The Intelligentsia in the Class Structure of State-Socialist Societies
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The Intelligentsia in the Class Structure of State-Socialist Societies

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The paper describes the class structure of East European state-socialist societies, positing the existence of a class dichotomy between the working class and the intelligentsia. This thesis challenges those theories which claim that the importance of class conflicts declined under state socialism and that therefore such societies should be described as containing nonantagonistic classes or strata. It also challenges the critical theories which acknowledge the existence of a new dominant class in Eastern Europe, but which describe that class as the bureaucracy or technobureaucracy. This paper attempts to base its class analysis on the exploration of the mechanisms and institutions of expropriation of surplus under state socialism. It is suggested that in contemporary Eastern Europe private ownership and market mechanisms of expropriation have been replaced by central planning and redistribution of the economic surplus. All those who have vested interests in the maximization of redistributive power are members of a new dominating class. If we define the new class this way it will include more than just the bureaucracy; potentially, it includes the whole intelligentsia. The paper describes the new dominant class of intelligentsia as a class in statu nascendi. The formation of this class takes a whole historical epoch. In the first stage of state-socialist development the Djilas thesis is basically accurate: under Stalinism and in the early post-Stalinist years the bureaucracy had the monopoly of power. During the last two decades, on the other hand, the social base of power holders has broadened, especially in those countries which experimented with economic and political reforms. The formation of a new dominant class which incorporates the whole of the intelligentsia is now under way.

In this paper I will describe the class structure of the East European state-socialist societies, positing the existence of a class dichotomy between the working class and the intelligentsia. It will be argued that the power to which intellectuals aspire in a state-socialist redistributive economy derives from the basic institutions of social reproduction and, more specifically,

1 This paper has been substantially revised from my article which appeared in Critique, nos. 10-11 (Winter–Spring 1978–79), pp. 51–76. Requests for reprints of the present paper should be sent to Ivan Szelenyi, Department of Sociology, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin 53706.

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from the institutions which guarantee the expropriation of surplus from the
direct producers; consequently, that power is of a class nature.

The thesis is a highly provocative one, challenging all academically
respectable theories of East European social structure and of the structural
position of the intelligentsia. Those schools of thought which acknowledge
the existence of class relations in contemporary Eastern Europe posit class
dichotomies radically different from the one I suggest. Official Soviet
Marxism distinguishes between two “nonantagonistic” classes, the working
class and the peasantry; those who build their arguments directly or
indirectly on Trotsky’s critical analysis of Soviet society suggest that a
class antagonism exists between the working class and the bureaucracy or
technobureaucracy (Kuron, Modzelewski, and Djilas are the best-known
examples). Most East European sociologists since Ossowski have tended to
disagree both with the official Soviet Marxist position and with the Trots-
kyist position. During the last two decades empirical sociologists have
questioned whether class analysis indeed has any relevance to the study of
East European societies, and they have tried to describe the East European
social structure in terms of social stratification (e.g., Wesolowski, Ferge, and
Hegedus). All these schools of thought would object to defining the in-

2 The so-called two-class, one-stratum model of social stratification under socialism is
usually attributed to J. V. Stalin (1972).

3 Milovan Djilas developed the concept of the bureaucracy as a new ownership class
under socialism. According to Djilas, “The bureaucrats in a non-Communist state are
officials in modern capitalist economy, while the Communists are something different
and new: a new class” (1957, p. 44). Djilas does acknowledge that the intellectual roots
of his criticism of socialism can be found in the work of Trotsky, but he also correctly
notes that Trotsky did not acknowledge the class character of the bureaucracy. “Attack-
ing the party bureaucracy in the name of the revolution, he attacked the cult of the
party and, although he was not conscious of it, the new class” (p. 50). In fact, the
Trotskyist analysis—contrary to the intentions of Leon Trotsky himself—was always
very close to different versions of a bureaucratic class theory; the writings of Shachtman
and Burnham are well-known examples of an extension of the theories of Trotsky into a
new class theory (Shachtman 1962; Burnham 1962). The strength of Djilas’s analysis
is that it ties his concept of the new class to the political and historical realities of Eastern
Europe; he is not venturing into a general theory of a new managerial or bureaucratic
class. Another influential application of the Trotskyist critique of the bureaucracy in
Eastern Europe is the “open letter” by Kuron and Modzelewski (1966). Kuron and
Modzelewski in this article are rather orthodox Trotskyists; they do not develop a bureau-
cratic class theory, but their analysis points in that direction. Kuron has since moved
significantly from this orthodox Trotskyist position, but even in his recent work he did
not develop a bureaucratic class theory (Kuron 1978).

4 Stanislaw Ossowski presented the first comprehensive and devastating criticism of the

5 Hegedus (1977) and Ferge (1973) build on the theories of Ossowski. Both Hegedus and
Ferge want to replace the Soviet Marxist theory of class under socialism with an analysis
of the social structure in which the division of labor is of central importance (Hegedus
1977, pp. 47–57; Ferge 1973, pp. 77–116). They actually replace class analysis with
stratification analysis, but while doing so they avoid the theoretical question of whether
socialist societies are class societies. (The terminological shift from the concept of “class”
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telligentsia as a class; there would even be some disagreement whether intellectuals form a homogeneous stratum. Finally, those who have looked on the East European intelligentsia as a class have rarely used the term "class"; more frequently, they have simply described how the East European radical intelligentsia strives for a power monopoly (e.g., Berdyaev and Machajski)\(^6\) or for what probably can be called "class power." They have not attempted to define the economic foundations of this class or penetrated beyond a description of its ideology.

When I started my work 15 years ago I, like most empirical sociologists in Eastern Europe, was highly critical of official Soviet Marxist theory. Following the example of Ossowski and Hegedus, I spent about 10 years in empirical work, describing different aspects of the East European stratification system, measuring and explaining the extent and nature of social inequalities; in fact, my empirical findings were further proof of the purely apologetic nature and scientific inadequacy of official Soviet Marxism. Thus I had to look for alternative theoretical tools. The Trotskyist frame of reference was obviously more relevant to the study of East European social structure than official Soviet Marxism or stratification theory, but I was not convinced of the theoretical accuracy of the definition of the bureaucracy as an ownership class, and even less so of the empirical validity of the crucial distinction made between bureaucrats and the rest of the intelligentsia (or the "intelligentsia proper").

I found that it might be necessary to go beyond the fairly rigid and orthodox official Soviet or Trotskyist interpretation of the Marxist notion of class, but not by accepting the superficial critique of Marxist class analysis contained within bourgeois stratification theory—which, despite the obligatory Marxist jargon of East European sociology, had had a major impact on the methodology and way of thinking of my fellow East European

to the concept of "social structure" is significant.) The main value of that kind of work in Eastern Europe was empirical—it prepared the ground to make empirical research on social stratification and social inequality legitimate in Eastern Europe. The task which was performed by Hegedus and Ferge in Hungary was done by Wesolowski in Poland (1970). Even Soviet sociologists conducted researches of this kind, describing stratificational inequalities, but they did not use their results to confront the official class theory (Shkaratan 1970).

\(^6\) Nicolas Berdyaev, a former Marxist, in exile in the West after the October Revolution, suggests in an impressive study that in order to "understand the sources of Russian communism . . . one must understand that singular phenomenon which is called 'intelligentsia'" (1972, p. 19). He reconstructs the intellectual history of the Russian intelligentsia and argues that the "whole history of the Russian intelligentsia was a preparation for communism" (p. 122). Berdyaev does not develop anything like a class theory of the intelligentsia; he only suggests that the agent in Russia which was ready to absorb the Russian version of communism was not the proletariat but the intelligentsia. As Gouldner points out, the Polish-born Russian revolutionary Waclaw Machajski also claimed that socialism was an ideology of the intelligentsia (Gouldner 1975–76, 1979, p. 99).
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empirical sociologists. I became convinced that Marxist class analysis could be a powerful tool for understanding structural conflicts under state socialism, but only if we tried to adapt it to the radically changed socio-economic conditions which now prevail: that is, to the conditions of industrial societies which operate without the institution of private ownership and which consequently, at least according to this crucial criterion, should be accepted as socialist. If a society no longer legitimates the expropriation of surplus through private property, then we should move toward a substantive analysis of the mechanisms and institutions of expropriation of surplus which are characteristic of this society. If we can define antagonistic interests focusing on these institutions, we can explain them as class interests and remain within the framework of Marxist class analysis, broadly defined, even if we do not base our definition of class on ownership relations as Marx did. It will be suggested in this paper that redistribution is the main mechanism which guarantees expropriation in state-socialist societies. All those who have a vested interest in the maximization of redistributive power are members of a new dominating class, since their interests are antagonistic to those of the direct producers. If we define the new class this way it obviously includes more than just the bureaucracy or even the technobureaucracy. It potentially includes the whole intelligentsia.

Finally, I would like to make clear in this introduction that the class I am talking about is still in statu nascendi. I am describing a process, not a static situation. The intelligentsia as a group, from the priests and monks of the Middle Ages to the anarchist and Bolshevik revolutionaries of the 19th and early 20th centuries and to the scholar-planner-technocrats of the late 20th century, has no doubt always had aspirations toward power monopoly, but this claim became realistic only with the institution of state-socialist redistributive economics. The East European intelligentsia still has a long way to go before it becomes an integrated class with its own class consciousness—the state-socialist societies are still at a very early stage of their development. All that I am suggesting is that there is a historical tendency for the power exercised in Eastern Europe to be increasingly the class power of the intelligentsia.

In The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power (Konrad and Szelenyi [1979]; the book was written in 1974 and published in English in 1979), George Konrad and I attempted to document more fully the signs of the formation of the class power of the intelligentsia. In this paper I can do no more than describe the inadequacies of alternative theories of socialist social structure; analyze briefly the institutions of social reproduction and expropriation found under state socialism to show what kind of antagonism of interest is built upon them; and, finally, document some of the limitations of the definition of the intelligentsia as a class and define more precisely the intelligentsia as a class in statu nascendi.
NOTES ON DIFFERENT THEORIES OF EAST EUROPEAN CLASS STRUCTURE

The official Soviet Marxist theory of socialist social structure dominated East European social science literature for three decades, from the early thirties until the late fifties. It is no doubt superfluous to mention that this domination was not purely a product of the intellectual strength of the argument; those with scholarly doubts were constantly reminded of the necessity of ideological discipline by other than purely academic methods. Even today this theory is officially unchallenged in the ideologically more conservative countries like East Germany and the Soviet Union. To see this, it is sufficient to look at any recent edition of a Soviet textbook on historical materialism. Granted, German and Soviet ideologues no longer object when in empirical research sociologists "absentmindedly" forget about official class distinctions and use occupation as a variable in explaining the distribution of their data, as long as they do not draw theoretical conclusions. In the more liberal countries of Eastern Europe, like Hungary and Poland, no one with any academic prestige seriously pretends to accept the old Soviet Marxist dogma, but few people openly challenge it. One is simply no longer supposed to talk about class.

Official Soviet Marxist class theory has pretensions to rigid orthodoxy. It is argued that, because Marx defined classes on the basis of ownership, the same methodology should be applied in contemporary socialist societies; thus, because there are two forms of ownership—state and cooperative—there are two classes as well, the working class and the peasantry.

It should be clear from the beginning to everybody familiar with the logic of Marxist class analysis that, despite the formal orthodoxy, this is quite a flexible interpretation of Marx. Marx did not define his basic class dichotomy in terms of forms of ownership. The basic class antagonism in Marx's formulation exists between those who own the means of the production and those who are deprived of ownership. It is not the form of ownership, but ownership as such (or lack of ownership), which constitutes the class. On the other hand, it is possible to argue that Marx himself attributed class-forming force to forms of ownership. In Capital (vol. 3, chap. 52) he defines landowners as a separate class simply because they own something other than "capital," and in the "Eighteenth Brumaire" he uses forms of ownership as the basis for further differentiation between classes, especially differentiation inside the ruling class. What I want to show is simply that

7 In Capital, vol. 3, chap. 52, Marx adds a third class, the class of landowners, to his basic class dichotomy between owners of capital and owners of labor power. By adding this third class to his scheme he changes the criteria which supposedly constitute classes. In this text he considers that it is probably not ownership or nonownership which generates classes, but the identity of revenues and sources of revenues. Unfortunately, as he enters this discussion the manuscript breaks off (Marx 1974, pp. 885–86). In "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," where Marx offers his most complex map of class rela-
the official Soviet Marxist dogma is not such a rigorous interpretation of Marx as it claims; in fact, it shifts from the main thrust of Marxist class analysis into a fairly marginal area (as we will see, the Trotskyists' claim to be rigorously Marxist is more justified).

There is another methodological trick built into this theory: namely, on the formal level it operates only with forms of ownership, but when the empirical relevance of the theory is tested we are referred to a distinction between industry and agriculture. It obviously appeals to our common sense that there are workers and peasants in contemporary East European societies, and a distinction between them sounds like a meaningful one. But if it is really the form of ownership that matters, then classes cannot be defined this way; it is not the peasantry which is the other class, but those industrial and agricultural laborers who are employed by cooperatives, and all agricultural laborers who work in the state-owned agricultural categories belong to the working class. Consequently, the industrial worker should belong to the same class as the industrial manager, or even the minister of heavy industry; but the peasant who works in a cooperative should belong to a different class than his neighbor, who is also an agricultural laborer doing the same type of work, having roughly the same income, education, and so forth, merely because he is employed on a state farm. This is obvious nonsense. Thus, what makes sense in the official Soviet Marxist class dichotomy is not the distinction between two ownership classes, but a stratificational distinction between people employed in the main sectors of the economy.

This official Soviet Marxist class theory has very little to do with Marxism; it has even less to do with the empirical realities of contemporary Eastern Europe. In fact, the unknown soldiers of the first silent revolution against this theory were the statisticians who were expected to use "Marxist class theory" in analyzing official statistics, especially population censuses. By 1960, at least in countries where statisticians and demographers had some self-respect, as in Hungary, they silently forgot their histomata seminars: in the population census volumes "class" no longer appeared, and statisticians used occupation as a variable to explain the distribution of data. In fact they had to do so, since "classes" as defined by the official dogma explained nothing, from the distribution of income to the allocation of housing. The significant difference was to be found between the major
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occupational groups, especially between white- and blue-collar workers. In a way we might argue that sociologists have undeservedly claimed the honor of being the champions in the struggle against the histomat class dogma. It was already practically destroyed by unknown civil servants in Central Statistical Offices. Ossowski and others only offered an ideological justification for an already existing statistical practice. Stratification theory has had a very different history in Eastern Europe and in the West. Critiques of stratification analysis from very early times emphasized its inbuilt conservative character. In the West stratification theory was a conservative weapon against "subversive" class analysis. But in Eastern Europe during the late fifties and early sixties, the discovery of social stratification was quite a subversive activity, subversion against an apologetic and conservative class theory. Those who nowadays criticize people like Ossowski from the ideological Left do not appreciate the intellectual and political courage he needed to challenge Soviet Marxism. The histomat class dichotomy served only one purpose: to justify the existing monopoly of power.

By defining the state and Party bureaucracy as the "working class," the official theory offered a convenient solution to the delicate question of the "dictatorship of the proletariat." Stratification analysis, however, at least proved that social inequalities did indeed exist and that the "physical workers" (probably not identical with the ideologically defined working class) were systematically the negatively privileged group in the East European "people's democracies." As time passed, the inherent limitations of stratification analysis came to the fore in Eastern Europe as they had in the West. Stratification analysis, by distinguishing between white-collar and blue-collar workers, between physical workers, clerical workers, professionals, and "professionals in leading positions" (using this polite term for highly placed Party and state bureaucrats), could statistically demonstrate the separation of white-collar workers, and especially the power elite, from the actual workers. But it could not offer any theory to explain the statistically observed differences. Most empirical sociologists used the term "working class" to describe manual workers, those directly involved in the production process, but they carefully avoided using any structural term for the upper half of the social hierarchy. We called them "people higher up in the social hierarchy," the higher-income group, higher social groups or strata—and no one seemed to pay much attention to the theoretical significance of this terminology.

Ossowski, the main theorist of social stratification, proposed that, since ownership had lost its explanatory importance with the elimination of private ownership, position in the social division of labor explained social structure and social inequalities. But it was unclear what the theoretical

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8 In Ossowski's view, the importance of the ownership relationship radically declined in societies in which the means of production have been nationalized (1963, p. 182); he also mentions the importance of the emergence of a new class, or "stratum," of non-
significance of this thesis was: did it suggest that class relations no longer existed and that socialist social structure could only be explained by inequalities between different occupational groups, or did it mean that we should define classes in terms of the division of labor? Marx himself obviously flirted with the idea of basing class analysis on the division of labor as far back as the “German Ideology”9 and Ossowski, a well-trained Marxist, could claim still to be a Marxist while rejecting ownership classes and using division of labor as the main variable for structural analysis. But as stratification research developed, it became clearer that East European empirical sociologists, by emphasizing the importance of the division of labor, wanted to replace class analysis with stratification analysis and were not interested in developing a new class definition. For East European empirical sociology, contemporary socialist society was a classless society, a thesis which did not bother the official ideological censors much and which also pleased Western anti-Marxists, who found it amusing that the first accomplishment of “Marxist sociology” was to get rid of the concept of class. The most consequential stratification theorist in Poland, Wesolowski, was even to question whether a working class existed at all in Eastern Europe, and he proposed

manual white-collar workers (p. 183). This new class or stratum (interestingly, he does not seem to attach much importance to the terminological distinction) is, on the other hand, constituted by the nature of its work and not according to ownership relations. Ossowski also suggested that Marx himself cannot be interpreted as a theorist who worked only with a single class dichotomy based on ownership. In Ossowski’s view, Marx combined at least three dichotomies to develop a complex map of class relations (Ossowski 1974, p. 82). Hegedus agrees with this, and he adds the “position in the division of labour” and the “sector of the economy” to “property relations” as the “independent variables in the mathematical model of the structure of socialist societies” (Hegedus 1977, p. 70).

9 Those East European sociologists who attempt to replace or at least combine ownership with “division of labor” frequently quote the “German Ideology.” Indeed, in the “German Ideology” Marx and Engels still seemed to assume that the historical development of class relations directly corresponds to the evolution of the division of labor (1972, pp. 18–21). Marx and Engels go so far as to suggest that “the existing stage in the division of labour determines also the relations of individuals to one another with reference to the material, instrument and product of labour” (p. 19). But probably already while writing the “German Ideology” Marx and Engels began to see problems with this proposition. In particular, when they attempt to describe the transition to feudalism, it becomes clear that quantitative indicators of the division of labor are not sufficient to explain the differences in class relations between a slave and a feudal mode of production. It might not be accidental that the manuscript breaks off at this point and that the authors do not even attempt to continue the analysis and to describe the transition from feudalism to capitalism (p. 21). I would suggest that Marx should have developed the concept of “relations of production” first, which would have provided more sophisticated instruments for discussing the issues of transition of modes of production and transformation of class relations. It is interesting, however, that neither Hegedus nor Ferge seems to notice that from the point of view of class theory the “German Ideology” is still an early work—and indeed without the concept of relations of production it cannot be regarded as a mature statement of Marxist class theory (see Ferge 1973, pp. 77–78),
that theoretically it might be more accurate to call workers a "stratum."\(^{10}\)

Suddenly we find the originally subversive stratification analysis turning out to be even more apologetic than Soviet Marxism. At least Soviet Marxists acknowledged that contemporary socialist societies were class societies (although composed of nonantagonistic classes—quite a squaring of the circle) and that classless "communist society" was still to come.

But this question of "classlessness" is not a purely ideological one. Wesolowski and the stratification school of sociology in Eastern Europe, by rejecting the applicability of class analysis to socialist societies, were in fact suggesting that it was impossible to define structural economic conflicts in these societies. Consequently, it was also impossible to explain existing social inequalities from structural economic conflicts. This has far-reaching consequences for empirical research and for the interpretation of empirical facts. If contemporary socialist societies are classless—that is, free from structural economic conflicts—then the inequalities we can observe and measure are not inherent characteristics of these societies. They are inherited from the capitalist past or, alternatively, are consequences of nonsocial factors (e.g., the ideologues of stratification theory would argue that inequalities will be overcome under socialism by the gradual development of productive forces or technology). If this theory stands, then the structure of inequalities could not reflect the socioeconomic laws of these societies and, historically, inequalities should decline. In my empirical work I found none of these assumptions to be true. The main inequalities which I observed in the fields of housing and urban structure or in the regional system were not inherited. They were emerging from the East European socialist strategy of economic growth. They were structured by the distributive mechanisms of the socialist economy and not by surviving market forces. And, finally, there was little evidence that inequalities were declining. (It is not the purpose of this paper to elaborate this point, which was documented in my earlier publications on housing and urbanization in Eastern Europe.) Since I found the inequalities I observed to be inherent in East European societies and to be structured by basic state-socialist economic institutions, it was logical to assume that class antagonism lay behind these inequalities.

It was Leon Trotsky who first suggested the existence of antagonistic interests in the Soviet Union, when he analyzed the nature of conflict between the bureaucracy and the working class. Trotsky himself never

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\(^{10}\) In Wesolowski's formulation: "The proletarian revolution abolishes the class structure thus conceived... Deprived of their 'opposed role,' the workers cease to be a class in the traditional sense of the term... In the Marxian sense, they are no longer a 'true class,' but rather an 'ex-class'... we continue to call them 'workers,' but not the working class in the Marxian sense of the term. Perhaps it would be convenient to call them 'the stratum of workers'" (1974, p. 123).
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went so far as to call the bureaucracy a class. Sociologically speaking, he defined the bureaucrats as a ruling elite alien from the working class. The theory that Trotsky developed concerning the Soviet social structure is a curious one. It is basically a class theory since it assumes a class antagonism, but it operates with a one-class model. The oppressed class is opposed only by a political elite. But this contradiction is quite understandable. Trotsky as a scholar was more a political scientist than a sociologist. He did not show a great deal of interest in the critical examination of the economic institutions of the Soviet system. He in fact assumed that the economic revolution was accomplished and that the Soviet system needed only a new political infrastructure. Later theorists were less restrained than Trotsky himself, and those trying to elaborate the sociological nature of the antagonism discovered by Trotsky became interested in the definition of the other class, the new dominating or ruling class of Soviet-type societies. All those who either followed Trotsky directly or were influenced by him described the bureaucracy as the new class. These theorists—Djilas is the most influential among them—used the classical Marxist tools of class analysis and defined the bureaucracy as an ownership class, arguing that under state socialism the bureaucrats monopolized the disposition of the means of production.

Undoubtedly we can learn more from Trotsky or from Djilas about the

11 Trotsky explicitly rejects attempts to define the Soviet bureaucracy as an ownership class. "The attempt to represent the Soviet bureaucracy as a class of 'state capitalists' will obviously not withstand criticism. The bureaucracy has neither stocks, nor bonds... The individual bureaucrat cannot transmit to his heirs his rights in the exploitation of state apparatus" (1972, pp. 249–50). But Trotsky very clearly sees that the bureaucracy which emerged in Stalinist Russia is a historically new phenomenon. "In its intermediary and regulating function, its concern to maintain social ranks, and its exploitation of the state apparatus for personal goals, the Soviet bureaucracy is similar to every bureaucracy, especially the fascist. But it is also in a vast way different. In no other regime has a bureaucracy achieved such a degree of independence from the dominating class.... The Soviet bureaucracy has risen above a class which is hardly emerging from destitution and darkness.... Whereas the fascists, when they find themselves in power, are united with the big bourgeoisie... the Soviet bureaucracy takes on bourgeois customs without having beside it a national bourgeoisie. In this sense it is something more than a bureaucracy" (pp. 248–49). He defines the bureaucracy as a "stratum" (p. 249), but this term certainly would not suit his aim of describing the parasitism (p. 250) of the bureaucracy, its bourgeois customs, etc.; therefore, he will often refer to a ruling Soviet caste (p. 253). In fact, in Trotsky the terms "ruling stratum" and "ruling caste" are used interchangeably. The Trotskyist concept of bureaucratic caste is a very insightful one, since it (unlike the concept of stratum) does emphasize the qualitatively new feature of the Soviet bureaucracy. However, the application of the concept to the Soviet bureaucracy does not seem to be very fortunate. Max Weber is very precise when he defines caste as a special case of "status groups" or "estates," as a position in traditional social structures. Weber is also persuasive when he suggests that caste differs from ordinary status order because caste is oriented religiously and ritually (1958, p. 44). None of these criteria seems to apply to the Soviet bureaucracy.

12 Djilas states: "The specific characteristic of this new class is its collective ownership" (1957, p. 54).
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real nature of social structure under state socialism than from the official Soviet Marxists or from the stratification theorists, but I have serious doubts—both theoretical and empirical—that the dominating class of state-socialist societies can be identified with the bureaucracy. The fundamental theoretical dilemma is whether the bureaucracy can be defined as an ownership class. Such a definition equates the right of disposition with ownership, which is more than questionable. It hardly requires textual proof that Marx himself clearly distinguished between ownership and disposition, and without this distinction it would be impossible to understand the bureaucratic and technocratic phenomena of capitalist society. If we define the socialist bureaucrat as a member of an ownership class because he has the right to dispose of the means of production, why not apply the same logic to modern capitalism and call the technobureaucracy found in the latter a new dominating class? In my understanding, the strength of Marxist class analysis is its emphasis on mediations. It is a powerful theory because it explains why those who formally exercise power act in the interest of a ruling class which may itself be less visible. If we equate ownership with the right of disposal, then we make the concept of ownership so abstract and general that it loses all its theoretical strength.

Furthermore, if we define the dominating class as those who dispose of the means of production, then we make an empirically unjustified distinction between the technobureaucracy and the rest of the intelligentsia. I do not want to repeat here the well-known arguments as to how difficult it is to determine accurately who in fact has the right to dispose of the means of production in a state-socialist society. It is well known how limited the rights of a factory manager are. Strictly speaking, any ownership class which could be defined in terms of a real monopoly of the right of disposal might be as exclusive as the Politburo, which would mean restricting the membership of the new class to 10–20 individuals—an obvious nonsense. But even if we treat these problems of operationalization generously, we would still have to explain why a minor bureaucrat in an economic ministry or in the Central Planning Office is a member of the dominating class and why an influential professor of economics is not.

One empirical difficulty connected with this crucial distinction between the bureaucracy and the intellectuals is created by the relatively fast circulation of the intellectual elite in Eastern Europe. The present director of one of the comedy theaters in Budapest is a former high-ranking officer of the political police. His former boss in the Hungarian equivalent of the KGB is today the manager of a big salami factory. Today one may be an officer in the political police, but tomorrow one might be the only person licensed to produce political jokes, or one might supervise salami production or sociological research, as a manager or an academic. The line between intellectuals and bureaucrats is a very shaky one in terms of personal
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career patterns. Many university graduates with academic ambitions enter the Party bureaucracy immediately after graduation, since they know that a few years in the Party bureaucracy is the most powerful recommendation to university chairs and other high academic positions. The intellectual elite circulates rapidly. It is stratified according to the levels of power rather than segmented into a bureaucracy/intellectuals dichotomy. It may well be more difficult to jump from the local level into the national power elite than to shift from the Academy of Science into the Central Committee of the Party or vice versa.

I would also argue that the bureaucratic class theory overemphasizes the power of bureaucrats and underestimates the impact of nonbureaucratic intellectuals on societal decision making. The bureaucrat in the Central Planning Office who allocates a few hundred million złoty or levas may not exercise a great deal of power, since the rules of the game are strictly set. However, those who have an impact on the formation of these rules, from the expert economics professor to the ideologically influential movie director or poet, may in fact have more power than the bureaucrat without having any right of disposal. Finally, I would like to add that from the point of view of material privilege it is practically impossible to distinguish between the technobureaucracy and the intelligentsia. Their living standards are practically identical. It is the level of power which stratifies them, not the bureaucracy/intellectuals dichotomy.

THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF CLASS ANTAGONISMS UNDER STATE SOCIALISM

I found that existing class and stratification theories do not explain the nature and dynamism of social conflicts and inequalities in state-socialist societies. Despite their diverging political and ideological overtones, they all espouse "formal Marxism." They define class relations as ownership relations. I will propose first that in state-socialist societies, which by definition have abolished the institution of private ownership, we have to go beyond this formal Marxism and beyond the analysis of ownership if we want to find the economic foundation of class antagonisms.

Marx himself undoubtedly explained class relations from facts about ownership, but Marxist theory was a reaction to capitalist society, and even Marxist methodology may need crucial modifications when applied to the substantive analysis of noncapitalist socioeconomic formations. Marx himself became increasingly aware of the limitations of his own methodology, whereby the structure of different modes of production was derived from ownership relations. Already in the Grundrisse he proved to be highly flexible when analyzing non-Western societies. He seriously considered the possibility that the institutions of the village community were as important
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for the understanding of Asiatic societies as the forms of relations of ownership, and it is clear from his later correspondence that he understood the significance of the obshchina in the Russian model of development.\(^\text{13}\) He started to differentiate between socioeconomic formations on the basis of criteria other than ownership. Generally speaking, I would argue that ownership played the crucial role it did in Marxist theory only because Marx developed his methodology in the course of his study of Western societies, where—already in the precapitalist stage of development—private ownership was the major socioeconomic institution around which social conflicts were structured. But this methodology will not explain much about the functioning of societies where private ownership does not exist and where we cannot find inherent forces which would lead to the development of private ownership. When Marx inclined to accept Vera Zasulich's proposition that in Russia socialism might emerge directly from the village community, he had to give serious thought to the possibility that societies might bypass the development of private ownership.\(^\text{14}\) Consequently, the history of mankind could not be explained simply in terms of how private ownership developed and why this institution would in the future cease to exist.

If this is true for non-European precapitalist formations, then the emphasis on ownership relations in the analysis of socialist societies is even more misleading. A formally applied orthodox Marxist methodology which assumes that socioeconomic antagonisms can emerge only from ownership relations loses all scientific strength and may well become pure apologetics when applied to state-socialist societies—societies which consciously abolished private ownership in the belief that this single historical act would generate the establishment of a nonantagonistic society. This may well explain how the most revolutionary theory of all time came to be a conservative state religion in all those countries which accept the ideological papacy of Moscow. Most contemporary Marxists try to solve this paradox

\(^{13}\) As Perry Anderson points out, in his early correspondence with Engels, Marx around 1853 assumed that a separate “Asiatic mode of production” should be identified (Anderson 1974, pp. 476–83) due to the domination of state ownership of the land under Asiatic feudalism. Later he changed his mind, and in the Grundrisse the “self-sustaining village community” seems to be the major variable which explains the existence of a separate “Asiatic mode of production” (Marx 1975b, pp. 66–70). In the light of Marx’s early correspondence with Engels and the analysis of the Grundrisse, it seems clear that Marx could not decide what sort of ownership existed in the East, and from this we might safely conclude that therefore ownership cannot be all that important to identify “modes of production.”

\(^{14}\) In 1881, in letters drafted to Zasulich, Marx goes so far as to suggest that “Russia is capable of developing and transforming the archaic form of its village community, instead of destroying it.” In these letters he clearly hesitates to decide whether the development of private ownership is an absolute necessity and if it would not be possible to maintain the “collective element” that he finds so attractive in the Russian communes. At the end he explicitly rejects a deterministic position and describes an alternative: “either the property element in it will overcome the collective element or the other way around” (1975b, pp. 142–45).
by questioning whether Soviet Marxism is "real" Marxism, but not even the most sophisticated talmudic argument could explain why orthodox Soviet ideologues claim to be Marxist, even though when they are weighed on the scales of real Marxism they are found wanting.

I would argue that Soviet ideologues chose and cling to Marxism because they found something in its orthodox teaching that suited them in their effort to build an apologetic ideology of state socialism, and this is precisely the assumption that class antagonism can emerge only from conflicts related to ownership. Consequently, if we want to develop a critical theory of any of the phenomena of state-socialist societies, we have first to fight the myth of the all-importance of ownership and develop a substantive understanding of the economic institutions and mechanisms of such societies. The last half-century has proved that Marx let himself be misled by his own methodology. He attached exaggerated hopes to the abolition of private ownership, and he failed to foresee that the new society would create its own mechanisms of economic exploitation and political oppression, that the abolition of the class power of the bourgeoisie would lead to the emergence of a new, similarly alienated, and politically—at least for the time being—even more oppressive class power. But if this is indeed a new class power and not merely the political totalitarianism of a ruling elite, then we should be able to find its roots in specific state-socialist economic institutions, and obviously in something other than the state ownership of the means of production. In this way we might be able to go beyond the formal analysis of ownership relations but still stay within the general framework of a historical materialist perspective.

In attempting to broaden the frame of reference of class analysis sufficiently to make it applicable to state-socialist societies, I would suggest that the purpose of class analysis is to explain rationalized forms of economic exploitation and the forms of political and social oppression built on these. When Marx and Engels developed their theory of the class dichotomy of capitalist society, they were first of all interested in the capitalist system of economic exploitation to be found in the institutions and mechanisms which guaranteed the expropriation of surplus from the direct producer by the owner of capital. The crucial task of class analysis is, then, to understand the institutions of expropriation of surplus; and if around these institutions an antagonism of interests is to be found, then one may be justified in talking about class relations. Furthermore, I would argue that Marx defined his classes on the basis of ownership relations because in a capitalist market economy it was the private ownership of the means of production which legitimated expropriation. Following this logic, I suggest that to test whether class analysis is applicable to state-socialist societies at all, we first have to understand the state-socialist institutions of expropriation of surplus and define the principles which legitimate expropriation under state socialism.
Then we need to find out whether the direct producer is in a position to challenge this system of legitimation and whether his interests are systematically in conflict with those who expropriate or who legitimate the state-socialist form of expropriation.

State-socialist societies developed and legitimated institutions of expropriation which are specifically state socialist, which are not known in other socioeconomic formations—and these are the institutions of state-socialist rational redistribution. In a recently published paper on the social inequalities engendered by state-socialist redistributive economies (Szelenyi 1978), I tried to contrast the redistributive institutions of state-socialist societies with mechanisms of redistribution of real income in welfare capitalism. I do not want to, and due to the limitations of space I cannot, repeat the arguments developed there. Here I merely want to emphasize that, despite the increasing role of redistributive mechanisms in contemporary welfare capitalism, modern capitalist economies can still be distinguished as "late market economies" from "state-socialist redistributive economies." The redistributive intervention of the welfare state did not overrule the market logic of the economy in any of the contemporary Western capitalist societies. In all these societies the state only redistributes incomes. The incomes themselves are defined on the market. Furthermore, the economic surplus that can be used for extended reproduction is not allocated by the welfare redistributors; the key investment decisions are made according to the logic of profit maximization by the owners of capital or their representatives. Under welfare capitalism the basic class division is still, therefore, the division between the capitalist (who disposes of the surplus available for investments) and the wage laborer or direct producer. The welfare redistributor plays only a mediating role in this basic class dichotomy. In state-socialist societies redistribution is not limited to the reallocation of incomes: under state socialism it is the very surplus which is redistributed. If the main task of the redistributor is to allocate surplus, then this redistributor does not mediate between the owner of capital and the seller of labor power; he replaces the owner of capital. While contemporary welfare capitalism is a market economy modified by welfare-oriented income redistribution, state socialism is a redistributive economy. It is a new type of economy. While contemporary capitalism still can be characterized by the class dichotomy between capital owners and wage laborers, contemporary state socialism might be characterized by the antagonism between redistributors and direct producers. I claim that this analysis is a quite consistent adaptation of the Marxian methodology: the basic class distinction is established around the processes of production and expropriation and the allocation of surplus, around the key relations of production.\(^{15}\)

\(^{15}\) My distinction between "contemporary welfare capitalism" and "state-socialist redistributive economies" is a distinction between two ideal types. I am aware that empiri-
If we define a new dominant class according to its relation to the institutions of redistribution in a state-socialist society, don’t we necessarily agree with Djilas or with Dahrendorf? If the new dominant class is constituted by the institution of redistribution of surplus, is it not identical with the bureaucracy which makes the actual planning decisions? If the new class is constituted on redistributive power, don’t we agree with Dahrendorf that in modern economies economic class is replaced by political power?\textsuperscript{16}

It is central to my analysis that the new dominant class is neither bureaucratic in the precise Weberian sense of the term nor based on political power, as Dahrendorf suggested. The class which is organized around redistributive power is far from being bureaucratic, at least if we use the term “bureaucratic” in a precise Weberian sense. Both Weber and Marx\textsuperscript{17}

\begin{itemize}
\item According to Dahrendorf, “From the point of view of social structure of industrial enterprises, this means a significant change in the basis of legitimacy of entrepreneurial authority. . . . The old style capitalist exercised authority because he owned the instruments of production. By contrast to this legitimation by property, the authority of the manager resembles in many ways that of the heads of political institutions. . . . The right of the manager to command and expect obedience accrues in part from the property rights delegated to him. . . . But besides these . . . the manager . . . has to seek a second, and often more important, basis of legitimacy for his authority, namely, some kind of consensus among those who are bound to obey his commands. . . . The manager, unlike the ‘full capitalist,’ can ill afford to exercise his authority in direct and deliberate contravention to the wishes and interests of his subordinates” (1959, pp. 44–45). Dahrendorf here suggests that even in the case of the industrial manager it is political power which constitutes class position—economic power based on ownership is replaced by political power based on consensus. My analysis is rather different. I suggest that economic power based on ownership is replaced by economic power based on the teleological knowledge of the redistributor.
\item Despite the fundamental differences in the Marxian and Weberian theories of bureaucracy, Marx and Weber both emphasize the executive nature of bureaucratic power and its dependence on modern capitalism and civil society. Probably the fullest and most interesting discussion of the bureaucracy by Marx can be found in his “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law.” Here Marx attempts to prove that Hegel is wrong in assuming that the bureaucracy is a “universal class.” For Marx the basic classes are formed within civil society and the political state. The state bureaucracy is far from being the universal class; the state is not above civil society. In the light of this analysis the state bureaucracy rather appears as the executive arm of the bourgeoisie (Marx 1975a). From this analysis of Marx it follows that it is in fact quite problematic for Marxists whether a bureaucracy can exist under socialism, when civil society and, more specifically, the class antagonism of the bourgeoisie and proletariat have been abolished. For Weber bureaucratic domination is the purest type of legal authority. Of course, Weber does not think that the bureaucracy is an executive arm of the bourgeoisie, but he
\end{itemize}
would agree that bureaucracy—at least in its pure form—is the product of civil society. Civil society is integrated by formal rationality; it is the first societal formation which separates ends and means, the telos and techne, and subordinates telos to techne.\textsuperscript{18} Civil society emerged when the rationality of goal setting, or teleological thinking, was questioned, and rationality was more narrowly defined as the "optimal choice of means leading to a given end." Marx with critical and Weber with apologetic overtones state that in civil society goal setting is referred to the "irrational," to the sphere of beliefs, to bourgeois politics. In civil society a separate sphere of politics exists, where goal setting is ideally done in a pluralistic political system and executive functions are reserved for bureaucratic organizations. When Weber defined bureaucratic power he identified it with executive tasks, and he believed that it was rooted in the expert knowledge of the bureaucrat. Weber strongly believed that experts are unable to tell people what they ought to do, that they can only tell them how to reach goals they have selected for themselves according to criteria not susceptible to judgment in terms of "rationality." For societal analysis this means that bureaucracy only executes goals set by a separate political mechanism. Bureaucrats will always try to extend their power. They will claim that goal-setting functions are basically technicalities; that the only possible course of action is the one that they predict with their "scientific methods"; and that, since no alternatives are open, no political decision is required or possible. But even the finds formalism or formal rationality the most crucial criterion of rational bureaucracy. The bureaucracy for Weber is efficient as long as it operates within formal rationality, as long as it uses technical knowledge, as long as it does not have to set goals but can execute goals set by a separate political mechanism. Weber is quite aware that the socialist project intends to transcend bourgeois formal rationality, and he very clearly sees the explosive contradiction between the substantive rationality socialism represents and the formal rationality of legal authority and bureaucratic domination. "For socialism would . . . require a still higher degree of formal bureaucratization than capitalism. If this should prove not to be possible, it would demonstrate the existence of another of those fundamental elements of irrationality—a conflict between formal and substantive rationality of the sort which sociology so often encounters" (Weber 1978, pp. 217–26, esp. p. 225). See also, about Marx's theory of the bureaucracy, Perez-Diaz (1978, esp. pp. 10–11).

\textsuperscript{18} In the work of Marx the critique of bourgeois rationality, the critique of capitalism as the system in which techne dominates telos, is implicit. Marx did not develop any systematic theory of rationality, and this is only implied in his critique of political economy. The problematic of the relationship between telos and techne, teleological and technical rationality, will mostly appear only as the subordination of use value to exchange value, as the subordination of human need to profit interests, as the problem of production for profit rather than for the satisfaction of human needs. It is the Frankfurt School which develops the Marxist critique of capitalism as a critique of technical or instrumental rationality, as a critique of rationality which accepts the domination of telos by techne. This type of critical Marxism finds its roots in the early works of Horkheimer and Adorno (Horkheimer 1978; see also Connerton 1976, esp. pp. 27–28; Arato and Gebhardt 1978, esp. pp. 8–12) and is later more fully developed in Habermas (see esp. Habermas 1974, pp. 195–252, 268–76; also see Habermas 1970).
most power-hungry bureaucrat operates within the framework set by the
civil society. He can claim power only on the basis of his expert knowledge.
He cannot claim to have the scientific, rational knowledge to set goals. I
would argue that redistributive power under state socialism is basically of a
different nature. It is not based on "expert knowledge." It is not based on
the assumption that goal setting is something irrational and that only the
choice of means can be considered as, properly speaking, rational activity.
The bureaucrat of civil society has to operate in the sphere of "formal
rationality." The redistributor of state socialism claims to operate within
the framework of "substantive rationality" (to use again Weber's termi-
nology). He claims a monopoly of rational choice among goals. He claims
a monopoly of technical knowledge. Thus the orthodox Soviet Marxist
view that under socialism bureaucracy does not exist makes sense in a way.
The teleological redistributor is of a different social nature from Weber's
bureaucrat. The Weberian bureaucrat's claim to power does not challenge
the fundamental power structure of civil society based on private owner-
ship; the bureaucrat may have certain particularistic interests, but he
cannot strive for his own class power. Bureaucratic power, properly defined,
can exist only in a world where techne dominates telos, in a world which is
split into economy and politics, means and ends, subject and object; and
this is the world of market capitalism, the world of private ownership,
which is basically structured into a class dichotomy between owners and
nonowners. Under these circumstances the bureaucrat of civil society will
mediate conflicts between the basic classes, but his main interest is in the
maintenance of the status quo of class relations, since by challenging it he
would undermine the very basis of his existence.

The Marxist ideal of socialism is an attack not only on capitalism narrowly

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19 It is interesting to note that Weber does not develop his distinction between formal
and substantive rationality in his general theory of types of rationalities, but only in his
sociology of economic systems (1978, pp. 85-113). The need to develop the concept of
substantive rationality arises for Weber when he begins to analyze the problems of
planning and especially planning under socialist economies. When I am using the term
"substantive rationality" to describe the specific nature of knowledge of the "teleological
redistributors" I follow closely Weber's own logic. As Weber states, "Where a planned
economy is radically carried out, it must further accept the inevitable reduction in formal,
calculatory rationality. . . . Substantive and formal . . . rationality are . . . after all
largely distinct problems. This fundamental and, in the last analysis, unavoidable ele-
ment of irrationality in economic systems is one of the important sources of all 'social'
problems, and above all, of the problems of socialism" (p. 111). This quotation, together
with the one from n. 17 above, allows us to conclude that, since formal rationality is the
rationality of the bureaucrat, the teleological redistributor and planning guided by
substantive rationality do not fit the Weberian ideal type of bureaucracy.

20 For Marx it is obvious that the bureaucracy does not represent such a separate set of
interests which would allow us to define the bureaucracy as a class. The bureaucracy
only expresses as general interests the particularistic interests of the dominant class, of
the bourgeoisie. What is peculiarly bureaucratic interest is nothing more than the trans-
formation of the particular interests into universal ones (1975a, pp. 44-48, esp. p. 46;
see also Perez-Diaz 1978, pp. 28-32).
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defined but also on the very principles on which civil society is built. All previous critical theorists criticized capitalism from the standpoint and values of civil society. Marx and Engels were the first to claim that the radical revolutionary transformation of the capitalist mode of production is impossible without the rejection of civil society and its values, without the rejection of bourgeois humanism and bourgeois democracy. The ideal society they proposed would reunite a world split into separate, alienated spheres of existence. It would be a society in which telos again dominated techne, a society ruled by substantive rationality. When I suggest that the intelligentsia is a class in statu nascendi in contemporary state socialism, what I am saying is that in this new society, which is the negation of civil society, the intellectuals attempt to monopolize this substantive rationality. And if they succeed in doing so the power they claim will be of a class nature, since it is based on the dominant principle of legitimation.

It would be wrong, on the other hand, to believe that this new class (and the new society) is the product of the Marxist ideal. On the contrary, it would be more realistic to say that intellectuals have used Marxist ideals in order to grasp class power. They had been unable to do this successfully in previous socioeconomic formations. Marx believed that his teachings would become a material force through the revolutionary praxis of the proletariat, but things happened otherwise. It was the Russian intelligentsia which realized the potential of Marxist ideology and transformed it into a powerful weapon of class struggle.

Neither was it accidental that this happened in Russia and that Russia’s example was followed first by other East European countries. The new society in which telos dominates techne emerged from societies where there existed an “intelligentsia” properly speaking, where intellectuals consciously articulated their aspirations to occupy a dominant position in the social structure.

In other words, state socialism and its new dominant class emerged in

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21 Marx formulates clearly that the purpose of his materialism is to transcend civil society in thesis 10 on Feuerbach: “The standpoint of the old materialism is ‘civil’ society; the standpoint of the new is human society or socialised humanity” (1972, p. 13). When Marx emphasizes that the standpoint of his new historical materialism is socialised humanity, he rejects the individualism of civil society, which is a clear indication that he does not limit his project to the critique of capitalism and its political economy but intends more: to develop a comprehensive critique of civil society too.

22 Gouldner does not believe that the proletariat came to power in the so-called socialist revolutions, or that it is likely for the proletariat ever to come to power: “The Communist Manifesto had held that the history of all hitherto existing society was the history of class struggles: freeman and slave, patrician and plebian, lord and serf, guildmaster and journeyman, and, then, bourgeoisie and proletariat. In this series, however, there was one unspoken regularity: the slaves did not succeed the masters, the plebians did not vanquish the patricians, the serfs did not overthrow the lords, and the journeymen did not triumph over the guildmasters. The lowliest class never came to power. Nor does it seem likely to now” (1979, p. 93).
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Eastern Europe because two sets of conditions met there. On the one hand, a redistributive economic system was created, and this system served as an objective base for class power rooted in the teleological knowledge of planners and redistributors. On the other hand, in this part of the world a new type of intellectual, the intelligentsia, developed prior to the socialist revolutionary transformation. This East European intelligentsia was distinguished from other types of intellectuals precisely by the importance it attached to the teleological component of its knowledge. In 1917 in Russia and following the Second World War in Eastern Europe, when the objective position of a new class was created with the abolition of private ownership and the creation of a centrally, “scientifically” planned economy, the “agents” to fill these positions—the intelligentsia—were also ready for their new historical task.

The central hypothesis of my analysis, therefore, is that the new class in Eastern European state socialism is broader than the bureaucracy: it is composed of all those who have a vested interest in the production and reproduction of a certain type of intellectual knowledge—teleological knowledge—which is legitimating redistributive power under socialist redistributive economies. The new dominant class is composed, therefore, of a type of intellectual, the intelligentsia.

In this paper I use the concept of intellectuals as a generic concept. Unlike Gouldner,23 I do not claim that all intellectuals in all modern societies are on the road to class power. My hypothesis is a more modest one. All that I suggest is that one type of intellectual, the intelligentsia, gains class power under state-socialist redistributive economies. I disagree with Gouldner concerning the possibilities of class formation of the other major modern type of intellectuals, the professionals. While Gouldner maintains that professionalism leads intellectuals into the new dominant class position,24 I propose that professionalism integrates intellectuals into the basic class structure of market capitalism. As long as intellectuals accept their

23 Gouldner, unlike most left-wing theorists of the new class (e.g., Djilas, Burnham, or Shachtman), does not exclude from the new class the “proper intellectuals”: ideologues, social scientists, etc. While left-wing theories mostly limit the new class to managers and/or technocrats and bureaucrats, Gouldner uses a broad concept which includes all intellectuals: “In all countries . . . in the twentieth century . . . a New Class composed of intellectuals and the technical intelligentsia . . . enter into contention with the groups already in control of the society’s economy, whether these are businessmen or party leaders” (1979, p. 1). I want to note here that Gouldner is using the concept “intelligentsia” rather differently than I do in this paper. I think my usage is closer to the conventional one (see Gella 1976, esp. pp. 9–27). It is also interesting that Gouldner, while using a broad definition of “intellectuals,” still excludes from this the Party leaders, but he never explains why he does that.

24 Gouldner believes that the vehicle by which the new class replaces the rule of money capital with the rule of “cultural capital” is professionalism: “Professionalism in effect devalues the authority of the old class” (1979, p. 19). I think Gouldner is wrong: professionalism, by emphasizing the significance of technical knowledge, does not represent any challenge to the ideological and cultural hegemony of the bourgeoisie.
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definition as professionals—what market capitalism offers them—they cannot claim class power of their own. They will remain only a semi-autonomous stratum—or, to use Erik Olin Wright’s more precise terminology, they will remain in a contradictory class location.25

At this stage I have to offer at least a working definition of the concepts of “intellectuals,” “professionals,” and “intelligentsia.”

I will follow Gouldner in defining intellectuals as those who are bound together by the “culture of critical discourse” (CCD).26 The CCD, according to Gouldner’s definition, is a “speech community”27 which has been developed since the Enlightenment by the modern “men of idea.” These modern men of idea, whom I will call intellectuals, within the CCD do gain monopoly of a kind of knowledge which has two main characteristics: it is secular (in Gouldner’s definition, it does not accept any authority but reason) and it is theoretical. The theoreticity of the knowledge intellectuals monopolize is sometimes also linked by Gouldner to its “context-variability.”28 The CCD is common to all modern intellectuals, under both market capitalism and state socialism. But in its historical evolution the CCD takes two different forms. Where modernization coincides with the development of market capitalism, the CCD leads to professionalization. Professionalism is the form of knowledge within the CCD in which the technical component, the know-how, dominates the teleological component. In those social-historical contexts where attempts to modernize do not coincide with market capitalism—already in prerevolutionary Eastern Europe and more so in this area after the socialist transformation—the teleological component of intellectual knowledge is not subordinated to technical know-how: intellectuals are not defined as professionals but, rather, as intelligentsia.

25 Erik Olin Wright introduced the concept of “contradictory class locations” to describe positions in the class structure that more conventional orthodox Marxists would call “strata.” According to Wright, “An alternative way of dealing with . . . ambiguities in the class structure is to regard some positions as occupying objectively contradictory locations within class relations. . . . (In a sense, of course, all class positions are ‘contradictory locations’ in that class relations are intrinsically antagonistic, contradictory social relations. The point is that certain positions in the class structure constitute doubly contradictory locations: they represent positions which are torn between the basic contradictory class relations of capitalist society. . . . I will for convenience simply refer to them as ‘contradictory class locations.’)” (1978, pp. 61–62).

26 Gouldner defines the culture of critical discourse this way: “The culture of critical discourse (CCD) is an historically evolved set of rules, a grammar of discourse, which (1) is concerned to justify its assertions, but (2) whose mode of justification does not proceed by invoking authorities, and (3) prefers to elicit the voluntary consent of those addressed solely on the basis of arguments adduced” (1979, p. 28).

27 Gouldner calls the CCD a “grammar of discourse” and therefore the new class of intellectuals is a “speech community” (1979, p. 28).

28 Gouldner uses the concept of context-variability to describe the CCD. “Here, good speech is speech that can make its own principles explicit and is oriented to conforming with them, rather than stressing context-sensitivity and context-variability. Good speech here thus has theoreticity” (1979, p. 28).
My basic typology therefore is the following:

- **Intellectuals**
  - those modern men of idea who are bound together by the CCD.
- **Professionals**
  - intellectuals under market capitalism in whose knowledge technical know-how dominates the teleological component.
- **Intelligentsia**
  - intellectuals who maintain the domination of the teleological component of knowledge above technical know-how, intellectuals in pre- and postrevolutionary Eastern Europe, in societies where modernization does not coincide with the development of civil society and market capitalism.

It is not accidental that most of the sociological and philosophical literature on intellectuals concerns Eastern Europe (publications on the Russian and Polish intelligentsia, particularly, dominate the field).\(^{29}\) I would attribute a symbolic importance to the fact that the very term “intelligentsia” is of Russian origin. Anglo-Saxon authors, when they had to go beyond the notion of “professionals,” needed to transliterate a Russian expression into English. Capitalism in England produced professionals. Eastern Europe, fluctuating between Asiatic and European feudalism, between feudalism and Western capitalism, between East European absolutism and civil society, gave birth to an intelligentsia. For a genuine empiricist (who is by definition a product of a “pure” civil society), trained in Anglo-Saxon pragmatism and positivism, the notion of an intelligentsia is an obscure, prescientific (or nonscientific) one. The scientific category is “professionals,” which includes a group of occupations: people with certain qualifications performing social and economic functions for which these qualifications are necessary. Professionals are people who have a monopoly of knowledge of how to choose means to reach already selected goals. They

\(^{29}\) Aleksander Gella emphasizes the uniqueness of the concept of intelligentsia for Eastern Europe: “While all other classes and strata of Eastern Europe have had their counterparts in the West, the intelligentsia, strictly speaking, did not” (1976, p. 10). He suggests that one should make a clear distinction between the concepts of intellectuals and intelligentsia (p. 11) and should locate the intelligentsia in the mid-19th-century East European context. Interestingly, he notes that the use of the term “intelligentsia” first occurs at almost the same time in Germany, Russia, and Poland (in 1849, 1846, and 1844, respectively) (p. 12).
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are experts whose services are bought by those who set the goals. Professionals are the product of civil society and of market capitalism. The very basis of their existence—like the basis of the existence of the bureaucracy—is the definition of "expert knowledge" as knowledge relating to means and a market demand for this knowledge from those who set goals.

The history of Western intellectuals is a continuous struggle against this definition. The best Western intellectuals never accepted this subordinate social role. They reserved their right to make judgments about the goals they were hired to execute. Among left-wing theorists, the belief prevailed that genuine intellectuals were more than professionals: they were social critics. But despite such reservations, most of those with rare intellectual skills were continuously "corrupted" by Western capitalism. High wages were offered for their executive skills, and they were increasingly allowed to wield bureaucratic power in compensation for their intellectual frustration.

This mass transformation of intellectuals into professionals simply did not occur in Eastern Europe. The numerical expansion of intellectuals from the 18th century onward was not followed by a similar increase in market demand for professionals. For many decades—in the late 18th and early 19th centuries—the intellectuals were in the vanguard of the fight for the Westernization of Eastern Europe, but by the mid-19th century, especially in Russia, Western professionalization looked less and less attractive to many of them. East European intellectuals increasingly realized the advantages of not being professionals. They defined themselves as intelligentsia, people with not only executive skills but also moral commitment and historical vision. This late 19th-century East European intelligentsia was open to ideologies which projected new "teleological societies," societies ruled by substantive rationality. The East European intelligentsia was ready to bypass Western professionalization, which had proved a historical dead end for intellectuals in their long march to power. It was ready for the Bolshevik call to form a historical vanguard to lead the revolutionary transformation of society and create a new rational order based on the principles of scientific socialism. The Leninist emphasis on superrationality in organization, the fight against any form of anarchism and spontaneity, the skepticism concerning bourgeois electoralism as a legitimate way to choose among alternatives, appealed not only to those who shared Bolshevik values but to all intellectuals who believed they knew how a rational society should be organized. Lenin argued on the eve of the October Revolution that the Bolsheviks were ready to take power, not because they could count on the support of the majority of the population, but because they

30 Paul Baran (1961) makes a crucial distinction between "mental workers" and "intellectuals" which is typical of most left-wing ideologues. For Baran, to be an intellectual means to be a "social critic." Those who fall short on this criterion—however competent they might be in their professions—can only be defined as "mental workers."
had enough cadres to fill all major decision-making positions. What the new society needed first of all was cadres armed with the tools of scientific socialism, cadres with teleological knowledge, to lead society and to run the state-socialist redistributive economy.

It should be clear from this short and necessarily superficial argument that the class which is organized around the position of teleological redistributor stretches beyond those who make the immediate redistributive decisions. It is integrated by the ethos of state-socialist rational redistribution, and it includes all those who claim power—not only economic power but, for example, cultural or administrative power—on the basis of their monopoly of teleological knowledge. It potentially integrates the whole intelligentsia into a dominating class. The main thrust of this analysis is the rejection of the bureaucratic class concept, but without the acceptance of Dahrendorf's proposition that in modern societies economic class power is being replaced by political class power. The intelligentsia's claims under state socialism are legitimated in the same way as is the expropriation of surplus. The class power of the intelligentsia stretches beyond the economic sphere, but its foundations are in the basic institutions which guarantee social reproduction in state-socialist societies. Critics of Dahrendorf rightly point out that he is basically rejecting class analysis. He calls the political elite a class and argues that classes proper—that is, classes emerging from economic antagonisms—no longer exist. When I suggest that the intelligentsia is in the process of becoming a class, I am not describing the political or bureaucratic elite of state socialism; I am using a broad, economically based category.

Here I have to acknowledge one major theoretical problem all attempts—including mine—which try to offer a class analysis of state socialism are

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31 Lenin, in September 1917, when he tried to convince his fellow Bolsheviks that the Party was ready to take state power, clearly indicated that for such a move the Party does not need the vote of the majority of the population, or even that of the working class. The Party will be ready to govern as soon as it can produce enough cadres to rule. In Lenin's own words, "The proletariat, we are told, will not be able to set the state apparatus in motion. Since the 1905 revolution, Russia has been governed by 130,000 landowners. . . . Yet we are told that the 240,000 members of the Bolshevik Party will not be able to govern Russia. . . . These 240,000 are already backed by no less than a million votes. . . . We therefore already have a 'state apparatus' of one million people devoted to the socialist state . . . " (1970, p. 413).

32 Giddens claims that Dahrendorf does not actually reformulate the concept of class, but replaces class with authority. "Indeed, Dahrendorf might be accused of escaping from the issues involved by the same sort of terminological speciousness of which he accuses Marx: 'for while private property may disappear (empirical hypothesis), this can have no possible bearing upon the existence or disappearance of classes (trick of definition).' In attempting to reformulate the concept of class, Dahrendorf throws out the baby with the bath water . . . by substituting 'authority' for 'class.' We already possess in sociology a reasonably adequate conceptual framework with which to analyse systems of authority, and there is little purpose served in confusing this with the terminology of 'class' " (1973, pp. 74-75).
confronted with. When I suggest that those who rule in Eastern Europe are not members of an elite constituted by political power, but that they form a class which is based in the system of economic reproduction, I have to justify why the concept of class is applicable to socioeconomic systems like state socialism where the separation of political and economic instances is much more limited than under market capitalism. Most class theorists would agree that the concept of class is applicable only in social-historical contexts where the political and economic instances are separated.33

I would try to defend my position and the applicability of the concept of class for contemporary Eastern Europe by claiming that under state socialism at least a relative separation of the "economic" from the "political" can be observed. Historically speaking, with the consolidation of the new socialist economic and social system this separation in fact increased. Following the revolutions the "political instance" seems to have a "primacy." This will later be criticized as "Stalinist voluntarism" in economic policy. With post-Stalinist "liberalization" this primacy of the political is reduced, and the need for scientific planning is emphasized. The "making of the new dominant class" of state socialism can be understood only in the historical process of this relative separation of the economic from the political. In the very first stage of state socialism those who rule do not yet appear as a class. The ruling Party and state apparatus appear to be constituted outside the economic system, constituted simply by coercive political power. (In this perspective the concept of "caste" of Trotsky is imprecise, but insightful.) We can understand only in the light of the later development that the main historic function of this Party and state apparatus is to facilitate the emergence of the new dominant class of intelligentsia as soon as the old social system is defeated politically and a relative separation of the economic instance becomes possible again. In this perspective the Party and state apparatus, which in the early stages of socialist develop-

33 Bauman, in the most original analysis, suggested that state socialism produced a new system of authority which he, with a sense of humor, calls "partynominal authority" (1974, p. 136). He suggested that this partynominal authority is different from legal authority since it is "intimately attached to Wertrationalitat" (p. 136). From this it follows that under partynominal authority neither the concept of "class" nor the notion of "bureaucracy" is applicable; both class and bureaucratic relations assume legal authority and "Zweckrationalitat." Bauman proposes the concept of "officialdom" to describe the distribution of power under partynominal authority. The notion of officialdom is a very insightful one and an interesting candidate to replace class for the analysis of the social structure in state-socialist societies. Balint Balla offered an analysis similar in many respects to that of Bauman. Balla documented in great detail why the Weberian concept of bureaucracy is inapplicable to Soviet-type societies, and he proposed the notion of "Kaderverwaltung" (administration by cadres) to describe the system of domination of state socialism (1972, esp. pp. 47–62, 173–204). One ought to consider the need, following the analyses of Bauman and Balla, to try to develop a completely new terminology to describe structural positions under state socialism. For some sociologists this might be a more attractive attempt than my analysis which, more modestly, tries only to reinterpret the concept of class for state-socialist conditions.
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ment appears as a bureaucratic elite, caste, or—to put it probably more precisely—estate, is actually a sort of vanguard of the new dominant class, the intelligentsia. This function of the early Party and state apparatus is obscured by the fact that the political history of state socialism can be described in terms of political struggles between the Party and state apparatus, which is constituted by the primacy of the political instance, and the technocratic and liberal and ideological intelligentsia, which represents the interest of the relative separation of the economic from the political.

The making of the new dominant class of intelligentsia is therefore identical with the historical process of relative separation of the economic from the political, the relative decline of the primacy of the political. From this proposition it follows that what Dahrendorf supposed to happen—namely, the replacement of "economic class power" by "political class power"—did not occur even under state socialism. A new dominant class emerged under state socialism only to the extent to which economic power can be conceived as relatively autonomous. The economic class was not replaced by a political class. However, Dahrendorf's analysis still offers insights for the understanding of social structures under state socialism. It is true that the separation of the economic and political instances declines with the transition from capitalism into state socialism. In this sense I would like to acknowledge that "class" under state socialism is a somewhat different concept than under market capitalism. While under capitalism class appears as economic class, under state socialism the classes which are formed probably should be called political-economic classes to acknowledge that, besides economic factors, political forces also play a role in constituting them.

The empirical and historical analysis of the complex interplay of political and economic forces in constituting the new class is important to explain the internal differentiation and dynamics of the new dominant class of the intelligentsia. It ought to be clear from the above analysis that I do not try to describe the new dominant class as a homogeneous one. The main fractions within the new class probably could be defined by the relative importance of political power in constituting them. The Party apparatus, more clearly constituted by political power, is a distinct fraction of the new class. The Party apparatus is in conflict—both historically and in contemporary struggles—with the planning-technocratic intelligentsia, which is more clearly constituted by the economic system. Most of political history is the struggle of the planning-technocratic intelligentsia (often articulated by their ideologues, the "liberal intellectuals") for economic reforms. On the surface it appears that the history of state socialism can be described as the struggle of liberal intellectuals against the Party apparatus. These conflicts between Party apparatus and rational planners and their liberal ideologues are real but not basic. The liberal, planning-technocratic
Intelligentsia gradually shares power with the Party apparatchik intelligentsia. The major economic antagonism is not between liberal intellectuals and the Party bureaucrats, but between the two classes, between the intelligentsia and the working class.

As was suggested earlier, if a class dichotomy exists in society, it must be rooted in the antagonism of interests with respect to the institutions which guarantee expropriation in the economic system. This antagonism under state socialism can be described in terms of conflicts between redistributive power and the interests of the direct producers—the antagonism on which the class dichotomy between the intelligentsia and the working class is based.

But does such an antagonism in fact exist? Is there a structural conflict of interest between the direct producer and the teleological redistributor? I would argue that such an antagonism does in fact exist and that the working class has an alternative system of legitimation. The dominating power under state socialism is challenged in a de facto way from time to time by attempts at self-determination by the working class, by the steadily re-emerging vision of self-managing socialism as an alternative to state-socialist redistributive economy. Yugoslavia, with her highly questionable claim to be the only country which has realized "self-managing socialism," is only one instance, but it can be shown that in political crises spontaneous working-class movements emerge unexpectedly, attempting to bring the economy more directly under workers' control. (Probably the classic example is the workers' councils formed in 1956 in Hungary without intellectuals or ideologues, on the initiative of the workers and under workers' control, but similar developments occurred in Czechoslovakia around 1968 and in Poland more recently.) These two alternative conceptions of socialism are already present in the classical theories.

Marx and Engels originally emphasized only that socialism would be that form of social organization which abolished the institution of private ownership, without specifying what the economic institutions of socialist society would look like. But later Engels, in particular, tried to define the *differentia specifica* of socialism as the self-determination of direct producers. The

34 Even the classics of Marxism seem to operate with different "models of socialism"; they seem to present different views of what constitutes the essence of a revolutionary socialist transformation of capitalism. In the "Communist Manifesto," Marx and Engels seem to assume that the socialist transformation is identical with the abolition of private ownership and the introduction of state ownership of the means of production—or, in more contemporary terminology, they see the essence of socialism in "nationalization of the means of production." Marx and Engels clearly state in the "Communist Manifesto": "The theory of Communists may be summed up in a single sentence: abolition of private property" (Marx and Engels 1970, p. 47). Then they add, "The proletariat will use its political supremacy . . . to centralise all instruments of production in the hands of the State . . . " (p. 52). But in other works the emphasis is on the socialization rather than simply on the nationalization of the means of production. Engels, in "Socialism: Utopian and Scientific," written more than four decades after the manifesto, strongly argues that
Bolshevik fixation on discipline and order subsequently omitted all content from this concept and transformed it into a pure slogan, a pure ideology of state-socialist redistribution which served to deprive the working class of all power and to make workers far more powerless than workers in a capitalist factory or in a capitalist economy at large.

A socialist counterethos based on the principle of self-determination of the direct producer is highly underdeveloped and unarticulated and in fact is more evident in spontaneous opposition movements by the workers of Eastern Europe than in codified ideologies. I would argue that one reason for the underdeveloped nature of this alternative vision of socialism is the class nature of the intelligentsia under state socialism.

The emergence of "organic intellectuals" of the working class, intellectuals who articulate working-class interests from within the ranks of a class in statu nascendi, is far less likely here than it is under capitalist conditions where intellectuals, after all, do not occupy a major position of their own in the class structure, but are by definition between classes. Furthermore, I am inclined to believe that the counterethos of self-determination will remain in the long run only an opposition ideology in Eastern Europe. It cannot replace the ethos of rational redistribution, only continuously challenge it, at most limiting redistributive power slightly and forcing redistributors to consider more seriously the interests of the direct producer. It is difficult to imagine a modern noncapitalist industrial society without strong redistributive mechanisms. A certain degree of expropriation from the direct producer may be unavoidable, and I have little doubt that if an opposition movement based on the ideology of self-management succeeded in coming to power its leaders would still have to exercise a certain degree of redistributive power. When in August 1980 the Polish working class won major concessions, Lech Wałęsa, the chief negotiator of Solidarity, summed up the working-class victory this way: From now on we are co-owners. This is possibly the most realistic formulation of the challenge which the direct producer can pose to the teleological redistributor. What Wałęsa put forward was not a program to "abolish" teleological redistribution or central planning. In a sense, Wałęsa proposed a sharing of powers between two "owners," the acceptance of two principles of legitimation, the establishment of a dual power system. Realistically, it might be very difficult to go much beyond this; it might not be possible to imagine a society based only on the "immediate power of the direct producer" in an anarchosyndicalist fashion. Nonetheless, spontaneous working-class move-

"state ownership does not do away with the capitalistic nature of the productive forces" (1970, p. 422). Here Engels emphasized that the criterion of socialist transformation is the replacement of the capitalist mode of appropriation with a "direct social appropriation" (p. 423). This is more than a terminological difference. Two different visions of socialism (one based on state ownership, the other based on the principle of direct power of the immediate producer) find their roots here.
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ments toward self-determination and workers' control and intellectual attempts to develop a counterideology based on the principles of self-management are highly important; they challenge the dominating ethos, and they represent forces which might transform contemporary socialist societies into articulated conflict systems. If we understand working-class interest in terms of a class hostility to redistributive power, then it becomes clear that self-determination is something qualitatively different from decentralization of administration, an easily acceptable concept for any teleological redistributor. The requirements of decentralization of administration, a central theme in most socioeconomic reforms in Eastern Europe during the last two decades, correspond to the spirit of redistributive power. Struggles between decentralization and centralization reflect conflicts between different levels of redistributive power. Real movement toward self-determination can only occur with the development of the countervailing power of the direct producer, a power which could force redistributive power into compromises. Decentralization in itself is only the delegation of power to lower echelons of the power structure and does not affect the relationship between the powerful and the powerless. (Probably Yugoslavia—at least if we can believe its internal left-wing critics—is merely a more decentralized version of the state socialism found in other East European countries.)

The purpose of the arguments above is to show that it may be meaningful to assume that a crucial structural antagonism exists within state-socialist redistributive economies between the class which is organized around the redistributor and the class which is to be found in the position of direct producer. It is to be hoped that any existing lack of theoretical sophistication and empirical documentation will only serve to stimulate both theoretical and empirical work in this direction, which may well be of crucial importance for the further development of socialist theory.

THE DOMINANT CLASS OF STATE SOCIALISM IN STATU NASCENDI

The intelligentsia is on its way to becoming the dominant class of East European state-socialist societies, but we are still only at the beginning of an obviously long historical process. Consequently, if we call the intelligentsia a class, we should be aware of a number of limitations in the use of this concept for the analysis of contemporary East European societies. The intelligentsia in many respects forms a different kind of class from the bourgeoisie, and it is not clear that all the connotations attached to the notion of a dominant class will ever be applicable to the intellectuals. First of all, the intelligentsia not only is not an ownership class; it is not an inheritance class either. Despite the laborite reform of inheritance laws which has taken place in countries ruled by social democratic parties for decades, the bourgeoisie is still an inheritance class: bourgeois wealth and,
to a large extent, power are passed from one generation to the next. No doubt from a purely political economic point of view this does not make a great deal of difference: the class power of the bourgeoisie is based on its right to expropriate surplus. With the legitimation of private ownership of the means of production, the roots of class conflict lie in the antagonism between capital and labor. In other words, if a social democratic party ever succeeded in abolishing inheritance of the means of the production, this ideal capitalism would still be capitalism as long as private ownership entitled anyone to expropriate surplus. What really matters is the nature of exploitation. On the other hand, it would be foolish to deny that inheritance is very important when it comes to judgments about the morality of capitalism. Societies which limit the inheritance of wealth and power are perceived to be "better" than those which do not do so. The East European intelligentsia, at least at present, is a noninheritance class. The intellectuals are unable to pass their power position to their children. This is especially true at the highest echelons of power. At these highest echelons of power "socialist nepotism" is not unheard of, but it is relatively infrequent. (Interesting exceptions are Rumania and North Korea.) The intelligentsia is also a fairly open class. It receives new members from the "dominated class." You do not have to be the son or daughter of an intellectual to enter the class. It is possible to argue, on the other hand, that the intelligentsia is slowly losing its open character. A significant proportion of university graduates in Eastern Europe are still from nonintellectual backgrounds, but the proportion is steadily declining.\footnote{According to Zsuzsa Ferge, the proportion of children of whom at least one parent is a manual worker in institutions of tertiary education increased dramatically with the socialist transformation. This proportion increased in Hungary from 3.5% in 1938 to 48.5% in 1950. Over the next 20 years this proportion declined, to 37.1% by 1970 (1979, p. 145). Hungary does not seem to be atypical of Eastern Europe; see Walter D. Conner's quite similar data on the USSR and Poland (1979, pp. 177-214, esp. p. 206).} It is also possible to argue that this open character was always a relative one. The intelligentsia received new members, but only very rarely did these intellectuals let their own sons or daughters leave the dominant class. In other words, upward mobility into the intelligentsia is high, but downward mobility is quite insignificant, and even if crucial positions are not transferred along family lines, those who are born into the families of the powerful are significantly privileged. They usually start their careers in higher positions, and they climb the ladders of power faster. As state socialism matures, the inheritance of wealth also plays a more important role than formerly. Even if it is incomparable with inheritance in capitalist society, the inheritance of flats, dachas, cars, and so forth is clearly and increasingly a privilege. Finally, one could argue that the open character of the dominant class was only a temporary phenomenon and that any new and numerically expanding dominant class is "open." There are simply not enough sons and daughters to occupy the new positions.
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In fact, even if the *numerus clausus* had not operated and all children of the intelligentsia had been admitted straight into the university, enough places would still have remained for the children of blue-collar families simply because the university population expanded so rapidly. (I think few children of the intelligentsia were kept out in the long run. The *numerus clausus* guaranteeing a certain proportion of non-white-collar children at the universities usually placed children of intellectuals on a waiting list. After one or two years all who really wanted to enter the university could do so.) But despite all this evidence we should acknowledge that the intelligentsia, compared with the bourgeoisie, is basically a noninheritance class and that this may be significant for those who wish to make moral judgments concerning its rise to power.

Furthermore, the intelligentsia is not a "selfish" class. It does not expropriate surplus in order to consume it. The selfishness of the bourgeoisie, the conspicuous consumption of the leisure class, the extent of inequality in terms of consumed and personally possessed material goods, are important criteria in moral judgments of capitalism. Theoretically, selfishness is not a crucial criterion; the dominant class can be ascetic—and in fact, if we can believe Benjamin Franklin, the bourgeoisie has been highly ascetic in the past. It is also important to remind ourselves that in modern capitalism, with progressive taxation, absentee ownership, and so forth, most of the surplus is not consumed by the owners of capital. It is reinvested or allocated through the state budget. We could imagine an egalitarian capitalism, with ascetic capitalists who only expropriate in order to reinvest, which would not be less capitalistic as long as the exploitation was of a capitalist nature. We also should not overemphasize the unselfishness of the East European intelligentsia. There is a significant degree of inequality between the intellectuals and the working class. Wage differentials in Eastern Europe between a university professor and a plumber or taxi driver are frighteningly similar to those in a Western welfare society. Eastern Europe is only more equal in terms of the extremes—it does not know the extreme rich and does not allow the existence of the extreme poor—but the gap of inequality for the overwhelming majority is nonetheless significant, and it follows in direction the class distinction between intellectuals and workers.

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36 Reliable data from Eastern Europe are not easily available. To the best of my knowledge, Zsuzsa Ferge offers the most reliable and comprehensive data for Hungary. According to her figures (based on investigations carried out in the mid 1960s), in Hungary the top 20% of the income earners earned 36.2% of the total income, the top 5% earned 11.8%. Comparable figures for a group of countries composed of the United States, Sweden, and Denmark were, according to Ferge, 42.7% and 16.4% (1979, p. 169).

37 According to Ferge, in Hungarian state-owned firms in 1975 the ratio of total monthly income of top management to the income of workers was 2.5:1. The same ratio for middle-level management was 1.5:1. She also claims that the ratio is steadily declining. For the top management the above ratio in 1968 was 3.0:1; in other words, she reports a decline of almost 20% over less than 10 years (1979, p. 180).
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The intelligentsia, furthermore, is privileged not only in terms of income distribution. For example, the intellectuals have a better chance of getting a highly subsidized state flat; they fill trade union vacation homes during peak seasons; they are the only people who have access to the well-equipped Party hospitals and who can shop in the tax-free hard currency shops. Wherever the analyst looks in the East European redistributive economy he will find the intellectuals in a privileged situation, even in those spheres where, in a capitalist welfare state, socialist policy counteracts inequalities. 38

But it is still true that intellectuals not only cannot pass on to their children the surplus which is expropriated under their power, but they are by and large unable to use it for their personal purposes. A capitalist, despite trade union and state control, even today can commit economic suicide, can overconsume and underinvest, but the redistributor of state socialism does not own the surplus which flows through his hands. He only administers it. However, it is crucial to emphasize that this unselfishness of the intelligentsia is only true in terms of material goods, not in terms of power. The chances for the redistributor to increase his personal wealth are very limited, but he is not only permitted but also structurally motivated to maximize his redistributive power. If the law of capitalism consists in the striving for more profit, the law of state socialism consists in the striving for the maximization of redistributive power, and from this point of view the teleological redistributor—with, of course, evangelistic zeal—will be as ruthless as any capitalist could ever be.

Furthermore, the East European intelligentsia, at least at present, is only a "class in itself"—it has not developed a class consciousness.

One could argue that, at least according to orthodox Marxist class theory, "class" does not have a sociological meaning without class consciousness. Class, properly speaking, is always "class for itself." The East European intelligentsia is obviously not a class in this sense. Not only does it not recognize the class nature of its own power, but it promotes the ideology of classlessness and consensus and, even more paradoxically, claims that the power exercised by the intellectuals is in fact the power of the proletariat. The revolutionary intelligentsia interprets itself as the tool of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Dominating classes are not usually very keen on promoting the development of class consciousness. Dominating classes always promote ideologies of consensus, while dominated classes have a vested interest in becoming classes for themselves and in emphasizing the conflictual nature of social relations. However, I am ready to acknowledge that class consciousness or even, more generally speaking, social consciousness in contemporary Eastern Europe exists at a very low level. Social

38 For inequalities in administrative and redistributive allocation, see Szelenyi (1978) and Ferge (1979, pp. 233–73).
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consciousness is less articulated than that in bourgeois society at a very early stage of its development. On the level of political analysis one can see this in the vulnerability of state-socialist societies when confronted with significant changes. The events of 1956 were totally unexpected in Hungary. No one was able to predict the rapid rise and fall of the "Prague Spring" or the more recent working-class opposition movements in Poland. The East European societies know less about themselves, despite fairly well-developed sociological and public opinion research, than bourgeois societies did even in times when the terms "sociology" and "opinion poll" did not exist. I would argue that the inarticulate nature of social consciousness is one of the main social and political problems East European societies are faced with today. It produces political and economic instability. It is partially responsible for the repressive political infrastructure, since the dominating class overestimates the forces which threaten its power monopoly and may feel it necessary to eliminate by administrative measure critics who in bourgeois political systems would be peacefully coopted by means of sheer "repressive tolerance." On the other hand, the inarticulate nature of social consciousness is the direct product of the class formation of the intelligentsia. The fact that the intelligentsia for the first time in the history of mankind is becoming a dominating social class prevents the development of opposing class ideologies, prevents the emergence of organic intellectuals of oppressed classes. Bourgeois society was able to produce conflicting class ideologies because intellectuals, the potential ideologues, occupied an intermediary position between two basic classes and could become organic intellectuals of one or the other of them. The fact that the intelligentsia is not a class in capitalist society, but only a stratum (and this means that intellectuals do not have a system of interests antagonistic to other major components of the social structure), is the precondition for the development of class consciousness. It is a precondition of the development of the proletariat as a class for itself. As the principle which legitimates the claim of the intellectuals to power becomes the main principle of legitimation of social and economic power in society, the intelligentsia loses its potential to produce organic intellectuals of the dominated classes. It only promotes ideologies which are in its own basic class interest, the most important being the ideology of classlessness.

The state-socialist redistributive economy represents a new system of economic exploitation. Under this economic system the immediate producer has no more control over the product of his labor than the worker in a capitalist economy. But in state-socialist societies the cultural deprivation of the working class is probably more serious than the economic—the worker is deprived not only of the products of his labor, but also of his social identity. Curiously enough, one of the first measures of the so-called dictatorship of the proletariat was the abolition of all working-class organizations.
The authorities outlawed not only political organizations such as parties, trade unions, and youth groups, but even workers' choirs and hiking clubs. Since the working class has ultimate power in society—argued the official ideologues of state socialism—there is no longer any need for specifically worker organizations. The trade unions were transformed into worker-management corporations (in all East European societies managerial and engineering staff belong to the same union as workers), and the same logic was applied to "innocent" cultural and sporting organizations or clubs.

Not only are the workers deprived of the opportunity to associate with their fellow workers, but their quest for identity as workers is also continuously questioned. The worker is replaced with an ideological notion, that of the proletariat—the worker who is aware of his historical mission. The worker finds himself labeled as "petty bourgeois" or "lumpen proletariat" if he tries to live up to his immediate values and aspirations, and he is accused of lacking proletarian consciousness. The empirically identifiable values, aspirations, and ways of life of the actual physical workers are confronted with the ideals of "socialist man," who socially and in class terms is a faceless creature devised by Soviet Marxist ideologues. If someone were to analyze carefully the ideal type of socialist man—a test still to be done—he would find striking similarities with the values and tastes of the high-brow upper middle class of any advanced industrial society. Socialist man should read books, listen to music, be dressed like, and behave with his children as doctrinaire left-wing academics do. If a semiskilled factory laborer in Prague does not match this ideal, then he should be ashamed of himself. State-socialist society does not permit self-identification in terms of position in the social structure. One cannot be proud of being a worker or peasant: the cultural image is a homogeneous one, and conflicting or competing values simply do not exist. There is only a single hierarchy of values.

The ideology of classlessness of state socialism could not suppress all expressions of working-class consciousness. Haraszti's powerful book *A Worker in a Worker's State* (1977) offers convincing evidence of the existence of a significant degree of "class identity" and "conflict consciousness," to use Michael Mann's terminology, among workers. The workers Haraszti worked with in the Red Star Tractor Factory in Budapest could draw as clear a distinction between a "we" and a "they" as any "traditional worker" can under capitalism. Haraszti found that a strong identity among blue-

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39 Michael Mann distinguishes among four elements of consciousness—identity, opposition, totality, and alternative. According to Mann, these four elements are separate in reality and any can occur without the others. However, he claims that revolutionary class consciousness can develop only if all four elements are present in the consciousness of the working class (1973, pp. 68–73).

40 The development of workers' consciousness of class identity and even of some perception of opposition and totality is powerfully argued by Haraszti in his discussion of
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collar workers on the production line was reinforced by a perception of an antagonism between workers and all those who work in the office rather than on the shop floor. "They" were the enemy. It is worth noting that for the workers Harasztı described, this "enemy" was not only high-level management but included the lowest echelons of salaried supervisory personnel: the night guard who searched the workers at the factory gate after their shifts was one of "them," was also an enemy. Harasztı empirically identified a perception by the workers of a dichotomic class structure in the Red Star Tractor Factory, a strong feeling of identity among blue-collar workers and an ability to perceive the conflictual nature of class relations. What Harasztı could not document, in Michael Mann's terminology, was a sense of class totality; the vision of an "alternative" was rather naive. From the Harasztı study we can establish the existence of a conflict consciousness, but we still do not have proofs of the existence of a class consciousness.

The recent events in Poland, especially since August 1980, are of major importance for the understanding of class dynamics under state socialism. Since August 1980 one can find signs of development of a consciousness among the Polish working class which may point beyond a simple class identity and conflict consciousness. In orthodox Marxist language, one can suggest the transition from a "trade union consciousness" to "class consciousness" among the Polish working class during August 1980. It would be premature even to attempt to offer a full analysis of the present Polish struggles; without aspiring to draw far-reaching conclusions, I would like to

how workers distinguish between "we" and "they": "They, them theirs: I don't believe that anyone who has ever worked in a factory... can be in any doubt about what these words mean. In every place of work... them means the same thing: the management, those who give orders and take the decisions, employ labour and pay wages, the men and their agents who are in charge. The word lumps together those whom one knows and those whom one does not know, those whom one likes and those whom one hates, the foreman with whom one is on friendly terms, the design engineer whom one addresses formally, the manager whom one approaches with obsequious respect, the secretaries, the time-keepers, the inspectors, the factory journal and the guards. Although we mainly talk about factory matters, them transcends the walls of the factory and encompasses... everything which is above, far away, outside the power of whoever is speaking... I have also worked in offices in which, just like here, they had directors and subordinates, some of whom were privileged and others on low salaries... But nowhere, except among factory workers, have I heard this absolute them, peremptory, exact, and crystal clear. This usage not only differentiates industrial workers from others, even within the factory it traces a subtle demarcation line between the majority and those whose posts and qualifications are such that they lost sight of the distance which divides the common destiny: dropping them is the first sign that someone really wanted to start climbing the ladder" (Harasztı 1977, pp. 71–72).

For rich documentation of the Polish events see the special issue of L'Alternative (no. 7), November–December 1980. This special issue published the full text of the "Information Bulletin" of the Solidarity movement from August 23, 1980, until August 31, 1980 (L'Alternative 1980). For an interesting theoretical analysis see Arato (1981).
point to a few interesting new elements in the development of class consciousness of the Polish working class.

It is of theoretical importance that the first six of the 21 demands formulated by the Solidarity movement on August 24, 1980 (L’Alternative 1980, pp. 14–15), are political, and only the rest can be called “normal” trade union demands. It is probably even more important that the very first demand is for unions which are independent from management, which are genuine organizations of workers rather than worker-management corporations. The striking workers of the Gdansk shipyard put the “question of organization” first in this list of demands, before the trade union issues. In fact, in the agreements later reached with the government, Solidarity compromised on many trade union–type demands but was unwilling to compromise on the question of organization. Under some government pressure, Solidarity accepted that the unions are not political in nature (L’Alternative 1980, p. 44) and agreed that the movement would not play the role of a political party. But this concession was significantly less than the acceptance of a “proper trade union” role for Solidarity. The intention of the Polish Communist Party and government was to limit the activities of Solidarity to “bread and butter” issues, but—as Kania, the first secretary of the Polish CP, noted with disquiet—with the establishment of Solidarity Poland moved rather toward a “dual power” system (Arato 1981). It is probably true that, in the early stages at least, when Solidarity was virtually identical with the striking shipbuilders of Gdansk and had not become an occupationally highly heterogeneous body, the movement’s main aim was not to challenge the existence of the Party and/or the government. Even the issue of the composition of the Party and government appears to be secondary. The main objective was to establish the “countervailing power” of workers. The editors of the “Information Bulletin” of Solidarity expressed this in the following way in their declaration dated August 28, 1980: “Malheureusement certaines pertes dues à la mauvaise gestion... ne pourront être récupérées.... Nous ne cherchons pas de coupables.... Il s’agit avant tout de créer les conditions qui garantiront la non-reproduction de ces pertes. Cela sera possible quand le monopole du pouvoir ne sera plus transformé par ce pouvoir en monopole de l’intelligence, du savoir et de la rationalité. On ne pourra y parvenir sans décentraliser le pouvoir, sans créer les conditions qui permettront l’utilisation du savoir professionnel des savants et l’intelligence collective de la classe ouvrière” (L’Alternative 1980, p. 29).

What the movement is seeking to achieve, therefore, is not a change of personnel in the existing power structure, but a new system of power in which the “collective intelligence of the working class” can be utilized side by side with the professional knowledge of scholars. According to the authors of the declaration, the decentralization of power, the reform of the
planning system (and a "better utilization of the professional knowledge of scholars"), is necessary, but not sufficient. In addition to decentralization of the planning system, they insist that the right of the producers to dispose of the products of their labor be respected. In the wording of the declaration: "Nous faisons confiance aux militants sociaux et aux spécialistes qui insistent sur la nécessité de réformes fondamentales dans le système de planification et de gestion de l'économie. . . . Cela n'est certes pas facile . . . mais il faut entamer le processus de changement . . . en créant les conditions d'une authentique participation de tous ceux qui travaillent et qui ont le droit d'attendre des effets de leur activité, à l'élaboration du destin de notre pays" (L'alternative 1980, p. 29). Unlike Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, where the opposition was initiated and led by sections of the intelligentsia, in Poland in 1980 the movement emerged from the working class directly. Unlike 1970 and 1976, in 1980 the Polish workers were no longer willing to restrict their struggles to bread-and-butter issues; they moved beyond conflict consciousness, and one can identify elements of class consciousness in their actions. In this sense Poland in 1980–81 represents an important further stage in the unfolding of the new class structure of state socialism.

But even in the light of the Polish events of 1980–81 the analyst can identify only elements of this new class structure: the new class regulations and the new dominant class of state socialism are still in the making, still in statu nascendi.

As I proposed above, the new relations between the rulers and ruled will appear in class relations only after the political and economic instance becomes relatively separated, after civil society gains a significant autonomy from the political state.

As long as the civil society is penetrated by the totalitarian political state, all political movements in Eastern Europe will aim first at the establishment of basic civil liberties. The Polish working class—and the workers of other East European nations—obviously cannot articulate successfully the interests of workers' self-determination as long as basic civil liberties are not guaranteed to all, as long as at least a relative autonomy of civil society from the political state is not achieved. Both the rationalization of the central planning and management of the economic (and cultural-political) system and the aspiration to workers' self-determination require the relative autonomy of civil society, guarantees of civil liberties. At this stage it appears that the only conflict is the one between the state and civil society, between the "powers" and "society." The central thesis of this essay is that, as the relative autonomy of civil society is achieved, this ideologically constructed facade of consensus of the whole society against the powers disappears, and the new and now class type of conflict between intelligentsia and the working class becomes obvious.
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In a sense this paper does not therefore reject Djilas. Djilas offered a theory that probably accurately described the agents who first held power under state socialism, under the conditions of total penetration of civil society by a totalitarian state. Under these circumstances—under Stalinism—state socialism indeed is dominated by the party and state apparatus. Unlike Djilas, I would not call this apparatus a class, since I could not locate it in an identifiable economic structure. My main claim is that during the last 20 years, since the publication of Djilas's work, profound changes have taken place under state socialism. Stalinist economic voluntarism is gradually replaced with a more rationalized system of planning whose claim to be "scientific" must be taken more seriously, and there has been some tendency toward an increase in the autonomy of civil society. As these processes continue the circle of the power holders gradually opens up, the power monopoly of the party and state apparatus declines. The apparatchiks gradually begin to share power with the intellectuals, and the power of apparatchiks is gradually replaced with the class power of the intelligentsia. My claim is that, while Djilas accurately identified the power holders prior to the 1960s, since then analysts have noted the emergence of a genuinely new class of intelligentsia. This intelligentsia is broader than the "new class" of Djilas, and it is also more clearly of a class nature. As one can see from the example of Poland in 1980–81, and especially from the events following the imposition of martial law on December 13, 1981, these apparatchiks still hold on to their power. But in this later stage of development of state-socialist societies we can already see what Djilas could not notice in the late 1950s: the replacement of a conflict between the apparatchiks and the society by conflicts between a new dominant class of intelligentsia and the working class as the most likely outcome of political and economic developments in contemporary Eastern Europe.

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