-cut kinship constituted the birth of a societal community with a feeling of “we” extensible beyond the particularisms of kinship. One might add that socialization also became therefore more problematic. This non-kinship sense of “we” could not just be learned in the family realm. Instead, parental authority became a mechanism to produce this new collective identity. However, this problem really came into its own only with the next stage. And it was then when the differentiation of two separate solidarities was completed and institutionally stabilized.

Solidarity in Historic Societies

The three most important evolutionary developments of this stage were the emergence of monotheism, the break-through of a linear rank order of social classes into a four-class system, and the differentiation of secular and sacred authority. The formulation signified the disappearance of the operation of capricious, ocular vicissitudes in the cultural order. It brought a tremendous concentration of man’s contingency on ultimate meaning into one single focus with two results: a new task, viz. the effort to understand God, and a newly focalized burden, the assumption of responsibility for failure to understand. As Bellah put it:

“Primitive man can only accept the world in its manifold givenness. Archaic man can through sacrifice fulfill his religious obligations and attain peace with the gods. But the historic religions promise man for the first time that he can understand the fundamental structure of reality and through salvation participate actively in it. The opportunity is far greater than before but so is the risk of failure.”

The profound world rejection so characteristic of this stage highlights the polarization of religious life. But monotheism had another important consequence. This concentration of the meaning problem into one figure led to a greater and clearer

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94Ibid., p. 346.
95Ibid., p. 344; Bellah, R. N. op. cit., pp. 366-368.
96Ibid., p. 567.
differentiation between culture and the rest of the action system by spawning a kind of incipient differentiation between personality and society. There appeared the notion of a core or true self, 'deeper than the flux of everyday experience, facing a reality over against itself, a reality which has a consistency belied by the fluctuations of mere sensory impressions.' Yet given the scarcities of literacy and freedom for contemplation this was probably a symbolic property of even a minority among the small upper classes. For all that, the notion of a self signalled the differentiation of action and experience for the affairs of the world, i.e. the still relatively fused complex of society+personality+organism. And that differentiation made possible the symbolic organization of culture on the one hand and the 'world on the other according to profoundly different central codes. Religion was no longer a mere reflection of social organization or vice versa. The clearest cases in this respect were classical China and the medieval Christian Occident. Chinese social life was almost wholly organized according to kinship codes shot through with all kinds of variations on one theme: father-son. But the 'ruling religion,' Confucianism, was not at all characterized by any centrality of kinship symbols. On the other hand, Christianity is unthinkable without the categories father-son. But the central code of the social organization of the medieval West was the principle of voluntary intentional association shot through with near contractual natures of reciprocity and performance contingency.

Historical societies are characterized by a four-class system, an urban and a rural upper class, and an urban and a rural lower class. In addition this too is the era of center formation in political and cultural terms. There were variations on both counts here: the Christian world had one religious center, but was polycentric in politics. China was more uni-centered, and a rural upper class was the most prevalent in feudal societies with the urban upper stratum the far more prevalent in irrigation empires, etc. But whatever these variations, historic societies differentiated secular and sacred rule, even though once again this was brought to its culmination in terms of completely separate and independent resource mobilization only in the Occident. Therefore two upper classes coexisted in mutual tension serving as a matrix for further functionally differentiating change. By pushing the upper class principles down into the masses in the formation of distinct roles of the believer and the subject, it also brought the corresponding religious-expressive and econo-political solidarities so created into mutual contingency. For present analytical purposes, the Occidental case serves as the classical one and needs special comment.

Hinze's explanation of the birth of political democracy revealed the important fact that a formal organization can act as a structural museum preserving within its confines a solidarity code taken in from another different-function organization and make it available once again to that neighboring-function organization hundreds of years later. The Catholic Church bureaucracy borrowed from Roman political institutions the twin "democratic" principles of exemption from political rule and policy-making in deliberate

assembly, preserved them and made each available to the late medieval state apparatus later on again. This shows that the 'democratic aspects' of the next stage of religious evolution, the Reformation, could draw on a genuinely political symbolic reservoir not only in the secular world but also, and more importantly, in the very organization of sacred action, the bowels of the Catholic church itself. It also emphasized that the two solidarity complexes institutionalized in historic societies, each with its own hierarchy, already involved one important criterion of genuine function-differentiation: they coexisted in mutual contingency. The secular column could threaten the legitimacy of the sacred and vice versa: political authority, particularly its malfunctioning, could undermine the stability of collective identity enshrined in cultural commitments, and religious mobilization could shake the foundations of the political economy. The problem of socialization also entered a new phase. For success in socialization now came to rest on articulating variant if not contrary symbolic patterns between three contexts: (i) the socialization scene of the family; (ii) other social networks; and (iii) monothestic, and thus more stable culture templates. Already for primitive society, Eisenstadt pointed out a problem of producing adequate solidarities in cases where the wider forms of socialization are organized on non-kinship codes. Such societies face the problem of emancipating aspiritive and diffuse loyalties born and bred in the familial realm from the web of kinship without destruction of their aspiritive and diffuse nature. The universal mechanism that sets free aspiritive and diffuse loyalties and so makes them disposable for non-kin categories is a "linkage sphere" in the form of a psycho-social youth moratorium. Its essential characteristic is an age-heterogeneous relation between two age-homogeneous groups. The socializers are socially age-homogeneous despite their varying chronological age, while the socializers are age-homogeneous in both a social and a chronological sense. Secondly, the cross sex organizational feature of the family is broken through in that the moratorium employs sex-segregated forms of socialization. The generalization of aspiritive and diffuse loyalties comes about through the fact that socialization pits a universalized parent generation and their agents against a universalized youth generation. Further details of this linkage sphere are unimportant here. What is important here is that a mechanism developed at earlier stages now comes to serve a new function in articulating three rather than just two contexts. For this stage with its far more time-invariant religious symbols in monotheistic institutionalizes a sense of history, posing an entirely new problem, viz., that men must devise mechanisms to insure diachronic solidarity, ties that bind the generations and insure for each successive group that they are members of a stream of continuous community. At the psychological level the need to maintain continuity in collective identity through time constitutes the motive force for efforts geared towards the production of diachronic solidarity. Such efforts involve the exercise of authority. Parents act as the final authority concerning the difference between good and bad. But while in archaic society such parental mechanism could be backed up symbolically by one upper stratum, historic societies have two and with that two symbolic foci of authority. Therefore historic society is the birth place of the capacity to have a generation gap in the form of rebellious youth confronting an elder generation in the name of those ideals taught by the elders but
necessarily practiced by them in forms adjusted to the inevitable Weberian irrationalities of everyday life. In practice once again, with no written sacred text to contemplate and identify with, most lacked a sufficiently definite object of moral commitment per se to confront authoritative human representatives of such ideals.

Turning to the structure of the societal community, these observations should suffice to establish that historic societies fully institutionalized two basic types of solidarities. Each was functionally differentiated for two analytically separate yet structurally fused functions: the external still comprising goal-attainment and adaptation, and the internal still comprising pattern maintenance and integration. Engagement in the former "worldly" bonds implied information-saving, enactment of solidarity for religious-expressive ends information-spending. Empirical opportunities for both were separately organized. Most men had contact or direct engagement with but two formal organizations incorporating these solidarities, the state with the tax collector and the army and the church. In the "world" work for most was still organized in terms of political obligations. Free market relations was characteristic of minorities, multi-plex ascribed liturgical political resource mobilization a reality for the majority. One vivid illustration of this fusion can be seen in eighteenth century Prussia where agrarian "production relations" and army relations involved the same families on both sides of the fence. Frequently one peasant who faced lord X on the land had a brother who, as a soldier, faced the brother of lord X as an officer in the army.62 Needless to say, such functional fusion through so tight an articulation of the respective personnel was neither the rule nor required for the essential fact, a normatively defined political economy as the general condition. On the internal side of the functional divide in the social community the main point is simple. Despite the new capacity for using religion to change the social order, for the most part religion still served to integrate it.63

Most men then lived with the acceptance of traditional authority within two coexisting solidarity networks each with its own hierarchy. Enactment of work solidarity was at the same time an act of political loyalty. Engagement in expressive relations was at the same time acting out religious obligation. Holidays and their activities were obligatory in terms of religious demands.65 But elite struggles, however, rare in the life of any given one person, made it clear that one was involved in two sets of solidarities existing in mutual contingency. Furthermore, in each there was stratification with the political ranked above the work sphere on the one hand and the religious above the expressive on the other. Finally however rare the encounter with choice in either realm, the struggle among elites did make it clear that choice existed. One had to share action and experience in both realms, and both of these were separate categories of orientation.

For the sake of convenience and contrast with the foregoing and upcoming stages Figure 2 depicts the two types of solidarities fully institutionalized in historic society.

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by and large the same set of others with whom one had to implement different kinds of solidarities. Presumably, this constrained the solidarities both with respect to their relatively rigid organization through time and the feasible amount of variation of sharing experience and/or action within any one of them. Such pervasive face-to-face familiarity with other in all solitary contexts and the attendant limitations on privacy reduced the problem of the production and disposal of solidarities which largely boiled down to securing safe primary socialization.

Solidarity in Early Modern Society

The Protestant Reformation and its fall-out elsewhere constitutes for present purposes an intermediary stage. Concerning religion it brought the idea of a direct personalized relation between God and man down to the mass level, thus making personality a separate object of orientation in mass culture. A preoccupation, if not an obsession, with motive forces and their proper organization was made widely available. Faith as against action became separate and problematic concerns. Everyone was declared potentially equally capable of salvation through disciplined effort. Differential religious or salvation ranking could cross-cut differential power standing in the secular realm, making really independent stigmata religious mobilization feasible for the first time.

Personality and society had become scenes of deliberate value-implementation; they were now “self-revising” systems. While historic and earlier man had to attend to a pattern maintenance in dealing with the vicissitudes of environments, early modern man had to face a pattern maintenance and modification function. The maintenance of identities through time, and hence the production of diachronic solidarity had assumed a new level of complexity and importance. Life had become a “many possibility thing” with a potential triple mismatch between culture (God), self, and society and all the combinations of understanding and misunderstanding at each level. But struggles about revelation still revolved around a relatively fixed object, the sacred text now available as an object of orientation through the invention of printing and the growth towards mass literacy. The age of achievement had arrived, significantly reducing world-rejection as an integrative path to salvation.26

Not accidentally of course, this too was the era of the invention of the capitalization of agriculture. Though lacking legitimacy at home and being practicable only with real impunity on outfields afar, it nevertheless made widely available the idea that human could be treated as just one factor of production when that was the business of their association.27 Thus the symbolic supplies for a further differentiation of solidarities into instrumental ones on the one hand and purely expressive ones on the other had been established (cf. Table 1). The latter element was notably associated with the Renaissance and its differentiation of expressive art from religious symbolizations.28


One consequence of these changes was a significant increase in time-consciousness. This laid the groundwork for the differentiation of solidarities along the familiar instrumental-consummatory divide. The two category schema of the solidarity complex of historic society split into a four-category schema. In term of cultural templates made available for the mass of the population, one could now potentially engage in four kinds of distinct solidarities: the religious (I), the expressive or self-rewarding (ii), the political (ii), and the instrumental (a). Nevertheless, neither cultural development nor the division of labor in society had gone far enough to push the development of the societal community into a four-function specialized system of solidarities. Culturally, neither the IQ nor an equivalent symbol of skill competency relatively independently of motives had yet been elaborated. Consequently, personality and organism were still characterized by fused action and experience. On the conditions’ side it was only the advent of the industrial economy which brought about both sufficient choice concerning with whom to associate for different purposes and sufficient surplus for pure leisure engagements. For these reasons, the early modern stage was an intermediary one as regards the evolution of the solidarity system.

The most important developmental breakthrough of this stage was the emergence of time-utilization norms. These were added to the already established information-utilization norms. The new concern with time also accentuated the problem of diachronic solidarity. Such facts suggest that norms bearing on the use of time and information should serve as a classificatory device for four functionally specialized solidarities which become available at this stage at least in the form of a widespread cognitive map. They also suggest that such a classification should use the pattern variables. Analytically, it will be seen that time and information are prior to the concept function in its four-function format. This also puts new light on the functional location of the pattern variables.

Time, Information, and Function

First, as used here, norms about the “proper” use of time and information have as their object belongingness. One can share a sense that “it makes sense” to save time in belongingness or to spend it; similarly, one can share a sense of appropriateness to save information about alter or to generate and spend it, seeking maximum knowledge about alter as a social being. Second, quite parallel to the formulation of the pattern variables, norms about the proper use of time and information are here seen as dichotomous choices. One can save time and information, spend these, or structure distinguished choices as normatively appropriate: saving one and spending the other. “Choices” are not understood here in a literal sense as being actually made in the normal course of events when two or more actors meet. That would imply they were burdened with the difficulty of negotiating the social contract anew each time they meet. Rather a choice as an existing norm on both dimensions-time and information-use is treated as a minimal legitimation context which must be met before a solidarity scene has sufficient meaning for both parties.

Third, information and time-utilization norms are prior to pattern variables. While the latter have been developed from the beginning to apply to three of the four
components of the action system, viz. culture, society, and personality. On the social level they have been used as necessary choices to define the situation with respect to role-expectations or types of interaction. Hence it needs emphasis here that solidarity is the sharing of action and/or experience between alter and ego about each other's social significance for each other, not whatever else they might share in interacting, say an interest in an outside object such as stamps. And the norms in terms of time and information-use define a situation merely in terms of whether time is to be spent in togetherness or saved, and whether information about other is to be maximized. Fourth, time and information-utilization norms are also useful for theory building simply because efforts concerning the theoretical potential of time have yielded rather complex classifications of social time and little else. Perhaps one can do better by applying time to solidarities.

Orientations to time define a situation as either instrumental or consummatory. One can share a sense that it is desirable to save time in togetherness then time itself is treated as a scarce resource, and the time that togetherness takes competes with alternative uses of time. Operationally, time-saving norms are shared when the burden of proof rests on him who wishes to prolong togetherness. But there is one other characteristic of time-saving norms that deserves emphasis. Always conscious of the scarcity of time and its uses in ways alternative to togetherness, the hurried saver of time also has a peculiarly foreshortened conception of the expiry of time. For him whose focus is on the precious moment, time is a fleeting element. Bits of immediate futures rapidly slip into bits of immediate pasts. Neither the future nor the past are extended spaces and the same is true for the precious present. However, in this intuition, it should communicate that time-saving norm involve an ahistorical object-orientation. Taking an ahistorical orientation means treating objects in generalized categories that tree their significance from historicity; one does not ask where an object came from, or whence it might be moving if left alone; one treats it instead as if it had no constraints due to the three dimensions of time.

Time-spending norms define the situation in opposite terms. When one shares an understanding that it makes sense to spend time in togetherness, solidarity is consummatory; it is its own end, as it were. Operationally, the burden of proof rests on him who wishes to leave the relation; he must excuse himself. Time-spending norms involve a historical object-orientation. With three separate objects of commonality now set free,
hence pattern-maintenance and modification functions. Spending time and saving information orients actors to consummatory and external concerns, hence to goal attainment functions.

But times and information-use norms also organize the pattern variables and in a criss-crossing fashion both structuring each one of the modality and attitude pairs.

Time, Information and the Pattern Variables

With respect to solidarity the choice between affectivity and affective-neutrality is one between immediate, direct, and mutual gratification of self and other in and through each other. This poses the question of what one means by a mutually gratifying relation? It is a psychological-fit problem clearly involving emotions. One can define a relation as mutually psychologically gratifying or intrinsically need-fulfilling when, once established, neither partner has an incentive to leave it. This fits with time-sparing as the appropriate norm. But there is another fit. Sharing affect, like sharing anything, involves communication. Sharing affect, however, involves communicating with expressive symbols, not exclusively of course, but they have primacy if affect is to be shared and cathexes are to flow back and forth. And we know that all communications, where expressive symbols have primacy take a lot of time to achieve their end. Whether one thinks of the psychoanalyst’s couch, Fidel Castro’s speeches, the Beatles or Beethoven, these are all communication patterns where empirically saving time is simply normatively inappropriate. Affect takes time to unfold; expressive symbols take time to get their punch. Using music as an illustration, Levi-Strauss notes that expressive symbols operate on two grids, one natural by exploiting organic rhythms, another cultural involving a code that orders, in this case, sound. In spanning these two realms, music mediates the personality between two realities, that of the organism with its finitude and that of culture with its timeless truths. Music does that to the extent that it can use time in order to defeat time-boundedness. To quote: “Below the level of sounds and rhythms, music acts upon a primitive terrain, which is the physiological time of the listener; this time is irreversible and therefore irremediably diachronic, yet music transmutes the segment devoted to it into a synchronic totality, enclosed within itself. Because of the internal organisation of the musical work, the act of listening to it immobilizes passing time; . . . . It follows that by listening to music and while we are listening to it, we inter into a kind of immortality.” What is said here about music probably applies to all organised expressive symbolism. If so, all solidarities structured on time-saving norms involve affectivity, and those structured on time-sparing norms dictate affective neutrality.

Time-utilization norms also dictate the choice about the universalism-particularism dilemma. Considering other in terms of the most general categorization schemas completely independent of ego’s particular placement amounts to taking an ahistorical object orientation where neither past, present, nor future has special relevance. Treatment of alter on universalist standards is a way of relating to him independently of ego’s biography. Conversely, seeing alter in terms and on dimensions relevant to ego’s


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particular placement is a way to orient without the suppression of his historicity. Thus time-saving norms lead to selection of universalism as the appropriate standard, while time-sparing norms commend particularism.

Information-utilization norms relate to choices about the remaining two pattern variable pairs, specificity-diffuseness and performance-quality.

Information-saving norms dictate that the business of togetherness is not togetherness itself. Having established an attention-focus on externality recommends specificity, defined as placing the onus on proof on the inclusion of an interest in the relation. On the other hand, information-saving dictates diffuseness, defined as placing the burden of proof on the exclusion of an interest in the relation. But information-saving norms also dictate the selection of performance over quality in the significance of other. Information-saving directs attention to matters other than the social bond. The focus of attention being external to togetherness itself permits “acting on principle” as it is put in common parlance. Whenever we act on principle, we presuppose the existence of some relevant performance capacity produced someplace else but available for disposal. In the terminology of the existential philosopher, “acting on principle” is a way of avoiding personal responsibility for all the consequences that may flow from compliance on the part of alter in respect to all his social attributes save the one mobilized for an external end. It is avoidance of the assumption of personal responsibility in our relationships with respect to other statuses which we do not consciously share in the purpose of our togetherness: thus “acting on principle” facilitates specialization of responsibility with limited liability. Attention to qualities, by contrast, is always more information demanding. Determining who we are in terms of the social significations ascribed to us and hence who we can be and what we can mean to each other in our mutuality poses an intrinsically more complex grid of relevances than the reliance on some performance capacity produced somewhere else. Quality considerations imply less limited, if not unlimited liability. When they structure solidarity individuals must adapt their mutual relations to the fact of their inescapable and historically given ascensions: characteristics, therefore, which can be mitigated but not manipulated in the short run. If such adaptations are to be successful, solidarities based on qualities need a good deal more information than those based on performance. This view contrasts with the usual function associated with ascensions in interaction, which involves information-saving.45 Ethnic discrimination in economic interaction is a classic case. So the analytic level as well as the fact that solidarity, sharing action and/or experience are the business here need re-emphasis. Ethnic phenomena are historic social realities par excellence. Both intra-ethnic solidarity and inter-ethnic tension patterns always involve a whole gamut of significant events, economically, politically, territorially, and frequently religiously. Such pattern of ascension presuppose the actor’s given right to make or reject demands of another in the name of historically developed contrasts over this whole range, despite the fact that empirically the actor can select just one such element as a significant focus and on that ground assert a right to inclusion or exclusion.

45Mayhew, Leon. “Ascription in Modern Societies.” Sociological Inquiry 36, No. 2 (Spring, 1968), 103-120.
If the foregoing is not entirely mistaken and information and time-utilization norms relate to both the concept function and the pattern variables, then a four-function typology of solidarities can be based on time and information-use norms as the significant marginal variables.

Time, Information and Types of Solidarities

Norms that call for the saving of both time and information in belongingness yield a solidarity type structured by the pattern variables universalism and affective-neutrality (time-saving function) on the one hand, and performance and specificity (information-saving) on the other. A suitable name for this type of solidarity would be instrumental solidarities because of two properties. Subject to time-saving, the tie can be treated as an ahistorical object thus becoming freely disposable at least by virtue of being lifted out of past constraints. Due to the information-saving feature, neither party need assume personal responsibility for the wider consequences of their belonging concerning other ties which they also hold. In this sense an instrumental solidarity is one of quite limited liability.

Spending time and information yields a solidarity structured by the pattern variables particularism and affectivity (time-saving function) on the one hand, and quality and commonness (information-saving function) on the other. A suitable name for this type would be **auto-telic** or expressive solidarity. This type is of integrative significance for the solidarity system as a whole by virtue of its direct articulation of the general action system. A tie is self-rewarding if and when motives of personality, skills of the behavioural organism, and meaning selections from a cultural reservoir can be brought together into a social contingency between ego and alter in such a manner that both parties realize themselves in their complementary need dispositions. By selection from three realms—symbols of belonging, motives to belong (need-affiliations) and skills to express the former two—auto-telic solidarity constitutes not only an integrative resource for society—it is also at one and the same time the core of the solidarity system. For it is only the presence of and the opportunity for participation in auto-telic solidarities that "rewards" man for participation in the other functionally specialized solidarities which are intrinsically more frustrating for personality. The most important aspects of these rewarding characteristic lies in the fact that by virtue of time & information-saving norms, this type of solidarity is of unlimited liability without constraining the individual's uniqueness.

The joining together of elements from all four complements of the action system into auto-telic belonging typically can be neither a tame nor a calm affair. For where solidarity serves to satisfy personality needs it must articulate and "express" the ambivalences lodged there. On the direct level of interpersonal intimacy the bipolarity of eros and aggression must be articulated; on the level of more mediated intergroup life the corresponding patterns of institutionalized separateness-similarity must be articulated. At this level auto-telism in solidarity refers to the dynamics of ethnic and class phenomena. Regardless of level, self-rewarding togetherness is always a selection, it operates on grids of satisfaction of appreciated qualities through exclusion of possible alternatives. Implemented with expressive symbols primarily, auto-telic solidarity operates with ties of attraction-repulsion. It preserves group identity and does to the better the more sharply it delineates what social selves are not.

Norms calling for the saving of time but information-spending in belongingness yield a solidarity type structured by the pattern variables universalism and affective-neutrality (time saving) on the one hand, and quality and commonness (information-saving) on the other. A suitable name for this type could be **socio-moral** solidarity. It is the kind of solidarity that Eisenstadt had in mind as the result of the "socialization-moralization." There is quality and commonness but coupled with affective-neutrality and universalism it has been freed, as it were, from the particularism and affectivity of the kinship-site where it was born. The time-saving norm here dictates an aspect of limited liability. A socio-moral sense of belonging does not constitute an end in itself but is to lead to a sense of integrity portable to all solidarities a person is involved in. The information-saving norm, on the other hand, also applies this solidarity with an aspect of unlimited liability. Emancipated from the restriction of kinship the ego-alter socio-moral obligations are those of everyone. The quality of membership alone entitles everyone to extend an invitation for socio-moral consideration, and given commonness, the onus of proof rests with him who wishes to exclude such consideration.

Finally, norms calling for the spending of time but the saving of information in belongingness yield a solidarity type structured by the pattern variables particularism and affectivity (time-saving) on the one hand, and performance coupled with specificity (information-saving) on the other. A suitable name for this type could be self-realizing or **political** solidarity. Given the role of expressive symbolism in a personalized reference system, affectivity and particularism, this constitutes a kind of belongingness geared to the use of time in order to overcome time. By serving a group of which he is part, the individual can invest part of the self into an entity that has an indefinite life-span and so partake of a kind of immortality, the larger entity which will exist long after he himself is gone. On the other hand, anything but partial self-realization is excluded from this mechanism by virtue of information-saving. Alter and ego treat each other “on principle.” Hence a political solidarity is one in which both parties renounce personal responsibility for status consequences that go beyond common membership status in a group supra-ordinate for both. In that sense political solidarity does constitute a limited-liability social bond, but the time-saving norm also specifies one unlimited liability, viz. loyalty, defined as readiness to contribute to the enhancement, security, and continuity of the supra-ordinate collectivity as long as one lives.

Lastly, instrumental solidarity has adaptive significance for the system of solidarities, because saving information about other directs the attention to the external situation and saving time in belongingness signals that the social bond is not its own end but rather serves other than solidarity interests, viz. the generation of generalized means for the enactment of political, auto-telic, or socio-moral solidarities. Political solidarity has goal-attaining significance for this system, in that saving information directs the attention to the situation outside but time-saving in belongingness makes the maintenance of a tolerable ideal-real gap in the system's contingency on
environments the major business of this social bond. Auto-telic expressive solidarity has integrative functional significance, because spending both time and information provides an opportunity to sort out and organize the different affiliational needs involved in the other three types of belonging. Socio-moral solidarity has pattern-maintaining and modification significance for the other three because the spending of information about others provides the meaning parameters for affiliation, but the time-saving norm signals that those meanings are to serve as stabilizing mechanisms of the organization of solidarity through time.

As cultural templates these four solidarities existed in somewhat varying degrees of distinctness at the early modern stage. The remaining fusion of personality and behavioral organism probably made instrumental and auto-telic senses of belonging less distinct than the other two. But what of their empirical prevalence and their organization as structure of the societal community? For the mass of the population three facts suggest that there was widespread engagement with political and socio-moral solidarity but far less enactment of the other two in the normal round of routine life. First, without the industrialization of the economy, structural differentiation between the family and the occupational complex was yet to come. Most “families” were still household economies. This posed tremendous restrictions on the enactment of genuinely instrumental solidarity quite apart from the availability of cultural templates for it. Because of the absence of sufficient surplus there were similar restrictions concerning the enactment of pure auto-telic belongingness. Mass leisure had not yet arrived. Secondly, contact with or embeddedness in formal organization was still restricted to those of state and church. Thirdly, just how much socio-moral and political solidarities had become separate realities can be seen in the struggle about the Reformation itself as well as in the fact that the most important single determinant concerning its success and failure in different states was the nature of the meaning code of political authority institutionalized prior to the Reformation. For where that code assigned greater reality to the constituent groups of political association, the Reformation succeeded while it failed in the great majority of cases where the authority code assigned greater reality to the territorial polity than its constituent parts.48

For these reasons one may conclude as follows: the early modern period subjected political and socio-moral solidarities to incipient differentiation out of the econo-political and religiously-expressive solidarities of the historic stage. Otherwise political and socio-moral solidarities became more mutually contingent because of the increased action demands of the new religious commitments. Producing diachronic solidarity had become a distinct problem because religious ethics demanded more value-realizations in this world than ever before. But the low division of labor still permitted time to operate as a diachrony in organizing man’s enactment of these solidarities in serialized fashion. For convenient overview and contrast with other stages, Figure 3 diagrams the solidarities and their organization in early modern societies.

48Smelser, N.J. Social Change...op. cit. p. 183.


Solidarities in Modern Societies

The Kantian revolution in culture, the industrialized economy, mass leisure, and the invention of the IQ as well as perhaps the atomic bomb, symbolizing man’s capacity to wipe out his species, were the critical developments at this juncture. To varying degrees these made available all the four components of the action system as separate objects of commonality at the mass level.

Kant’s ideas that there were as many significant worlds of meaning as modes of their apprehension49 posed the possibility to choose one’s source of ultimate meaning making it intellectually respectable to substitute art for religion or deny the latter’s relevance by means of an ideology of science. Kant also supplied the intellectual resources to commit what an earlier Judeo-Christian if not all historic religion had declared as “ultimate sin,” viz. to choose not to care about ultimate meaning at all, or at least to act as if one had made that choice. This unleashed a potential for unlimited learning and the total abandonment of history as a source of identity and morality, making it definitely possible for legality and legitimacy to diverge completely. The fact of Auschwitz has come to stand as a universal reminder of that possibility. I doubt though that this version of “life as an infinite possibility thing” has filtered down to the mass level even to this day.

The industrialized economy with its affluence and the normative differentiation between on-job and off-job relations provided the necessary condition for instrumental and auto-telic solidarities to become separate engagement scenes for most people. Here the invention of the IQ and the development of mass expressive culture supplied the cultural control resource for such separate solidarities. The IQ and its use for recruitment to both the educational and the occupational complex signaled a concern.

Figure 3: Solidarities and their Organization in Early Modern Societies

Orientation to Time

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- **Instrumental**
  - Performance
  - Specificity
  - Universalism Neutrality

- **Socio-Moral**
  - Quality
  - Diffusion
  - Universalism Neutrality

- **Auto-Telic**
  - Quality
  - Diffusion
  - Particularism Affectivity

- **Political**
  - Performance
  - Specificity
  - Particularism Affectivity

with skill-capacity relatively independently of motives. While early modern man was preoccupied with the question “had other the will?” Modern man added to this other concern, equally pressing almost, “had other the brains?” Thus the IQ came to represent the behavioral organism as one object of commonality even in everyday life, though perhaps restricted in its central significance to adolescence and early adulthood. The atomic bomb can probably be credited with raising everyone’s consciousness about the human organism through the channel of a species concern activated through man’s capacity to end the human condition altogether. To this one might add biological engineering and medical developments posing the problem of “death by choice or death by chance” as a third symbolic resource for treating the organism as a separate object of commonality. To decide whether and when “will” counts more than “brains” and what the consequences for life-chances ought to be; to decide whether and when to risk war and thus perhaps the ultimate end; to make choices about the nature of the yet unborn, and to have to face the decision where human life should start and end as in abortion, medical transplants, and terminal illness are problems clearly identifying one common denominator in all the manifestations of the behavioral organism as a public object of commonality: its emergence is fraught with moral problems of an unprecedented and yet unmanaged complexity.

Concerning the impact on solidarities, three features stand out. First, in terms of cultural supplies available at the mass level there are now four separate objects of commonality, i.e. models of and for social, cultural, personal, and behavioral organizational orders. Each is subject to learning and consequently change. Second, as regards the opportunity to engage in different types of solidarities, the vast increase in the division of labor now yields modern man those significant choices that historic man lacked and early modern man only dreamed about. The choices are whether to engage in a given type of solidarity or not, the time when to do so, and the partner with whom to do it. Whereas at the two stages before organized solidarities in a diachrony, the modern life in the metropolis permits time to operate as a synchrony in organizing solidary engagements. When some pray, others play, some work. Different solidarities are enacted at the same time. The fact that one can be together with different others for different purposes and knows that different solidarities are coextensive in time furthers the sense that belongingness music can be played in more than one key.

Thirdly, the upshot of these two features amounts to a tremendously heightened consciousness about change. Impressed by the feats of technology over nature, the idea of “life as an infinite possibility thing” becomes extended to the human realm and its organization, including most notably to whom to belong on what terms. The potential for gratification has increased and so has the dread about uncertainty and alienation. One immediate consequence is that the production of solidarity can no longer be left to socialization alone. Solidarity has to be produced continuously and in different terms. How and where, that is one question.

**Producing Solidarity Beyond the Primary Socialization Scene**

Admittedly speculative and without direct evidence, I would contend that producing any type of solidarity requires an interaction context of face-to-face

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60) I owe this suggestion to my colleague John Marx whose willingness to read and discuss has been most generous and very helpful.

interactions where men play roles, it is the supra-role aspect of an individual, his personality, that can perform the carrier function of transporting elements of solidarity from occasion to occasion. This is the reason why "a social process specialized for the production and regulation of solidarity" presupposes the free availability of the mass level of differentiated personality, the notion that man is more than the sum total of his roles. This in connection with great role-proliferation and multiple role-incumbency for all in modernity constitutes the general transmission mechanism between occasions.

With indefinite occasions and four separate objects of commonality to draw on, the potential for chaos in solidarities is tremendous. But a state of order can be imagined. Action theory suggests four-function differentiation of solidarities and their stabilization through subsystem formation and interchange.

In contrast to earlier stages such internal function specialization permits the screening out of apparent function irrelevancies. Now one can also empirically separate in time, in physical space, and in terms of choice of different partners when to enact what solidarity. Therefore one can control the effects of solidarity engagement in each type on another. But having become more differentiated, the proper functioning of each is more contingent on the proper functioning of the other three. Each one of the solidarities so specialized is intrinsically unstable by virtue of lacking both opposite and contiguous functional requisites. Each one now must be supplied with the specialized commonality components of the other if any degree of stability in its operation is to be insured. In the case of instrumental solidarity, for example, some sense of loyalty, of self-rewarding affiliational acceptance, and of identity must be added on to its utility and competence as the primary governing sense of belonging if instrumental associations are to hold through time. In general, functional differentiation demands that elements of each special tie be carried into the operation of the other. "Bits" of solidarities of four functional kinds must be packaged together but in such a fashion that one-function primacy can be attained. Two features of development might satisfy this requirement: One is that the solidarity system operates as an interchange system in a manner that permits the mutual supply of orientational bits in such a fashion as to safeguard one-function primacy. The other is that the system of solidarities must be organized in ways to safeguard stability over time. Concerning the question what is interchange this requires analysis at the sixteen-fold level. Following the rules of Gould and Loubser, Figure 4 shows a four-function allocation of the pattern variables in each type of solidarity and their contiguous function interchange flows. The principles of organization of the system as a whole are capitalized for easy distinction with the categories of processual flow.

To start with, it should be noted that Figure 4 displays a simplified interchange paradigm. In contrast to Parsons’ usual paradigm with its distinction between factor/products, this model does not distinguish between factors and products constitute as double interchange, here there is but a single interchange. This departure rests on nothing but my present inability to apply the factor/product

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it lacks for implementation with some stability in organization. Thirdly, this being an analytical subsystem of society with integrative specialization for it, something ought to be said about the disposal of solidarities to the economy, the polity, and the linguistic subsystem. Given inter-systemic contingency, the two processes of internal transmission and external disposal must be linked by control mechanisms. Such linkage occurs through the social media. But Figure 4 shows no disposal and only general labels for money, power, influence, and commitments. This shortcoming rests on the requirement of four functional forms of each medium for this type of analysis. But excepting influence, such four forms of the societal media still await conceptualization. Keeping these restrictions in mind, receipts and yields of solidarity elements between functionally specialized occasions can be described.

Instrumental solidarities receive from "g" an element of emotional commitment tied in with performance. This has been labelled associational loyalty. The empirical referent here is the normative demand for some loyalty to the employing organization. Without such an element instrumental associations would be subject to severe personal instability. A quality element tied in with affective neutrality comes into instrumental associations from "h". This has been labelled task identity. A familiar empirical example would be occupational identity as one part of a person's sense of self. This again functions as a stabilizing mechanism for instrumental associations to count on. Finally, an affective-quality element labelled expressive acceptation is put in over the double functional boundary from "i". One could conceive of this as an element countering the otherwise "dehumanized" nature of sheer instrumentality in mutual orientations. Informal organization within formal bureaucracy emphasized by some researchers as necessary is one illustration. Putting it this way also shows, at least formally-schematically, why the opposite and confusius function elements do not undermine the functional primacy of the time and information saving norms. The loyalty category comes in a fashion tied with performance which ranks as a priority claim in instrumental solidarity. The identity component of self comes in a manner tied in with affective neutrality which is also a primary normative component. Two of the "other-function" components thus come into the reception set in a fashion "bonded" with those normative components primary in the receipt solidarities. And it is only a minority of one, the input from across the diagonal which is a genuinely functional "foreign" element. Given this minority position, its function can be described as mitigating the strains associated with one-function primacy without a capacity to cause dedifferentiation of specialization.

Moving to the political solidarities, one requirement here is that commitment to particularized performance be shored up with standards to insure success. This comes through the supply from "a" of a performance element tied in with universalism.

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It has been labelled associational competence. On the other hand, information-oversaving also has to be countenanced if political solidarities are to be stable. Hence a particularized quality element labelled hierarchic acceptance coming from the integrative set has been posited as an input to supply sufficient variety in aspirational terms reflective of a society's heterogeneous qualitative base in terms of religion, ethnicity, age, and sex which form the core of the socially structured given. Finally, for the input across the diagonal from "i", a universalist-quality element labelled cross generational identity has been posited to supply through-time stability to organized collective performance commitments by drawing on socio-moral commonalities. This commonality element serves to mitigate the potential danger of oversaving in socio-moral commitment, a feature intrinsically associated with the pursuits of power.

Turning to the auto-centric category, a first problem to be avoided is the total particularization of the very idea of self-rewarding solidarity. If that were to happen the reward aspects of being in society at the national level could not be realized at all; in terms of reward integration, no one would be a member of society, everyone but a member of some special group of society. Thus a "common identity" element of universalized diffusiveness has been posited as an input from "f" to counteract the overspending of time. This can put a stop to an otherwise infinite regress of need complementarity. But the potential autistic features of self-reward must also be countenanced if a solidarity is to be rewarding for individuated personality but still remain one that can be shared between persons. Some specifications of the common group properties must take place lest the individual gets lost in total permissiveness of his uniqueness. Hence a hierarchic loyalty element has been specified as an input from "g" that counteracts information overspreading. But there must also be some departicularization of affiliational need-gratifications if such gratification is to be gained through sharing qualities. Hence a universalist-specific commonality element, labelled expressive competence, has been posited as a counterbalancing mechanism coming in form "a".

Finally, in the socio-moral category there is the danger of information overspending. If such bonds are to lead to anything in terms of implementation some specification of what is to be shared must be assured. Hence a neutral and specific commonality element, labelled task competence, has been posited as a necessary input from the instrumental solidarities. But if socio-moral bondage is to involve real commitments the danger of overspending has to be countenanced as well. Hence an affective element coupled with diffusiveness has been posited as the necessary input from the realm of self-rewarding solidarities. The label differential acceptance suggests itself to highlight that the cathartic aspects of socio-moral bondage must be organized to make room for different personality types (some are more idealistic than others). But some room has to be provided also for the differential structuring of moral commitments through an organized life-cycle common to all (the morality of adolescence is one different from that of the middle years, which in turn differs from that of old age). The point here is of course that differential moral propensities organized through a life-course operate simultaneously in a societal population. And, just like the previous two, modern society is also a historical one, only more so since the vastly increased capacities to implement cultural ideals which have been bought at the cost of increased
environmental contingencies pose the problem of historical continuity in a sharper focus. For this reason an affective and specific commonality, labelled cross-generational loyalty has been posited as a necessary countervailing input mechanism across the diagonal from political solidarities.

As regards the organization of these solidarities as a system and the maintenance of its level of internal differentiation this is a question of double contingency. As a subsystem of society, the solidarity system is contingent on the economy, the polity, and the fiduciary system. On the other hand, as a system in its own right the maintenance of different kinds of solidarities and their continual production is a function of their organization. Little will be said about the former, somewhat more about the latter.

Stepping back for a moment from Figure 4 and following Gould's interchange paradigm,66 facilitates placement of the solidarity subsystem into the societal frame. Schematically shown in Figure 5, this highlights that the solidarity subsystem has integrative functional significance for society as a whole in a triple sense. First, organized around the production of solidarity, it is the direct source of the most important kind of cement which keeps society together. Accordingly, this system is placed in the internal consummatory cell of the societal frame. Second, its product outputs have "integrative," i.e., internal consummatory functional significance for each of the three contiguous subsystems, economy, polity, and the fiduciary subsystem. Third, solidarities which for the solidarity subsystem itself have other than integrative significance have a product output to the other contiguous subsystems elements of nothing but integrative functional significance. In each case, whether economy, polity or the social organizations functionally specialized for the production and processing of socio-cultural patterns, the function-relevant solidarity is directly supplied from the solidarity subsystem. This is one reason why instrumental solidarities have primacy in economic organizations, political ones have primacy in political organizations, and socio-moral ones reigned primary in the fiduciary subsystem. In each case the remaining three solidarities necessary for stable functioning are supplied through double processing being subjected to the appropriate function exigencies before becoming free for disposal at the receipt subsystem.

Consequently, a first condition of the stability of a solidarity subsystem is adequate income from the other three subsystems. Malfunctioning of any of the three contiguous subsystems constitutes a source of strain on solidarities. Un- or underemployment in the economy, for example, can affect directly instrumental solidarities and its three competencies outputs within the solidarity subsystem. Dubious electoral practices can do the same to political solidarities and dubious socialization practices may do the same to socio-moral solidarities and their respective outputs. At the same time, three-way contingency of the solidarity subsystem also signals relative robustness of this system. The malfunctioning of any one of its external boundary interchanges may be partially compensated for through the adequate functioning of the others. Such partial compensation mechanisms will be the more likely the greater the autonomy of the contiguous subsystems in question. For example, the Great Depression of the 1930s brought with it regime change in those countries with the newest, hence institutionally weakest political regimes, Germany and Italy. But constituting the integrative resource base for each of the other three subsystems of society; the solidarity subsystem can also partially limit the effects of the malfunctioning of any of these on each of the other. That insulation role is confined to those processes flowing through the solidarity system. And how much of this task can be done is a direct function of its internal organization.

The requisites of stable internal organization comprise conditions. First, all members of the societal population must be involved intensively and extensively in all four types of solidarities, instrumental, political, autotelic, and socio-moral. Second, there must be extensive cross-cutting among instrumental, political, autotelic, and socio-moral solidarities.67 To the extent that either of these two conditions is not met, the solidarity system lacks autonomy and must be shored up by special political processes to counteract the integrative deficit so created. Consociational democracies are a classic example of such political compensation for deficits in cross cutting ties.68 And such making up for the underfunctioning of one system occurs at cost. Consociational politics

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66These two specifications are adopted directly from Mayhew, Societies...op. cit., pp. 15-76.
is relatively inefficient with respect to budget formation and government formation after the elections.88

Third, and turning to categories of organization displayed in Figure 4, external and internal solidarities must be hierarchically organized. Socio-moral solidarity must rank above instrumental ones; the political must rank above the auto-telic. Hierarchization here means no more than the temporary yielding of interests associated with the lower ranking—category in a case of a conflict of interest. In the instrumental column the internal category ranks above the external one, while this relation is reserved in the consumatory column. The former is a necessity if religious or equivalent commitments after translation into societal values are to guide efforts to perfect the social system in accordance with cultural ideals. And this role of an action-demanding condition that religion comes to play for modern society demands the supremacy of socio-moral solidarity vis-a-vis instrumental ties. But subsystem-formation, if it is to lead to relative autonomy, demands also the relative supremacy of one external category. Otherwise external contingencies are underserviced and the system is subject to being overwhelmed by internal demands. And since the political has been identified as the collective implementation arm of moral commitments since Durkheim, it seemed appropriate to let this role of coming to grips with external reality constraints be taken over by political solidarities. Such a reversal of hierarchical ordering in the instrumental and consumatory columns would permit the cross-national extension of ties in the subordinate categories. Thus economic and for example ethnic-consumatory interests can be shared across national boundaries without endangering the organization of the solidarity system at the national level because higher ranking loyalties can be invoked in case of need. This provides the solidarity system with a relative openness to influences from abroad thus enhancing its overall adaptive capacity.

Fourth, given internal differentiation, there must be a phasing between instrumental and consumatory solidarities involving collective rites that symbolize and affirm the idea that implementation of instrumental solidarities pays off. National holidays and national elections come to mind as such mechanisms. However short, such events must involve massive temporary suspension of economic action if they are to serve as mechanisms suggestive of the need to evaluate and to justify the fact that the men can treat each other so often on principle without necessarily thereby denying each other diffuse commitments in principle.

The fifth and sixth conditions of stability of a solidarity system in modern society must meet two of the most severe sources of integrative strain. One such source is the vast division of labor. Most men live out their lives by being in direct contact only with organizations that form parts of the nationally organized society and some of these, as for example corporations, do not clearly belong to any nation at all. Furthermore, due to the Reformation full-out the sense of individuals has been much advanced; a common consequence here has been a fairly widespread institutionalization of individualistic values. The other problem of solidarity results from the very idea of treating society as a self-revising system. This has meant the institutionalization of expecting social change. Thus


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two problems are posed to a degree unknown in earlier societies. One is that there must be mechanisms symbolizing the supremacy of collective-national interests over those of individual parts. The other is that there must be mechanisms symbolizing some continuity over the prevailing image of change. Drawing on societies whose wider social networks are organized on mechanisms quite unlike kinship, the former problem has been well stated by Eisenstadt. With but slight alteration in wording, the respective proposition reads:

The solidarity of modern society demands the effective symbolization of the supremacy of collective over individual goals even where, and especially when, purely individualist value patterns prevail. Any integrative mechanism must reflect such primacy.89

With respect to the problem posed through a widespread expectation of social change, the complementary proposition concerning this problem would read:

The solidarity of modern society also demands the effective symbolization of the supremacy of continuity over change in the integrity principles underlying rights and obligations even and especially under conditions of high rates of perceived social change. Any stabilizing mechanism must reflect such primacy.

The idea that the solidarity of a society has two aspects is an old one as evidence in Durkheim's abiding concern with organic and mechanical solidarities.6 The former deals with the problem of synchronizing differentiated parts, the latter with stabilizing relations through time.

Applied to the area of solidarity interests, the parts-whole relational problem concern the questions how "motive-force to belong" is to be secured as voluntarily as possible rather than purchased through negative sanctions or even the expenditure of real categories such as force, material deprivation, or abandonment from the company of decent men. The cheapest way to secure the individual's desire to belong demands a symbolic mechanism demonstrating that belongingness pays. Fifthly, therefore, the integration of a solidarity system also demands the synchronic organization of auto-telic and instrumental solidarities. For implementing these functionally opposite ways of human inter-dependency at different places but the same time assures those who treat each other as utilities that theirs is but a relation serving their mutual realization as ends at another time.

As to the need to symbolize continuity in change, the most important objects for such continuity would seem to be the legitimization rules of stratification in society. Modern societies are active societies. They are oriented to diminish the ideal-real gap in societal affairs. Since the life time of a society is indefinite but that of the individual quite finite, it follows that some mechanisms must be developed to ensure that efforts expanded in the present by finite men can be seen as outlasting their finitude. Such a mechanism could be one that maintains the codes regulating differential rewards and obligations. While role change, and perhaps definitions of what the most pressing problems of society are changing as well, the roles of differential reward could serve as a link between generation connecting the ongoing with the outgoing into a continuity of community. That demand:

88Eisenstadt, From Generation to Generation, op. cit., p. 47.

stability in stratification codes and mechanism to insure it. Therefore, sixth, diachronic solidarity as a mechanism to insure continuity in the codes of the patterning of inequalities is also demanded as a condition of the stability of the solidarity system. Regardless of form and site, producing diachronic solidarity articulates socio-moral and political solidarities.  

But change and stability is also differentially patterned among functional solidarities. This is especially relevant for evolutionary changes. Since the early modern stage societies have an inbuilt developmental tension. This poses the possibility for convergence, divergence, and evolutionary invariance or continuity in solidarities. What then of long-run evolutionary change in solidarities?

Convergence, Divergence, and Evolutionary Invariance

Scanning the four functional types of solidarity in terms of the marginal variables concerning time and information-utilization norms reveals two basic types. Information and time-orientations can be either consonant or dissonant. In the former one either saves or spends both; in the latter one saves one and the other. Saving both time and information defines instrumental solidarity. Spending both time and information defines auto-teleic solidarity. And both of these types with their consonant norms on time and information-use are solidarities controlled by positive-sanction media, money and influence. Consonance of norms and positive sanction media make these two, the instrumental and the auto-teleic, candidates for long-run evolutionary change through learning. But the other two, socio-moral and political solidarities, are structured by dissonant norms on information and time-use. They are also controlled by negative-sanction media, viz., commitments and power. Both dissonance in norms and negative media act as brakes on learning. Therefore, the candidates for evolutionary invariance are the socio-moral and political solidarities.

Intrinsically, the most ahistorical type is clearly instrumental solidarity. Given its generally adaptive functional significance, instrumental solidarity can also be seen as the most generalized social resource. Therefore assuming a universal Reformation fallback, one would predict cross-societal convergence in instrumental solidarities.

As Figure 4 and attendant argument about the need for interchange in highly differentiated solidarities have shown this does not mean the universal appearance of a cash-cash nexus type of relationship running on nothing but utilitarian considerations. For instrumental solidarities to operate in a stable fashion there must be a requisite supply of task identity, associational loyalty and expressive acceptance. What one expects to converge in empirical terms is then the bureaucratic work relationship. And even here it is only a very limited set of items defining the normative content of instrumental solidarity in terms of: (i) punctuality; (ii) reliability in performance; (iii) cognitive priority in the exercise of skills rather than a primarily emotional attachment to a given way of performing work, and (iv) a primary commitment to do an effective job over and above other satisfactions available in the work situation as well. The convergence hypothesis covers only these four core characteristics of any bureaucracy and not what men bring to their work from other spheres. In this restricted fashion, bureaucracy will be the one common tie among mankind, a proposition familiar since the work of Max Weber. Hence the pay-off of this effort of analysis here must rest with specifying divergence and invariance.

Intrinsically the least historical type of solidarity is the auto-teleic variety. Its consummatory functional significance makes it the likely site for the application of new means in the service of perfecting ancient ideals. This is the site where the joint ideals of social and personal perfection become fused into one set of sharing one another. Here again there is consonance in terms of time and information utilization norms. But this time spending of both is the issue. Based as much as possible on action there is through time and the disposal of new means a common exploration of the boundaries of solidarity experience. With the reality constraints operative on self-rewarding togetherness suspended (a function of the organization of solidarities as a system), auto-teleic ties too are subject to long-run change. But here, given the perfection of historically rooted cultural ideals concerning man's relatedness to man there should be divergence. Variant cultural ideals should become ever more manifest as more and more wealth becomes available for implementing auto-teleic solidarity. Such a proposition is a testable one. Empirically, auto-teleic solidarities cover strata relations, leisure type associations and, perhaps most importantly, the law of privacy and approaches to deviance. The last two show impressive cross-national differences in modern societies.

This leaves two solidarities, the socio-moral and the political. Both are structured by dissonant time and information-utilization norms. One spends one and saves the other. And it is this feature of dissonance which exempts them both from long-run evolutionary trends of change. For in saving one and spending the other of either time or information there is a general pattern of relating here in which action and experience constrain each other. Postulating evolutionary invariance in the area of political and socio-moral solidarities does not mean asserting total stability in all respects. Universalization of the franchise, heightened political participation in politics, and growth in the assumption of governmental responsibility for solving social problems are components of political development everywhere, hence constitute convergence. Such processes as value-generalization and universalization of legal principles constitute parallel convergent developments in the socio-moral sphere. Therefore, the invariance hypothesis is restricted to specific objects, the meaning codes of political authority on the one hand and the code of socio-morals which symbolizes collective identity on the other.

Since the advent of literacy and particularly that of print, these codes were subjected to rationalized manifest form. Thereafter they could be changed but no longer simply as

61Empirically modes of producing diachronic solidarity vary. In socialization settings authority is always used to insure continuity in collective identities from generation to generation. In all other realms maintaining a proper mutual contingency between legality and legitimacy constitutes the main mechanism. Identification with legal institutions (if there operates on a constant set of socio-moral principles), is one mechanism, maintaining normatively required inequalities across different age groups is another. C. Baum, R.C. & M. Baum "The Aged and Diachronic Solidarity," Aging & Human Development (forthcoming, 1979).

62Baum, R.C. op. cit., p. 235.
a function of changes in the economy, technology and the like. As pointed out in the previous section, in the Occident the meaning codes of political authority were already so general to determine the fate of the Reformation. Consequently, treatment of the Reformation or early modern stage as a universal one means universalizing the idea of the generality of the political codes regardless of whether any given society goes through that stage or jumps it through symbolic and/or real-categories' import. Furthermore, if these codes were already general enough to control the significant religious revolt, they must have been surely sufficiently general also to organize the subsequent mass involvement with formal organization in the economy as well as any further intensification of the engagement with the civilian and military bureaucracies. It follows then that since these authority codes were different and thus controlled the religion upheavals, they can stay different subsequent to the early modern stage, though they need not.

Another reason concerning the invariance of both authority and socio-moral codes since the late historic stage involves the relation between psychological and social systems. The institutionalized exercise of legitimate authority analytical presupposes through-time stability in the meaning codes of authority and collective identity. Their articulations, i.e. producing a successfully contingent relation between legitimacy and legality, hinges on a stable relation between both codes. The reason is simple. In a political association with any internal societal complexity decisions binding on all members are always legitimized in the interest of the whole collectivity, such interests being presumptively those of an entity with an indefinite life span. But the relevant performances are ultimately exacted through the duty to obey from moribund finite personalities no matter how role-articulated. The inherent frustrations connected with obedience can be made acceptable if man can afford to care about future generations. Such care depends on his ability to trust the continuity in collective identities. Then a sacrifice in the present to shape a future state of affairs is possible because the effort demanded can draw on societal value commitments extant among those who have to sacrifice. Then it is also worthwhile, at least in principle, because obedience affords finite man the chance to see himself reflected in his children's children and thus to know that what he deeply cared about shall never vanish from this earth. Empirically all this hinges on actual production of diachronic solidarity.

Limited empirical evidence sustains the invariance hypothesis. With authority codes the question is whether or not a unit involved with decision-making at the center is required to divest itself symbolically of its periphery characteristics. In the Soviet Union such symbolic divestment has been required; and in that respect politics in Russia shows an unbroken continuity with Caritari times. In the United States there has never been such a requirement, showing an equally impressive historical continuity over the nearly two hundred years of the existence of its polity. Such continuity in authority codes has also been documented for France and the Netherlands. Symbols are fairly stretchable, therefore too, codes need not change. Soviet center politicians can draw as much on institutionalized and necessarily specialized expertise in their policy making as can Americans. Different codes do not interfere with that process. The costs of uncertainty in a reliably drawing on the outside expert may differ in form; but that the amounts differ cannot be clearly demonstrated. In America the costs of uncertainty take mostly the form of shifting interest coalitions such that support and hence implementation of given policy solutions to social problems cannot be predicted well. In the Soviet Union the same uncertainty rests with shifting personal alliances since succession in office is less regularized.

Similarly, image of the good society and the code elements of socio-moral belonging that are associated with them may not change at all. One may conceive of "society" as an atomistic aggregation of unit interests, a series of bilateral arrangements in which a national collective interest is little more than an artificial means; or one can maintain a more collectivist image in which the nature of any part-interest must not only be legitimated but even thought of in terms of a function for some presumed given society-wide interest. This makes for profound differences in the realm of socio-moral solidarities involving a pragmatic-individualist ethos in the former and the presence of a distinctly idealistic cast in the latter. Such variants in socio-moral solidarities remain quite compatible with the universal requisites of bureaucratic daily life. These too can stay stable, though they need not.

Unless the above turns out to be flawed in fundamentals, any unqualified convergence thesis in modernization theory has little merit. Following Marx the philosopher rather than Marx the social scientist, its proponents assume the end of society as a historical entity. Whatever the philosophical merits here concerning a penultimate future of development, such a perspective remains beyond the empirical tools of science. Critical available facts in the bureaucratization of economic relations, the development of law, the approach to deviance, and political legitimation suggest convergence, divergence, and evolutionary invariance. This has been an attempt to ground such possibilities in general action theory and do so in a manner amenable to testing ideas.

Conclusion

An evolutionary perspective of the "problem of solidarity" necessarily emphasizes several dimensions of development. Solidarities proliferate in kind, gain in functional specialization, in the complexity of their organization, and in their interdependent contingency on several environments, cultural, social, personal, and behavioral organismic. Belonging was relatively secure in primitive and archaic societies. Theirs was a rigid

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solidarity in that gaining access from the outside was as difficult as abandonment for those born inside. As displayed in Figure 4, the modern situation differs profoundly. Here there is a system of solidarities, composed of four basic types, dependent for stability on six conditions of properly matched interchanges producing solidarity. Each one can become a faultline in the system. It is a flexible situation characterized by many opportunities for inclusion as well as exclusion.

Next to specifications concerning convergence, divergence, and invariance, another theoretical product of this effort is an analytical grid for the analysis of phenomena of "discrimination against or for" social categories, based on criteria of achievement, description, or combinations of both. It seems appropriate, therefore, to conclude with a brief sketch showing its potential in this respect. The inclusion of the American Negro and the exclusion of German Jews in recent history may serve as illustrations.

These being "ethnic cases" occurring in modern solidarity systems, the present schema interprets an iteration of both as attempts to "refuse" relevant aspects of culture, society, personality, and organism. Borrowing the term "pollution" from the ethnic case par excellence, the races of historic India, reveals the first yield of the present analytic grid: the four types of solidarity in modernity have a differential "pollution potential." The ahistoricity of the instrumental tie with its time and information-saving norms carries least pollution potential. The opposite characteristics of the auto-tele solidarities turn them into the most pollution-prone, which is one reason why ideologies concerning inter-ethnic relations stress expressive symbols structured around sex and/or aggression. The pollution potential of the remaining two solidarities rank in between, with the socio-moral and its information-processing norms placed above the political. This generates two hypotheses, one for theoretical, the other for empirical work. First, advance in the theory of inter-ethnic relations will be more likely if one conceives of inclusion and exclusion phenomena as essentially parallel social processes. Second, the probability of success for inclusion or exclusion of any given ascribed group concerning any given type of solidarity varies directly with the ordinal pollution potential of that solidarity.

Also a modern solidarity subsystem can be seen as feeding the solidarity requirements of three distinct institutional spheres, viz. the economy, the polity, and the fiduciary subsystem. With a solidarity subsystem in its own right, this means that four distinct institutional "vested" interests come into play whenever exclusionary or inclusionary forces materialize. Given the high degree of functional differentiation among these subsystems, one can safely assume that "vested" interests at the respective elite levels coalesce primarily around a concern for the smooth functioning of "their" institutions. Smooth functioning is after all the main basis on which such elites enjoy differential rewards, above all legitimacy of their leadership. This yields a third hypothesis: Attempts to exclude or include any ethnic minority from or into a given set of institutions at any given time encounters elite opposition as an inverse function of the degree to which such ethnic group was assimilated into the institutional complex before the attempt. For a disprivileged minority, the higher the occupational specialization through discrimination of some sort, for example the more critical the role played for the elites and, consequently, the less able are the elites to do without the minority. On the other hand, the greater the degree of occupational assimilation, which in the case of a minority means dispersal across occupations, the greater the vulnerability of the ethnic group to exclusion from occupations. In the latter case one can virtually pluck out the minority from their jobs without causing any serious economic disruptions. The same is true for all societal subsystems. For example, where the smooth operation of a party system involves blocs of ethnic votes, other things being equal, party elites will oppose attempts to exclude their respective ethnic from political solidarities. With a zero correlation between the vote and ethnicity, on the other hand, party elites may not care. In order to make them care other than their "vested" interests must be mobilized. Presumably the latter is more difficult.

Turning now to the American Dilemma, broadly this signals inclusion of the American Negro into the system of solidarities over the last decades. The waystations of this inclusionary process here roughly moved from the socio-moral, over the economic, to the political and finally the auto-tele set of solidarities. On the first and excluding kinship, the lower-class Protestantism of the American Negro never constituted a genuinely foreign element. More or less from the beginning the Negro was part and parcel of America's dogmatically pluralist but societally homogeneous "civic religious complex." Whatever the weight of the economics causes of the civil war, it seems clear that in terms of legal change inclusion into instrumental and political solidarities followed next and in that order. The far more recent abolition of miscegenation laws concluded this gradual inclusion process at least in legal terms. As always, legal provisions are one thing, actual practice another. But the basic direction toward the free disposability of cultural personality, and organism for solidarities seems hardly in doubt, just as little as the reliance on significant symbolic reflexions on the part of the civil rights movement for both white and black participants.

One cannot speak of an empirical path of exclusionist disengagement of the Jews from Nazi Germany since the events happened during a very short period of time. But this disengagement by legal means in contravention of prevailing legitimacy was a mirror image of the legal rights that prior polities had doted out to the Jews in line with prevailing legitimacy dictates before. The Nazi polity deprived the Jews of specific occupational and property rights, a process much facilitated by the Jews' prior assimilation into the economy. Political rights were "regressed" from national citizenship to state subjects. Rights of access to public leisure in high and lowbrow culture were curtailed, and miscegenation laws prohibited cross-ethnic marriage. In each case the new law took away what an earlier one had granted. The speed with which the

68 "Solidary ethnocism" involves two central characteristics. The perception of a commonly shared past particularistic and unique to a group serves in the present as a selector mechanism for socio-moral solidarity. The fact of a unique past is treated as experience, the details of its significance as action. Secondly, on the personality side, belonging serves to ascribe; hence make available as inseparable givens, special limitations concerning a person's sense of self, who he can be and what he must be which in turn are based on common descent operative through blood ties. Cf. DeVos, George, "Social Stratification and Ethnic Pluralism," Race, Vol. XIII, No. 4 (April 1972): 435-460
As regards the connection between modernization and improvements of the human condition, such an analysis of the problem of solidarity necessarily ends on an equivocal note: there is no clear connection. Analytically, modernity implies man’s arrogance for unlimited learning, the temptation to freely substitute experience and action with respect to all four components of the action system. It follows that modern solidarity systems are at once very brittle indeed, potentially subject to indiscriminate inclusions and abductions, and relatively secured against precipitate erosions due to their greater concomitances on other subsystems of society as well as other societies. Still, institutions like the U.S. supreme court cannot be simply invented or exported, nor can their continual effectiveness even on home soil be taken for granted. It is a factual legacy of recent German history that modern citizens can act on their fellow citizens as if they had succeeded into simply redefining their status, not only into a non-citizen but even into a non-human category. In some fashion men always had to decide about that. But the number of distinct and separate bases and rationales on which to decide have expanded tremendously. Whether it is abortion and hence the beginning of belonging or terminal illness and hence its ending, even peacetime modern societies make such decisions as part of the routines of their hospital operations. And there is at present considerable doubt as to whether such decisions in the aggregate are determined more by economic necessity, political expediency, or morality of a more encompassing nature.

Primitive and archaic men decided on belonging by invoking multiple powers, inclusion and exclusion were processed through dream states constitutive of id-inversions on ego-ideals. Their was a state of anxiety and its forgetting. Monotheist historic man had to fashion a convenent.78 Constructing a societal community in the light of a given


source of meaning had become a duty, and error here meant a super-ego hurling id-derived aggressions against the ego. His was a state of guilt and its atonement. But early modern and modern men added the need to realize and choose the nature of a covenant, respectively. On top of id, ego, and super-ego came selectivity concerning ego-ideals. Given the invention of function-specific moralities, modern man’s problem of belonging has become a condition of guilt and its displacement, as well as anxiety about the reasonableness of guilt itself.

The frame of reference

Talcott Parsons wrote his theoretical works under the ambitious title of 'the general theory of action'. In his use of this title, two bold claims were implicit. The first concerns the scope of the object world to which the theory applies. Parsons designed his theoretical framework to provide concepts for analyzing every empirical field within the domain of social action, vast as that is. The theory is intended to be general in the sense of encompassing everything that is constituted by meaningful human conduct. The second claim concerns the range of intellectual orientations toward the world of social action that the theory incorporates. Parsons hoped to unify in a coherent, logically consistent framework the validated elements of all previously established conceptual schemes for studying social action. The theory was to be general in the sense of providing essential theoretical means for the entire community of social scientists, excluding no necessary schools or styles of thought. It was to protect social scientists from building a new Tower of Babel, where commitments to logically incommensurable theories would predestine scholars to talk past one another and hence fail to resolve their disputes.¹

To be sure, Parsons held these twin ambitions for his general theory of action with qualifications. He understood, for example, that parts of his theory remained in the form of preliminary concepts. These parts figured in the overall frame of reference, but their value could not be fully established until they were complemented by more precise analytical categories and more specific causal propositions. Until a large number of empirical areas had been analyzed in terms of more precise categories and explanatory hypotheses, the claim of general validity remained provisional and largely formal. This is hardly to say that the importance of the general framework was negligible, but simply to acknowledge its limits. Parsons also understood that determining the theory's logical relations with independent conceptual schemes, for example, symbolic interactionism,
but reinforces commitment to basic values, solidarity ties and authority relationships. We may add to Tumer's conclusions that restricted symbolic media are diffuse social mechanisms serving, but with lower degrees of freedom, functions associated in more highly differentiated societies with commitments, influence and power as well as money.

Rainer C. Baum, in Chapter 12, applies the concept of a general action complex in the mould of Parsons' and Platt's 'cognitive complex' to the analysis of relations of social solidarity. Unfortunately the conditions of publication did not permit Baum to review proofs of his essay. As a result, the published version is marred by many typographical errors. Fortunately, the analytical lines of Baum's argument are not obscured.

Baum's analysis has two major foci: process within the general action system involving culture, social system, personality and behavioural organism; and the major stages in the evolution of society, conceptualized in terms deriving from Bellah's analysis of religious evolution. In addressing the general action system, Baum explores the forms that solidarity may assume in relation to other elements of social action, for example institutional, political and acculturating or socializing. He defines solidarity as a sharing of action and experience, a sense of 'we-ness' or commonality in senses of personal identity among independent actors. Solidarity in this sense may follow from many kinds of mutual engagement in group processes. Much of the essay traces the differences in systems of solidarity among societies at different stages of evolution. Baum argues that in all human societies individuals have had the capabilities of awareness of differences between the self and the other that G.H. Mead identified as constitutive of a reflective self. In primitive societies these reflective capacities are limited to awareness of relationships among diffusely functioning groups based on kinship. A person identifies with his or her own kin as a solidarity group unified across sex and age-group differences but also set off against other kin-based groups. In archaic societies, class differences emerge and consequently a form of solidarity representing society as a unified whole embracing privileged and lower classes must emerge and be sustained. In a historic society, a further differentiation between sacred and secular privileges and lower classes is introduced, resulting in a four-class system. The religious privileged classes bring with them conceptions of transcendent ideals for social institutions, vastly deepening the grounds of societal solidarity in senses of higher purpose to a collective way of life. Early modern societies experienced, with the Reformation and its doctrines of conscience, a belief in an individualized self apart from the particular set of social roles in which a person might be engaged. This deepened sense of the individual imparted a new concern for diachronic solidarities and their moral or ideological foundations. Yet, the scope of differentiation in the system of solidarities remained restricted until industrialization in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries introduced the extensive system of associations that is encompassed in truly modern societies. Contemporary modernity is characterized by many independent but continuous and flexible opportunities for forming relationships of solidarity. Yet, it is also characterized by risks of experiences of alienation and indeed of living in circumstances of exclusion, from crucial types of solidarity groups. Baum discusses racial and ethnic exclusions as examples of the latter.

Baum provides formal models of the systems of solidarity (or societal community subsystems) in societies at different stages of social evolution. Perhaps most important are his models of fully modern systems of solidarity. They show four components of solidarity systems: instrumental for the subsystem engaged most directly with the economy, political for

the subsystem maintaining societal solidarity in engagement with the polity, sociomoral for the subsystem relating primarily to cultural and socializing institutions; and the autotelic for relationships of solidarity that draw their meaning from within the societal community. The system of solidarities in a society is dependent upon adequate inputs of resources from the economy, polity and socializing or cultural-socializing subsystems and is subject to profound strain whenever those inputs prove inadequate, as they were in many societies during the Great Depression. While Baum notes that solidarity systems can often adjust to strains of inadequate inputs to one subsystem by intensifying the functioning of another subsystem, there are limits to such adjustments and phenomena of alienation, conflict and anomic may occur despite the immense capabilities of modern societies.

Like Baum, Ldz attempts to resolve basic gaps and difficulties in Parsons' theory of solidarity or social integration. However, in Chapter 13 he follows a different, though complementary, strategy of theory development than Baum. His essay addresses solidarity relationships at the level of the integrative subsystem of society - that is, within society community, rather than at level of the general action system. He begins by reviewing strengths and weaknesses of Parsons' analysis of influence as a generalized symbolic medium of social integration. He then suggests that influence should be treated as a medium of demand for what he calls associative performance or action undertaken in response to a duty or obligation arising through an acknowledged solidarity relationship. His suggestion leads to the proposal that intersecting curves logically similar to supply and demand curves in economics can be drawn to represent associative performance as a supply of solidarity action and influence as a demand for it. He discusses the quantitative 'logic' that can guide, on the one hand, actors who expend influence to gain associative performances on the part of others and, on the other hand, actors who provide associative performances in order to gain influence, while he also acknowledges that influence does not exist in the numerical form of money. He discusses the fact that influence, although generalized, is not transferable across different spheres of solidarity. For example, particular physicians and lawyers may have great influence within their respective professions, but their forms of influence are not interchangeable. A lawyer does not have influence in the practice of medicine nor does a physician have influence in the practice of law. Nor is the professional influence of physicians and lawyers, however great within their professions, simply convertible to influence in the public domain, as may be commanded by a political leader. Yet, there are public issues concerning practices within their professions on which a political leader might call upon influential physicians or attorneys to exercise their influence, for example as advocates for new policies.

Ldz proceeds to relate the dynamics of influence and solidarity association to Durkheim's conception in The Division of Labor in Society (1933) of the spontaneous equilibrium between the dynamic density of a society or civilization and the intensity of its social life. He argues further that Durkheim's forms of social pathology, the two opposed pairs of egoism and altruism, anomic and fatalism, may be interpreted as conditions in integrative institutions that alter the shapes of the curves, respectively, of influence and associative performance thereby altering the points of equilibrium for solidarity relationships in particular societal communities or sectors of societal communities. Ldz proposes that the resulting conception of the equilibrating processes between influence and associative performance, with the variation added by consideration of the 'social pathologies', provides a core concept of the dynamics of social integration that was the original goal of Parsons' analysis of influence.